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PREFACE
This essay is the explication of an idea through the
exploration of a relationship.

The idea is the potential

of creativity as a mode of political being.

The emphasis

on the creative is intended to supplement and moderate
the excessively rational approach to politics that proved
catastrophically destructive in the twentieth century.
The relationship is the intellectual one between Simone
Weil and Albert Camus, each of whom considered creativity
central to their political thought.

The result is a

speculative reorientation to political phenomena the
relevance of which transcends the specific historical
circumstances in which these two thinkers wrote.
Though contemporaries and fellow participants in the
French Resistance, Weil and Camus never met.

She died in

1943 and Camus discovered her work in the waning days of
the Occupation.

Instantly moved by this encounter, Camus

used his influence to get permission to edit and publish
editions of her works for the French publishing house
Gallimard after the war.1 Their orientations to the
world differed, but Camus admired Weil's spirituality, if

'See his notebook entries for November 1943, April
1948 and September 1950 in Camus, Notebooks 1942-1951.
translated by Justin O'Brien (New York: Paragon House,
1991) at pages 93, 194, 265 and 267. See also Herbert
Lottman, Albert Camus: A Biography (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday, 1979).
iii
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not its Christian tenor, and occasionally turned to her
work for inspiration.2

In one significant instance,

Camus requested permission from her family to visit her
old room before going to accept the Nobel Prize for
Literature he received in 1957.3

Despite these

biographical linkages, however, there is no extended
study of the intellectual relationship of Weil to Camus,
let alone a study of the importance of that relationship
to political thought in general.

She appears but a few

times in biographies of Camus, while he is rarely
mentioned in the available biographies of Weil.
Among the reasons this relationship is so
infrequently explored is the apparent incompatibility
between the intensely religious, even mystical character
of Weil's thought and the absurdist tenor of Camus's
work.

Camus's interest in her work belies these apparent

differences.

While editing Weil's writings, Camus found

that her work clarified his thinking on important matters
and he discovered that they shared close, complementary
conceptions of the dilemmas of modern politics.

2See especially, Fred Rosen, "Marxism, Mysticism and
Liberty: The Influence of Simone Weil on Albert Camus,"
Political Theory 7:3 (1979) discussed at length below.
3See Camus, "Extract from a Letter to Mme. Selma
Weil," in L'Express February 11, 1960 and his unsigned
Preface to L'Enracinement fThe Need for Roots) in Camus,
Essais (Paris: Gallimard), 1700-1702.
iv
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Many accounts of Weil's life and thought deemphasize
her political thought as merely derivative of her more
significant spiritual considerations.4 Weil, educated a
neo-Platonist, viewed the spiritual and the political as
parts of an integrated whole.5

For the philosophically

trained and deeply spiritual Weil, politics, like every
other human endeavor, should be conducted in adherence to
the Platonic conception of the "good."6 Recognizing the
4See as representative examples Diogenes Allen,
Three Outsiders; Pascal. Kierkegaard. Simone Weil
(Cambridge: Cowley Press, 1983) ; David Anderson, Simone
Weil (London: SCM Press, 1977); Robert Coles, Simone
Weil: A Modern Pilgrimage (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,
1987) ; Marie-Magdalene Davy, The Mysticism of Simone Weil
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1951); Janet Little, Simone Weil:
Waiting on Truth (Oxford: Berg, 1988), and Eric Tomlin,
Simone Weil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954).
5More balanced accounts include, Jacques Cabaud,
Simone Weil. A Fellowship in Love (New York: Harvill,
1965) ; Mary Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine: The
Social and Political Thought of Simone Weil (New Jersey:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1989); John Dunaway, Simone Weil
(Boston: Twayne Publishing, 1984) ; John Heilman, Simone
Weil: An Introduction to Thought (Waterloo: Wilfrid
Laurier University Press, 1982); David McLellan, Utopian
Pessimist: The Life and Thought of Simone Weil (New
York: Poseidon Press, 1990); Simone Petrement, Simone
Weil: A Life, translated by R. Rosenthal (New York:
Pantheon, 1976); Richard Rees, Simone Weil: A Sketch for
a Portrait (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966) ; Eric
Springstead, Simone Weil and the Suffering of Love
(Cambridge: Cowley, 1986); Peter Winch, Simone Weil:
The Just Balance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989), and the essays in Richard Bell (ed.), Simone
Weil's Philosophy of Culture: Readings Toward a Divine
Humanity Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Especially instructive is Iris Murdoch's
understanding of Weil's use of "the good." See Murdoch,
The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Schocken Books, 1971)
v
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good as the source of political value was critical for
Weil, but making decisions according to that good
remained problematic.

She attempted to mask the

difficulty by adherence to a self-professed "intellectual
rigor," but as her later writings on political matters
indicate, this rigor tended to restrict her political
vision.7
The absurdist tone of Camus's work has been a
similar obstacle to taking his political thought
seriously.

While very few try to argue that he is an

existentialist of the Sartrean type, some find it
difficult to get beyond Camus's use of the absurd as the

where she concludes that (104) "Simone Weil tells us that
the exposure of the soul to God condemns the selfish part
of it not to suffering but to death. The humble man
perceives the distance between suffering and death. And
although he is not by definition the good man perhaps he
is the kind of man who is most likely of all to become
good."
Murdoch's debt to Weil continues into her later
work. See Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (New
York: Penguin, 1993).
7Weil's frail constitution made her a liability in
the Resistance movement during World War II. In London
in 1943, Weil was charged with drafting a document
expressing a vision of postwar France compatible with the
views of the Free French and rid of the errors of the
Third Republic which died unmourned in 1940. There is
little doubt that the Free French gave her this task
because of their regard for her intellect, but they also
did it to keep her out of harm's way on the continent.
Whatever their motive, she took the task very seriously.
The result was her only book-length essay The Need for
Roots, translated by Arthur Wills (New York: Putnam,
1952).
vi
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starting point of his inquiry.8

His embrace of the

absurd leads to a protracted concern with suffering and
death, but his response is a rebellion of limits.9
Camus's vision was grounded in a sense of the commonality
of human experience, the sameness of the human condition:
to paraphrase two of his early characters, "We die and we

8See Lev Braun, Witness of Decline: Albert Camus
Moralist of the Absurd (Rutherford, New Jersey:
Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1974) ; David Denton, The
Philosophy of Albert Camus: A Critical Analysis (Boston:
Prime, 1967) ; Thomas Hanna, The Thought and Art of Albert
Camus (Chicago: Regnery, 1958) ; Donald Lazere, The
Unique Creation of Albert Camus (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1973); Patrick McCarthy, Camus (New
York: Random House, 1982); and Joseph McBride, Albert
Camus: Philosopher and Litterateur (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1992).
9More willing to attempt, as Camus did, to
incorporate the concept of the absurd without falling
into the trap of existentialism are Germaine Bree, Camus
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964) and Camus
and Sartre: Crisis and Commitment (New York: Dell,
1972) ; John Cruikshank, Albert Camus and the Literature
of Revolt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960);
Jeffrey Isaac, Arendt. Camus and Modern Rebellion (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) and "On Rebellion
and Revolution: Albert Camus' The Rebel Reconsidered"
Dissent 36 (Summer 1989): 376-84; Albert Maquet, Albert
Camus: The Invincible Summer, translated by Herma
Briffault (New York: George Braziller, 1958); Emmett
Parker, Albert Camus: The Artist in the Arena (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1965); Roger Quilliot, Sea
and Prisons: A Commentary on the Life and Thought of
Albert Camus, translated by Emmett Parker (University,
Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1970); David
Sprintzen, Camus: A Critical Examination (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1988); and Fred Willhoite,
Bevond Nihilism: Albert Camus' Contribution to Political
Thought (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1968).
vii
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must imagine ourselves happy."10 Human happiness
entailed denying the absurdity of the human condition
through action:

saying "no" to existential despair and

saying "yes" to human life and inevitable death.

Camus's

political vision, then, the ground of his political
ethic, always erred on the side of life.
There were significant differences in emphasis and
temperament between the two thinkers.

Weil's thought

tended to be more systematically philosophical than
Camus's.

Though both were intensely spiritual, Weil was

more religiously orthodox than Camus.

She in fact longed

10This is a combination of two common themes in
Camus' early work, themes given articulation by his
Caligula who says to Helicon "Men die; and they are not
happy" in Caligula and Three Other Plavs (New York:
Vintage, 1958), page 8, and by Camus' own conclusion in
the Myth of Sisyphus (New York: Knopf, 1953 and Vintage,
1991) that we "must imagine Sisyphus happy" (123). The
themes of the inevitability of death and the necessity of
living joyfully in spite of this end continue throughout
Camus' work. In The Rebel, translated by Anthony Bower
(New York: Knopf, 1956 and Vintage, 1991) Camus writes
(250) "But rebellion, in man, is the refusal to be
treated as an object and to be reduced to simple
historical terms. It is the affirmation of a nature
common to all men, which eludes the world of power."
Camus further substantiates this commonness in
"Reflections on the Guillotine" in Resistance. Rebellion
and Death, translated by Justin O'Brien (New York:
Knopf, 1960 and Vintage, 1974). In this essay condemning
capital punishment, Camus writes (217) "There is a
solidarity of all men in error and aberration. Must that
solidarity operate for the tribunal and be denied the
accused? No, and if justice has any meaning in this
world, it means nothing but the recognition of that
solidarity; it cannot, by its very essence, divorce
itself from compassion."
viii
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for a way to join the Catholic Church; she referred to it
as "the Christian community."

Camus could not bring

himself to entertain organized religion as a serious
personal option.

Weil believed that justice could only

issue as a product or manifestation of divine grace at
work in the world.

Camus too believed justice required

"grace," but he denied a divine component to grace,
insisting that grace and, therefore, justice could only
be generated by and among human beings.
Despite the differences, Camus found in Weil a
kindred spirit and this kinship had implications for his
political thought.

To begin with, Camus shared her overt

hostility to abstractions.

Preoccupied with the concrete

problems of social and political order, both questioned
the adequacy of abstract formulations as responses to the
complexity of those problems.

Camus made use of Weil's

model of functional oppression and relied on her account
of factory work in fleshing out the consequences of
modern social arrangements for the human spirit.

They

shared a concern for the plight of the worker, each
having an early enthusiasm for revolutionary syndicalism
and the trade union movement.

Marx's desire for the

union of intellectual and manual labor appealed to both
thinkers while neither could embrace Marx's revolutionary
methods.
ix
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Few studies have explored this unlikely intellectual
relationship.

Of those that do, most focus on the

spirituality the two seem to share.11 Two identify the
relationship as having a political dimension.

Fred Rosen

seeks direct corrolations between the elements of their
thought and the ultimate influence of Weil on Camus.12
He finds that Camus adopted her critique of Marxism and
gleaned from her work his idea of the rebel as artisan.
Camus's conception of the rebel-artisan, Rosen concludes,
was inadequate and while there were connections, the
chief value of the comparison is that the two thinkers
maintained their integrity while seeking different routes
to individual authenticity.

For present purposes, the

value of Rosen's work is that it does identify the
importance of art and work to the political thought of
both Weil and Camus.

Rosen's work will be of special

interest in Chapter Three of this study where work and
art are interrogated for their commonly-held creative
elements.

11See Stewart Sutherland, Faith and Ambiguity
(London: SCM Press, 1984) especially "Chapter 4: Simone
Weil and Albert Camus;" and John Dunaway "Estrangement
and the Need for Roots: Prophetic Visions of the Human
Condition in Albert Camus and Simone Weil," Religion and
Literature 17:2 (Summer 1985).
12Fred Rosen, "Marxism, Mysticism and Liberty: The
Influence of Simone Weil on Albert Camus," Political
Theory 7:3 (1979).
x
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Roy Pierce's history of twentieth century French
political thought also identifies the relationship of
Weil's thought to Camus's as an important one.13

Weil,

Pierce argues, tried to unmask language to reveal prosaic
realities beneath the surface of appearances.

At the

same time, she used a "functional sociology" to try to
make sense of human relationships, ultimately relying on
the power of grace to shed light on human motivations.
Pierce's Camus finds society an abstraction with which
human beings attempt to come to grips daily.

In his

philosophical and fictional work, Camus explored the
struggle of individuals in an attempt to extract meaning
from reality through their experiences.

Pierce concludes

that Weil and Camus share too deep a concern with the
grim realities of human suffering to remain at the level
of philosophical abstraction normally associated with
political theory.
The present study proposes a different way to view
the Weil-Camus relationship and a correspondingly
different way to look at politics.

Very little further

will be said about their direct relationship; it suffices
to say that Camus knew Weil's work very well and she knew
his not at all.

What is more important is that they

13Roy Pierce, Contemporary French Political Thought
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1966).
xi
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thought about similar questions from different
perspectives and often reached strikingly similar or
complementary conclusions.

Their political thought

represents two perspectives on the dilemma of twentieth
century politics:

must political

order inevitably be

founded either upon the will of a single individual or in
an artificially homogeneous collective in which the
individual is completely subsumed?

Weil and Camus each

conclude that there is, there must be, another way.
Separately they suggest that this other way may be found
in the human capacity and need to create the lived
environment.

The same creativity that had been so

destructive in the name of "rational order" in the
twentieth century could surely be
constructive use.

turned to more

In two persistent expressions of this

need to create and humanize the environment, in art and
in a more humane approach to work, Weil and Camus each
found possibility.
This essay will trace the critical development of
the idea of creativity in the political thought of Weil
and Camus.

The emphasis on the creative is a response to

an excessively rational approach to political reality
characterizing human existence since the Enlightenment.
Chapter One explores the reorientation to human knowing
that both thinkers believed to be a necessary prelude to
xii
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ethical political action.

The reorientation involves a

constructive integration of the imagination into the
human project of describing the world.

Chapter Two uses

Weil's categories of necessity, power, and force to
illustrate how the two thinkers described the political
world in which they lived.

These foundations

established, Chapter Three turns to an investigation of
the notion of creativity itself.

The chapter proceeds

from the assumption that work, as reconceived by both
Weil and Camus, and art share a common creative
component.

It argues that these two basic human

activities can and should be expressions of the human
encounter with the natural world.

Work and art should be

the occasion for expressing insight into the human
condition as well as for building a habitable human
environment.

Chapter Four emphasizes the way in which

creative insight is woven into their political theories
about the power of individuals, about home, about freedom
and justice.

The fifth and concluding chapter fleshes

out the strengths and weaknesses of their creative
approach to political theory.

xiii
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ABSTRACT
This essay traces the critical development of the
idea of creativity through the intellectual relationship
of Simone Weil and Albert Camus.

Members of the French

Resistance during the Second World War, Camus and Weil
never met.

Camus became enamored of her work after her

death and is largely responsible for its publication.
Camus recognized in Weil a markedly distinct, but
kindred, spirit.

Despite the apparent conflict between

her Christian mysticism and his existential orientation,
they both sought the preservation of the specifically
human in a world which, in valuing a mechanistic form of
reason, tended to objectify the human.

Their respective

political theories embrace the human creative capacity as
a dignified response to this objectification.
Creativity emerges as a basic reorientation toward
political phenomena.

The present essay argues that their

emphasis on the creative moves beyond their critiques of
totalitarianism and reveals a shared need to assert a
positive, non-dogmatic vision of political action.
Creativity embodies a temperament, extant in the work of
the artist and in a reconceived notion of labor, that
both Weil and Camus believed could be usefully applied to
the problems of modern politics.

xv i
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For both Weil and Camus, politics is the province of
individuals.

Their analyses of political reality share

concerns with preserving the creative potential of
individual human beings, creating and preserving home,
and reconciling an individual sense of freedom to a
collective sense of justice.

The difficult ethic

requires a willingness to approach political problems
imaginatively and with flexibility.
Creative politics relies upon a nearly Greek
conception of limits, in the person of the other, and in
a community's laws, traditions and mores.

Respect for

the other and for communal institutions engenders respect
for others' communal traditions.

The emergent form of

citizenship encourages individuals to find their place in
the community.

The emergent form of political rule

creates and preserves a community in which this
exploration is possible.

Weil and Camus make a

suggestion about the possibility of ethics in the
aftermath of total war.

Their work is a prelude to the

formulation of a self-consciously creative form of
citizenship.

xvii
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CHAPTER 1
KNOWING AS A PRELUDE TO POLITICS
I.

Introduction

Creating a different way of political being requires
recasting the way human beings know the political
world.1 Simone Weil and Albert Camus believed the
conduct of politics in the twentieth century reflected
the lack of modesty the pursuit of human knowledge had
exhibited since the Enlightenment.

Faith in human

reason's ability to rationalize the mysteries of nature
found its analog in a faith in that same reason's ability
to harness the mysteries of human nature and establish
rational political order.

Weil and Camus each saw that

by the 1940s the chief product of the demystification of
nature and the establishment of rational political orders
was the efficient, catastrophic destruction of human
life.

1The term "political being" is used to connote the
whole range of activities we ordinarily associate with
politics and not an ontological status. Weil and Camus
have in mind a different way of apprehending politics
that would render new approaches to political problems.
This requires an explanation of how we know.
1
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2

For thinkers like Weil and Camus, the restoration of
modesty to the conduct of the interrelated realms of
knowledge and politics meant heeding the limits native to
human beings:

the human ability to understand and the

human need to order an often arbitrary and chaotic
reality.

The epistemological considerations of Weil and

Camus reflect a larger twentieth century concern with the
nature and content of human reason, its character as
scientific and its role in modern politics.

This chapter

will show that in their considerations of human knowing,
Weil and Camus not only reveal the intellectual
environment in which they were educated but also
anticipate the work of later theorists.2
The intellectual climate of early twentieth century
Europe, of which Weil and Camus are inheritors, was

2The issue of reason's relation to politics is one
of the central problems of political theory. Among the
contemporary political theorists who are grappling with
the problem are: Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human
Interests. translated by Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1971) and Habermas, Moral Consciousness and
Communicative Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990);
Alasdair McIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984);
Thomas Spragens, The Irony of Liberal Reason (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1981) and Spragens, Reason
and Democracy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990);
Eric Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience" in
Voegelin, Anamnesis, translated and edited by Gerhart
Niemeyer (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1978),
89-115; and Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of
Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1984).
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defined by Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson.3
Nietzsche's impact on twentieth century thought cannot be
overstated.

For Nietzsche, the sovereignty of reason was

a myth, an unnatural subjugation of instinct inherited
from the ancient Greeks.4 Human reason imposes an
artificial order on the abyss of nature giving human
beings a solace which makes them weak.

Nietzsche's

response was to encourage human beings to draw on their
instinctive as well as their rational selves as a way to

3Weil's mentor Emile-Auguste Chartier (Alain) and
Camus's mentor Jean Grenier were both enamored of
Bergson. For a discussion of Weil's relationship to
Alain, see especially Simone Petrement, Simone Weil: A
Life, tr. by Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1976); Jacques Cabaud, Simone Weil: A Fellowship
in Love (New York: Channel Press, 1964). For a
discussion of Camus's relationship to Grenier, see
Herbert Lottman, Albert Camus: A Biography (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, 1979). For a more general
discussion of the intellectual climate in France in the
first half of the twentieth century, see Roy Pierce,
Contemporary French Political Thought (London and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1966).
4Nietzsche's objection to our cultural idolization
of Socratic reason is most forcefully stated in Twilight
of the Idols (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968).
Insightful renderings of Nietzsche's political thought
may be found in Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche:
Philosopher.
Psychologist, and Antichrist (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1974); Tracy Strong, Friedrich
Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1975); Bruce Detweiler,
Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) and Keith
Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political
Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1994).
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human fulfillment.5 Nietzsche's critique of reason
proved useful in restoring humility to human intellectual
endeavors, but his lauding of our instinctive selves at
the expense of reason opened him to dangerous
misinterpretation.
For Bergson, both Nietzschean instinct and Socratic
reason failed fully to meet human needs.

In Creative

Evolution. Bergson argued for a life force, the elan
vital. which wages an unceasing struggle with the
limitations represented by matter.6

Instinct and reason

are two ways the elan vital has made itself known.
Intellect is naturally predisposed to order chaotic
reality, while instinct naturally embraces the fluidity
of that reality.

Bergson believed that it was the

natural tendency of the elan vital to combine these two
and transcend them at the same time.

The manifestation

of this overcoming is what Bergson calls intuition, a
self-consciously, disinterested instinct.

Though

Bergson's influence had dwindled by the time Weil and
Camus wrote, the idea of the intuition as a supplement to

5Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals,
translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New
York: Vintage Books, 1989).
6Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, translated by
Arthur Mitchell (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1911)
and Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion,
translated by W. H. Carter (New York: H. Holt and
Company, 1956).
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and mediator of the ordering power of reason and the
passion of instinct was very powerful and proved central
to their recasting of human knowing.7
The similarities and differences in the thought of
Weil and Camus are manifest in their considerations of
human knowing.

Both understood human knowledge as

derived from human experience; human experience may be
articulated by laws of force, matter and motion.

This

articulation had limits, however, as knowledge could not
protect us from human suffering.

For Camus, suffering

was evidence of the absurdity of the human condition.

He

took the absurd, then, as the beginning of all human
inquiry.

Weil gave the human condition, including

suffering, a metaphysical origin which she calls
decreation.

In the act of creation, God abdicates a part

of being, turning created reality over to the laws of
force, matter and motion before withdrawing.

It is

critical for Weil's theory of knowing that God has been
here, but has withdrawn, leaving a residue of the divine,
grace, which human beings may access.

For Camus, God's

presence or absence is of no consequence.

It is what

human beings make of their own existence that counts.
Most importantly, once we move beyond the issue of God,

7See Pierce's "Introduction” to Contemporary French
Political Thought.
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both Weil and Camus embrace justice, beauty and truth as
evidence of something that transcends the human
condition.
Scholarly readings of the two thinkers turn on the
character of their understandings of how human beings
know.

Several Weil scholars, including Mary Dietz and

Jacques Cabaud, divide Weil's thought into two periods:
an early rationalistic or instrumentalist period and a
later moral or mystical period.8

The advantage of such

a reading is that it renders intelligible the shifts in
emphasis from her earlier to her later writings.

But

such a reading also exaggerates those shifts and makes it
difficult to see the continuities in Weil's thought from
her earlier to her later writings.

By grounding her

epistemology in her later conception of decreation at the
outset, I hope to follow the lead of J. P. Little and
avoid the difficulty.9

Weil's early writings on Marx

8See Mary Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine:
The Social and Political Thought of Simone Weil (New
Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1989); Gabriella Fiori,
Simone Weil: An Intellectual Biography (Atlanta:
University of Georgia Press, 1989); Cabaud, A Fellowship
in Love; and Pierce, "Simone Weil: Sociology, Utopia and
Faith," in Contemporary French Political Thought among
others.
9J. P. Little, "Simone Weil's Concept of
Decreation," in Richard H. Bell, editor, Simone Weil's
Philosophy of Culture: Readings Toward a Divine Humanity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 25-50.
See also Eric Springstead, Simone Weil and the Suffering
of Love (Cambridge: Cowley Press, 1986).
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are concerned with the excessively rationalistic tone of
Marx's inheritors, but even earlier in her dissertation
Weil is concerned with the lack of a spiritual component
in modern science and epistemology.

That she does not

have the language for this until later in her career
seems more a matter of intellectual growth than of
irreconcilable inconsistency.

Weil's writings throughout

her career, whether in the context of epistemology and
science, factory work, religion, or politics, are replete
with a concern for the spiritual well-being of humankind.
By retaining the spiritual component, Weil sought to
counter modernity's understanding of the nature and
limits of reason.
Camus took the absurd as his ethical and
intellectual starting point.

Camus scholars are divided

over the role of the absurd in his thought.

Some

emphasize the pervasive indifference of absurdity that
hangs over everything Camus wrote.10

Recently scholars

like David Sprintzen and Jeffrey Isaac, building on the
earlier work of Germaine Bree, have begun exploring

10See for example, Lev Braun, Witness of Decline:
Albert Camus. Moralist of the Absurd (Rutherford, New
Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1974) ; Thomas Hanna,
The Thought and Art of Camus (Chicago: Regnery Press,
1958); Joseph McBride, Albert Camus: Philosopher and
Litterateur (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); and
Lyman Sargent, "Camus: The Absurdity of Politics," in
Barber, et. al., editors, The Artist and Political Vision
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, 1982), 87-115.
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whether Camus was trying to fashion a way of existence
that would reflect his own love of the sun and the sea; a
way of being in which beauty, truth, and justice were
striven for without the illusion of their final
attainment.11

In all human endeavors, as this essay

will demonstrate, this striving was the point.

In all

human endeavors, the false sense of the possibility of
attainment was the trap Camus wished to avoid.
Camus and Weil both believed that post-Enlightenment
thought confused reason with truth.

This chapter will

explore their separate inquiries into this problem.
Given the frequently random substance of human
experience, both believed that truth claims in the realm
of human knowing were inevitably exaggerated.

This

exaggeration had devastating social and political
consequences.

Their twin conceptions of reality as

chaotic and articulable by laws of force, matter and
motion made them see that any description of human
knowing must take account of the unexpected in order to
be viable.

Weil and Camus separately concluded that

embracing a limited intuitive or imaginative component as
part of human knowing was the necessary antidote for an

11Germaine Bree, Camus (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, 1964); David Sprintzen, Camus: A Critical
Examination (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1988); and Jeffrey Isaac, Arendt. Camus and Modern
Rebellion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
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excessively logical conception of reason.

Embracing this

imaginative component was also the first step to a more
creative way of political being.
II.

Simone Weil:

Decreation and Human Knowing

Simone Weil grounds her theory of human knowing in
her ontology.
"decreation.1,12

She called her conception of being
For Weil, decreation is a way of

conceiving created existence.

God's act of creating the

reality that humans now inhabit was one of abdication on
His part.

In her essay on "The Pythagorean Doctrine,"

Weil argues that in the act of creation God "abandons a
bit of being to what is other than himself.
renunciation by love."13

Creation is

Creation is God's giving form

to matter, thus bringing order out of chaos.

Creation,

then, is a renunciation by God of part of Himself as
being.

God retains decreated being, that part of being

which He comprises.

What remains in created reality

consists of necessity or a material existence ruled by

12This section is indebted to the analysis of
Little, "Weil's Concept of Decreation," in Bell, Weil's
Philosophy of Culture. Weil describes the process of
decreation, though she does not use the term there, in
First and Last Notebooks, translated by Richard Rees
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 211-217.
13Simone Weil, Intimations of Christianity Among the
Greeks, translated by E.C. Geissbuhler (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), 182-183. See also Weil,
On Science. Necessity and the Love of God, translated by
Richard Rees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10

the laws of matter and motion.

Political existence takes

place in created reality, in the realm of an indifferent
necessity, but the insights that Weil brings to our
understanding of political reality derive from her grasp
of the decreated part of reality, the residue of God's
abdication that remains in created reality.
The soul of the human being is composed of two parts
roughly corresponding to the two levels of reality:
decreated and the created.
uncreated part of the soul.

the

The first is the divine and
This part is the residue of

God's presence which forms the core of our being.

The

decreated part of the soul is the locus of the faculty of
the supernatural in human beings.

It corresponds to and

is the potential receptacle of what Weil calls "grace."
The second, much larger part is the natural and created
part of the soul.

This is the carnal part of the soul

that sins and is susceptible to the "gravity" of created
existence.

If the created part of the soul remains true

to itself, it experiences that sin as suffering.

Through

a mystical reflection on God's original act of
abdication, it is possible for the carnal part of the
soul to transfer the suffering derived from sin to the
eternal part of the soul which, being innocent, suffers
and thereby absolves the natural part of the soul.

Most

human beings have this mystical capacity, but few follow
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the path and no one completes the mystical journey across
the chasm of time that separates the two parts of the
soul.

Human beings are thus creatures of a dual nature

who must live between the two parts of the soul.14
Sense experience restores the balance between the
two parts of the soul.

Through the body human beings

know the created world and recognize themselves as part
of that world.

For Weil, evil is the distance between

the two parts of the soul, between the decreated and the
created.

Embracing decreation suppresses this distance

by sacrificing the autonomous self.

The created being

cannot be the locus of truth, so for Weil there is a
fundamental incompatibility between the autonomous self
and the truth.15

Recognizing the human incapacity to

know truth is a prerequisite to the openness required to
experience truth.

This openness to truth requires

renouncing the "I" that is the conceit of created human
being.

Only by this renunciation can human beings

replicate God's initial abdication ("decreation") and
rise above the personal to the level of the "impersonal."
This conception of the "impersonal" is critical as it is
the prerequisite for ethical action in created reality.

14The insight of Little in "Weil's Concept of
Decreation," in Bell, editor, Weil's Philosophy of
Culture.
15Ibid.
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For Weil, everything that is personal is sin, all that is
impersonal, like truth, beauty, and justice is sacred.16
The sacred is the ground of Weil's ethics.

It points to

the other, beyond the personal, to something shared by
human beings.17
The "impersonal" is the perspective required to
"know" anything.

Rising to the impersonal means

acquiring the ability to see aided by the decreated part
of the soul.

Knowledge is a question of negotiating our

existence between the created and decreated levels of
reality.

Human beings must live in created reality, but

cannot do so without using the wisdom available to them
through contact, however limited, with decreated reality.
Knowing the difference between the created and the
decreated is a question of discerning the relationship
between "gravity" and "grace."18 Recall that created
existence takes place in the realm of the laws of matter
and motion.

Gravity, for Weil, is the most telling of

those laws.

"All the natural movements of the soul," she

writes, "are controlled by laws analogous to those of

16Simone Weil, "Human Personality," in Selected
Essays. 1934-1943. translated by Richard Rees, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1962), 15-16.
17Ibid.
18Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, translated by
Arthur Wills (New York: Putnam, 1952) .
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physical gravity.

Grace is the only exception."19 In

created reality, "we always expect things to happen in
conformity with the laws of gravity, unless there is
supernatural intervention."20 This supernatural
intervention is experienced as grace.
requires recognizing the supernatural.

Acting on grace
"Two forces rule

the universe," she writes, "light and gravity."21
Gravity's pull can be inexorable.

For Weil, the

supernatural bathes all that humans can know in its
light.

They need only pay heed to the perspective it

offers, the perspective of the impersonal.
The lack of "attention" to the supernatural forms
the core of Weil's critique of human knowing.

Paying

appropriate attention, drawing upon the decreated,
requires reintroducing human intuition and a certain
conception of imagination into legitimate human inquiry.
Beginning with her dissertation, Weil's epistemology
lamented an inappropriate, excessively logic-driven
understanding of human reason, the shunning of human
intuition by modern science and the distance that science
put between itself and what she understood as "common

19Ibid., 45.
20Ibid.
21Ibid.
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wisdom."22 Weil took modern science as representative
of our attitudes toward knowledge, so it bore the brunt
of her epistemological attack.

At the same time, it is

in the realm of science, properly understood as reason
taking intuition seriously, that Weil posited human
possibilities.
M o d e m science lays claim to an objectivity which it
cannot possibly possess.23 The impersonal does not mean
objectivity as we understand it.

Modern objectivity bred

an indifference to the subjects of knowledge that had
proven destructive.

Weil wrote: "Indifferent things

remain forever indifferent;

it is the divine things

which, by refusing love, acquire a diabolic efficacy."
There was something diabolic "in the indifference which,
since the Renaissance, science has shown for the
spiritual life."24

In its arrogant indifference,

science had ceased to appreciate its own nature.

Science

is worthless to humanity if it is imprisoned in the realm
of observable nature for "it belongs to it only by its
results and practical applications, but not by its

22Simone Weil, "Science and Perception in
Descartes," in Weil, Formative Writings. 1929-1941.
translated by Dorothy McFarland and Wilhelmina Van Ness
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987).
aWeil, Gravity and Grace. 105.
24This and previous quote in Weil, "The Pythagorean
Doctrine," in Intimations of Christianity. 171.
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inspiration; for in science, as in art, all true novelty
is the work of genius; and true genius, unlike talent, is
supernatural.1,25 True genius can flourish only on the
level of the impersonal.

These claims, refined in a

later essay on "The Pythagorean Doctrine," have their
genesis in Weil's dissertation on "Science and Perception
in Descartes.1,26
Human beings, Weil argued in her dissertation, begin
with no knowledge except "consciousness of self and
perception of the world."27

There is a higher knowledge

than that attained through the ordinary investigative
functioning of the senses.

Weil called this intuited

knowledge "simple ideas" or "common wisdom."

Though

intelligible, such knowledge is often inexplicable.

For

example, to know seven is a prime number does not explain
why this should be so.

In Weil's thought, the elegant

25Ibid.
26Weil's dissertation has
for its historical inaccuracy
Descartes. Leon Braunschvig,
thesis, gave her a ten out of
give her and still pass her.
66 .

been roundly criticized
and its depiction of
for whom she wrote the
twenty, the lowest he could
See Petrement, Simone Weil.

27Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes," in
Formative Writings. 31. See the discussions in Peter
Winch, Simone Weil; "The Just Balance" (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), especially Chapter 2
"The Cartesian Background" and David McLellan, Utopian
Pessimist: The Life and Thought of Simone Weil (New
York: Poseidon Press, 1990), 26ff.
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simplicity of "simple ideas" borders on a conception of
self-evidence.

Modern science denigrates itself by not

trusting these "simple ideas."

The obfuscation of simple

ideas, Weil argues, is the critical error of modern
science.

"One cannot explain simple ideas," Weil writes,

"which are understood from the start and in themselves
without obscuring them, for if one wants to explain them,
either one explains something else under their name, or
the explanation makes no sense."28

The very self

evidence of simple ideas reveals them as the products of
the human encounter with the world, as representations of
the world to be distinguished from the world itself.
distinction is critical:

The

simple ideas exist in relation

to our minds, not as the fabric of the world.
Weil found this distinction lost on modern science,
trapped as it was in the language of mathematics.

Modern

science failed to remember the sumbolic function of that
language.

Weil believed that the language of

mathematics, especially in geometry and physics, was
well-suited not only to expressing but also to
understanding simple ideas.

In geometry, Weil found a

purely mental activity dealing almost exclusively with
relationships between forms, that is, relationships

28Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes" in
Formative Writings. 52.
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between representations of intuited reality.29
Geometry, with its lines, figures, and angles, all
representing the inexplicable, accepts intuitions as real
and articulable.

This articulation or representation

leaves these forms open to human interrogation.

Intuited

knowledge, that which we cannot express rationally except
through representational symbols, becomes the object of
rational investigation by anyone who cares to learn the
techniques.

What is required to know reality is not the

secret knowledge of priests, but rather an orientation
toward knowledge that fearlessly embraces the intuited.
In physics, Weil argued, geometry's abstract knowledge of
forms was brought to bear on the physical world through
mathematics.

If geometry made intelligible the most

abstract knowledge, then physics, the application of
number and geometry to created reality, yielded insight
into the concrete concerns of daily existence.

Physics,

by isolating the forces responsible for movement in
created reality, brought number, the abstract language of
forms, to bear on mundane reality.30

Between geometry

^Weil's discussion of geometry appears in "Science
and Perception" in Formative Writings and is also
reworked in "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of
Christianity. See Winch, The Just Balance. Chapter 7 on
"Equilibrium" and Chapter 11 on "Geometry."
30Weil believed number was the vital link between
the abstraction of geometry and the concrete concerns of
physics.' The relationship also shed light on human
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and physics, math and science rendered intelligible the
most ordinary of human insights into reality.
Modern science, charmed by its own manipulation of
the language of mathematics, lost sight of the limited
symbolic character of what it renders intelligible.
Science, Weil believed, scorns the use of "ordinary
thinking."

The result is a science that excludes

everything having to do with intuition, which no longer
admits anything into science except the most abstract
form of reasoning.

Weil argued that "this science that

arrogantly scorned intuition is reduced to expressing the
results of experience in the most general language
possible."31
science:

A contradiction thus lurks in modern

intuited reality, which can be expressed in the

simplest terms, is scorned by a science which believes
its detailed explanations are comprehensive, but, in its

inquiries into decreated reality. In Weil, "The
Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of Christianity.
164, she wrote that "The notion of real number, arrived
at by the mediation between any number and unity, was
matter for just as severe demonstration, as clear as
anything in their arithmetic, and at the same time
incomprehensible to the imagination. This notion forces
the mind to deal in exact terms with those relationships
which it is incapable of representing to itself. Here is
an admirable introduction to the mysteries of faith. . .
. By this one can conceive an order of certainty,
starting from uncertain and easily grasped thoughts about
the sensible world, proceeding to thoughts of God which
are absolutely certain and absolutely inapprehensible."
31Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes" in
Formative Writings. 33.
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mathematical formulations, must resort to the most
"general language possible."

Modern human beings live in

a world created by their knowledge, a world of selfdeception in which knowledge claims are empty in as much
as they do not acknowledge their own limitations.

This

self-deception not only inhibits science, it also hinders
the human ability to diagnose and offer remedies for
social, political and spiritual problems.

For Weil, the

lesson of modern science is that human beings must be
careful not to take representations as more real than the
reality they are intended to represent.

Modern science

has forgotten this and in so doing, forgets the limits of
its language, the language of mathematics.

This math-

driven science, by forgetting its nature as a tool of
knowledge and mistaking itself for knowledge, obscures
the simple ideas that are the core of understanding
created reality.
Implicit in her critique of modern science is Weil's
confidence in the ability of the human mind to discern
simple ideas.

A distrust of intellectual authority

accompanies this confidence and allows the mind a
Nietzschean kind of freedom, which Weil described as
"absolute."32

The cost of possessing this "absolute"

32Weil acknowledged her intellectual debt to
Nietzsche but admitted that she could not delve into his
thought without becoming physically ill. See the letter

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20

freedom, however, is the suspension of thought, for at
the moment the mind thinks about something else, it
surrenders this freedom.

This kind of intellectual

freedom entails a paradox. "Freedom is the only power
that I possess absolutely," Weil writes, "therefore,
something other than myself exists.

Since no power is

limited by itself, it is enough for me to know that my
power is not absolute to know that my existence is not
the only existence.1,33 Human thoughts and consequent
actions, to the degree that they occur on the level of
the impersonal, mediate between human beings and the rest
of existence.

To recognize this is to think properly, to

think truthfully.

Knowledge takes work.

It is each

individual's responsibility to acquire knowledge which
then can only be interpreted by that individual.

"The

authority of others can persuade me, the reasons of
others convince me, the example of others guide me," she
writes, "but I can learn only from myself."34

The light

of the supernatural must aid this self-knowing, as the
supernatural is the source of the human grasp of intuited

to her brother Andre in Weil, Seventy Letters, translated
by Richard Rees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965),
1 22 .

33Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes"
Formative Writings. 62.
34Ibid., 64.
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reality.

Self-knowledge limits human action.

Knowing

clarifies the limits of human power in the world.
limits are all a person can truly know.

Those

"I now know that

to learn to know my own power is simply to learn to
exercise it," she realizes, "thus, I recognize that
becoming learned and attaining self-mastery are the same
thing.1,35
Consideration of self-mastery takes Weil's
discussion of knowing into the realm of ethics.

Freedom

is limited by confrontation with the world so judgment,
which with proper attention can be informed by the
supernatural, is the only real human possession:
All I can do is refuse my assent to what I believe
or desire. The only thing I have that is really
mine is my judgment. I do not have sovereign power
over my thoughts; I am only their arbiter.36
This realization takes place on the level of the
impersonal.

The valid exercise of the power to judge

must disregard considerations of the "I".

The

impersonal, to the degree that it is disinterested,
reveals free will as a liability rather than a value.
Exercising power for its own sake preoccupies the human
being with created reality and thereby obscures the
decreated part of the soul.

As in the case of freedom,

35Ibid.
36Ibid., 66.
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the world weighs on free will, and human beings may
become slaves to lesser impulses.
The act of judging has an inevitable impact on the
created world.

In impersonal judgement, the world is

recognized not as something that lords over the human,
but rather as an obstacle.
exercise of power.

Acting requires a leap, the

To act is to assume full knowledge,

though this "does not give me the means to solve the most
insignificant problem having to do with anything outside
my power."37 The assumption of knowledge as a precedent
to action is Weil's Kantian inheritance.

For Weil, it

means bringing to bear all that is known in the approach
to a given difficulty.

Action requires acting in the

faith that the consequences can be known in advance.

In

this way, human beings are responsible, not only for the
consequences of their actions, but in turn for the
content of the knowledge that informs their acting.

The

implication is that action requires knowledge and on the
question of the content of our knowledge, the presence of
the supernatural is decisive.
What is the content of human knowledge?

Weil begins

to answer this question by reintroducing human intuition
to science.

In so doing she paves the way for the

reintroduction of the divine to human knowing.

Intuition

37Ibid., 67.
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poses the problem of human imagination.
impulse that requires articulation.

Intuition is an

Turning that

intuitive impulse into action requires imagination.

As

Martin Andie shows, Weil's use of imagination is
ambiguous.38 There is clearly a dangerous form of
imagination; that given over to fantasy.

At the same

time, a form of the imagination is a necessary component
of human knowledge.

"Since the world cannot teach me and

I have to instruct myself, I will go and ask oracles,"
she writes, "I will go to this third ambiguous being that
is a composite of myself and the world acting on each
other."39

It is this oracle, this mental space of

interaction between world and self, that Weil calls
imagination.

Excessive reliance on imagination is

dangerous, but renewing science by paying heed to
intuition requires taking the faculty of imagination
seriously.

Without imagination:

My impressions and my thoughts would not be all
blended together, and, outside of the certainty that
I exist, I would have neither opinions, beliefs,
prejudices, nor passions; my wisdom would be
negative, but perfect. I would be always like a

38This discussion is informed by Martin Andie,
"Discernment and the Imagination" in Bell, editor, Weil's
Philosophy of Culture. 116-149. See also Diogenes Allen,
"The Concept of Reading and the 'Book of Nature'" in the
same volume, 93-115.
39Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes" in
Formative Writings. 69.
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spectator at a badly staged play in which the storm,
riot or battle is represented in a ludicrous way.40
In other words, perception would be the sole arbiter of
fact.

The world would be a series of disconnected ideas.

But simple ideas do not constitute knowledge until they
are connected.

Human knowing without imagination could

not make the connections that constitute knowledge and
that make judgement and action in the world possible.

In

the essay on the Pythagorean doctrine Weil observes that
one and one can remain side by side throughout the
perpetuity of time; they never will make two unless
an intelligence performs the act of adding them.
Attentive intelligence alone has the power of
carrying out the connections, and as soon as that
attention relaxes, the connections dissolve. . . .
The necessary connections which constitute the very
reality of the world have no reality in themselves
except as the object of intellectual attention in
action.41
A reasoning capacity in which imagination is repressed or
ignored has the flaws of its virtues.
unbending, but thereby limited.

Its logic is

It is purely rational,

so inadequate to cope with a created reality that is
defined by contingency.

It denies the interconnection

between the world and the mind that the imagination
supplies.

For Weil, intellectual attention, the only

40Ibid., 69-70.
41Weil, "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of
Christianity. 188.
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kind worthy of the name human knowing, consists of reason
informed by intuition and imagination.
Much as imagination offers a check on reason, so
reason must check imagination, for the uncontrolled
imagination poses serious problems of its own.

Weil

writes,
In this regard the impulse that, at the slightest
creaking sound, sends me forth to re-create the
world misleads me every time. Therefore I must not
study the imagination as action, that is, in
relation to its effects, but only as thought. The
world is not outside my thought; it is above all
what is not me in me. I must not try to go out of
myself in order to define the obstacle.42
As reason concerns itself with discerning order, the
imagination values the contingency of reality.
Imagination makes it possible to accept the truth of
certain clear ideas even if their origins are not so
clearly understood.
of mathematics:

Weil illustrates using the language

"Why is seven a prime number?

nine? I don't know.

That's how it is."43

Why not

The mind

resists clear ideas because they proceed from outside the
mind, from the world through the imagination.

The mind's

ordering function is to try to explain that which it
cannot by finding resemblances between the world and the
truth of these ideas, where, by definition, no such

42Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes" in
Formative Writings. 70.
43Ibid., 72.
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resemblance exists.

The mind attempting to overcome

contingency hands itself over to contingency and
ultimately yields to superstition, passion and folly.
Human knowledge is better served if the mind accepts
clear ideas (like "prime number") for what they are, that
is, true as mysteries, as "offspring of the docile
imagination."44

Unfortunately, "our intelligence has

become so crude," Weil laments, "that we no longer
conceive that there could be an authentic, rigorous
certainty concerning the incomprehensible mysteries."45
The notion of the "clear idea" is central to Weil's
epistemology.

But a clear idea is an invitation to

investigation and is itself inadequate to constitute
knowledge.

The capacity to "know" is demonstrated only

when the mind shows it can "add a clear idea to itself
and conceive that such addition is endless."46

What is

then known is not the world, but a series of symbols
representative of some worldly phenomena.

This series

may be used as a model or plan of action for human
beings.

It can make the world intelligible and therefore

subject to human action upon it.

The question of knowing

44Ibid.
45Weil, "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of
Christianity. 165.
46 Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes" in
Formative Writings. 73.
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in the created world is intertwined with considerations
of ethics or the exercise of power vis-a-vis the world.
Weil believes that this power is real to the degree that
a plan of action embraces the limit of human ability to
act upon the world.

But there is also the problem of

acting upon a reality which cannot be grasped finally and
completely:
In the world everything is set apart from
everything, everything is unrelated to everything,
everything is neutral with respect to everything.
If there is a reason why in my thought, insofar as
it is joined to the world, nothing is immediate, it
is because in the world everything is immediate. In
short, what comes from me in movement is the fact
that it is directed; what does not come from me is
that it is extended; and what constitutes the world
is extension.47
Knowing is the mind's ordering of a chaotic created
reality.

Likewise, science is the process of the human

mind's ordering of chaotic created reality over time.
That geometry and physics conceive of the world as
extended substance, with lines, figures, number and
movements, does not mean that the world is necessarily
extended substance.

Geometry and physics, conceived as

fields of knowledge, are composed of a series of clear
ideas which once accepted and mastered make chaotic
reality intelligible.

47Ibid., 77.
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The value of geometry and physics, then, consists in
the fact that they are the most useful way for human
beings to conceptualize created reality.

Inquiry into

created reality along the lines of geometry and physics
helps human beings grasp their nature as dual beings:
"on the one hand a passive being who is subject to the
world and on the other an active being who has a grasp on
it."48

With their representational languages coalescing

on the level of mathematics, geometry and physics allow
the conceptualization of how the active and the passive
may be united.

But geometry and physics work in the

realm of thought and so do not unite these two beings in
any concrete sense.

Geometry and physics are simply the

representational presence of the world in the mind; the
mysteries they articulate remind human beings of their
relative powerlessness.

Action is the indirect

unification of the active and passive aspects of being:
Not the appearance of action through which the
uncontrolled imagination makes me blindly turn the
world upside down by means of my anarchic desires,
but real action, indirect action, action conforming
to geometry, or, to give it its true name, work.49
For Weil, work consists of methodical action, that is,
action which through imagination approaches the world as
extended substance, and brings some usable order to

48Ibid., 78.
49Ibid.
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otherwise chaotic reality.50 Work, as will be seen in
Chapter Three, is a certain form of knowing the world.
It becomes for Weil, as art is for Camus, the
intermediary between thought and action, the locus of our
judgment at work on our material existence.

To this end,

Weil is very specific on the purpose of science: "first
of all to render the human mind master, as far as
possible, of the part of the imagination that perception
leaves free, and then to give it possession of the world;
and perhaps, when these two purposes are considered
closely, they amount to the same thing."51
Weil's difficult epistemology seeks to do two
things.

First, it attempts to revalue intuition and

imagination in the process of human knowing.

To

accomplish this, she argues that intuition draws on the
decreated part of the human soul, giving limited access
to a perceived but incomprehensible higher reality.
Articulation of what is intuited through the decreated
part of the soul requires the proper use of the
imagination, not to "re-create the world," but rather to

S0Mary Dietz has begun investigating this conception
of work in "'The Slow Boring of Hard Boards': Methodical
Thinking and the Work of Politics" American Political
Science Review 88:4 (December 1994): 873-86. See also
Winch, The Just Balance.
51Weil, "Science and Perception in Descartes" in
Formative Writings. 84-85.
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gain perspective on that world.

Second, in order to

avoid an atomistic, feeling-driven epistemology, Weil
introduces geometry and physics as appropriate models of
human intellectual inquiry.

Geometry has to do with

forms, representations of reality, and making those forms
manageable in the realm of thought.
application of number to geometry.

Physics is the
It has to do with

movement, specifically, the movement of matter in the
created world, that is, in the realm of necessity.
Together, according to Weil, the methods represented by
geometry and physics offer a basis for action in the
realm of necessity, while preserving the mystery of
forms, "simple ideas," which can only be represented and
never fully explained.

Human beings exist in a created

reality of matter and necessity according to Weil.

In

our negotiating this existence, human beings have the
ability and the need to call upon the decreated part of
their souls.

At the level of decreated reality human

beings act in accordance with obedience to God.
"Necessity is for matter the intersection of obedience to
God and of the brute force which subdues creatures," Weil
wrote, "at this same level of the intersection, necessity
participates in constraint on the one hand, and on the
other participates in intelligence, in justice, in
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beauty, and in faith."52 The realm of necessity that
Weil understood as created reality was a chaotic reality
of matter and motion, but the chaos perceived reflects
the inadequacies of human perception rather than
imperfections in creation.
The human mind has an undeniable need to order that
which presents itself as chaos or contingency.

Science

represents the timeless endeavor of human beings to bring
order to that chaos.

Through science, human beings

order, even positing "laws," with a greater or lesser
degree of success depending upon human capacities, but
necessity remains unchanged:
Necessity always appears to us as an ensemble of
laws of variation, determined by fixed relationships
and invariants. Reality for the human mind is
contact with necessity. There is a contradiction
here, for necessity is intelligible, not tangible.
Thus the feeling of reality constitutes a harmony
and a mystery.53
Weil's view of created reality resembles what Camus
understands as the "absurd," for necessity is utterly
indifferent to what human beings would understand as
moral value.

The "good" and the "bad" are seldom

rewarded or punished according to what they deserve.

The

indifference of necessity to good and evil carries with

52Weil, "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of
Christianity. 187.
53Ibid., 178.
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it an ethical imperative, for necessity is the obedience
of matter to God.

The pair of contraries, necessity in

matter and liberty in human beings, have their meeting
place in that obedience, "for to be free, for us, is to
desire to obey God.

All other liberty is false."54

Action in obedience to God requires that human beings act
from the level of the impersonal.

To imitate the

indifference of necessity in obedience to God, Weil
writes, "is simply to consent to it, that is, to accept
the existence of all that exists, including the evil,
excepting only that portion of evil which we have the
possibility, and the obligation of preventing."55

What

human beings "know" is created reality, the reality of
matter:

matter that sometimes moves in regular motions,

sometimes not;

matter that appears as sometimes good and

sometimes evil.

What human beings must do is accept what

cannot be changed and change the evil that it is in their
power to change.

Weil believed human beings must know

created reality for what it is:

an ambiguous gift of

being from God.

54Ibid., 186.
55Ibid., 184.
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III.

Albert Camus:

The Absurd and Human Knowing

Albert Camus preferred the mantle of artist to that
of philosopher.

He was more concerned with how human

beings live with what they know than in discerning the
mechanism by which they know.56

Simone Weil grounded

her theory of knowing in a theory of being, in a
metaphysical conception of reality.

For Camus,

epistemology was a suspect philosophical category to the
degree that it grounded human knowing in metaphysics.
Formal epistemology was incapable of abandoning the
notion that reason could be the objective arbiter of
human knowledge and value.

Consequently, "Even the most

rigorous epistemologies imply metaphysics,11 observed
Camus in The Mvth of Sisyphus, "and to such a degree that
the metaphysic of many contemporary thinkers consists in
having nothing but an epistemology."57 In Camus's
conception of knowing, the presence of metaphysics
denigrates the often mysterious character of human
experience.

Similarly, reliance upon a narrow

56Albert Camus, Actuelles I. chronicrues 1944-48
(Paris: Gallimard, 1950), 263, quoted in Germaine Bree,
Camus. 244: "The first choice an artist makes is
precisely to be an artist, and if he chooses to be an
artist it is in what he is himself and because of a
certain idea he has of art."
57Albert Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus and Other
Essays, translated by Justin O'Brien (New York: Knopf,
1955), note 9 on page 44.
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understanding of human reason gives the human mind a
false confidence in its own control over the experienced
world, denying pre-rational experiences often critical to
the formation of character.58 The key to reclaiming the
value of knowledge lay in a renewed appreciation for
sense experience as a supplement to, not a replacement
for, that which is known rationally.

"The body's

judgment is as good as the mind's," Camus writes early in
his career.

It was critical to Camus's thought on

knowing that human beings should not forget that "we get
into the habit of living before acquiring the habit of
thinking."59
Camus undertook a thorough critique of contemporary
understandings of knowing in an effort to redescribe
knowing in a way that transcends formal reason without
falling into metaphysics.

The result is neither

epistemological nihilism nor a form of intellectual
hedonism.

He privileges the possibility of an

individual's openness to the exigencies of human

58In the manuscript he left incomplete, Camus was
beginning to explore his own pre-rational experiences
when he died. See Albert Camus, The First Man.
translated by David Hapgood (New York: Knopf, 1995).
59Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 8.
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experience which he calls "lucidity."60

The lucid

encounter with reality involves an extra-rational
cognition which allows a given experience to be viewed
from several distinct angles at once.

Ethically,

lucidity demands creative as opposed to "rational"
formulaic responses to human experience.

Camus's

conception of knowing embraces the limitations of human
reason in the face of the absurd.

It recognizes as

natural but ultimately futile the attempt to impose
totalities on chaotic reality and seeks a way to
circumvent the deleterious effects of an excessively
logical, control-oriented understanding of human reason.
Camus interrogated reality from the perspective of
the absurd.

The method he gleaned from this perspective

entailed "methodical doubt" concerning any way of
thinking that denies or ameliorates the finitude of the
human condition.61

He believed that these denials or

^Lucidity is central to Camus's argument in The
Myth of Sisyphus and is further drawn out in his later
extended essay, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt,
translated by Anthony Bower (New York: Random House,
1956), especially the chapter on creative rebellion, 253278.
61By 1951, Camus had lost interest in the term, not
to say the concept, "absurd." In an interview with
Gabriel d'Aubarede Camus said, "This word 'Absurd' has
had an unhappy history, and I confess that now it rather
annoys me. When I analyzed the feeling of the Absurd in
The Mvth of Sisyphus. I was looking for a method and not
a doctrine. I was practicing methodical doubt." The
interview is translated and reprinted in Albert Camus,
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ameliorations amounted to cheating life of its value in
favor of what may or may not come after death.

Camus

valued living, the world of the sea and sun, over somber
meditations on death and the afterlife.62
death which defined life for Camus.

But it was

The one thing human

beings know for certain is that they will die.

With this

knowledge, how and on what principles do they act?

In

his Mvth of Sisyphus. Camus formulated a preliminary
response to the problem:

"the principle can be

established that for a man who does not cheat, what he
believes to be true must determine his action."63

The

requirement of acting in accordance with the true in the
face of inevitable death defines the absurdity of our
existence, but leaves human beings nowhere to turn for
solace.

Lvrical and Critical Essays, edited by Philip Thody,
translated by Ellen Conroy Kennedy (New York: Vintage,
1968), 356.
62Camus's beautiful essays on the physical and
spiritual landscape of his native Algeria illustrate this
point vividly. See especially the essays which make up
"Nuptials" (1938) and "Summer" (1954) in Camus, Lvrical
and Critical Essays. 63-106 and 107-181. Both of Camus's
extended philosophical essays, The Mvth of Sisyphus and
The Rebel, are meditations on "artificial" (man-made)
forms of death, suicide and murder respectively, as
opposed to natural forms.
63Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 6.
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Camus saw the need for solace as a major obstacle to
human knowing.

His understanding of the absurd as a kind

of homelessness makes the problem obvious:
What, then, is that incalculable feeling that
deprives the mind of the sleep necessary to life? A
world that can be explained even with bad reasons is
a familiar world.
But, on the other hand, in a
universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights,
man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is
without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of
a lost home or the hope of a promised land. This
divorce between man and his life, the actor and his
setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity.64
Camus tries to discern how human beings can live with the
absurd sensibility that issues from this sense of
homelessness.65

The absurd sensibility also belies a

deep-rooted frustration.

This frustration, a result of

demanding answers of an intractable existence, is not
rational; it begins at the limits of rationality.
Everything begins when one asks oneself "why?" Why do we
suffer?

Why do we die?

These questions are not rational

abstractions, but felt responses to the finite human
condition.

For Camus, the way human beings handle these

basic questions determines the value of their knowledge.
The world's response to human questions about suffering
and death is a silence that awakens in human beings a
consciousness of their finitude and powerlessness.

This

^Ibid.
65Ibid., 2.
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consciousness is the source of the anxiety common to all
human beings.66 Human beings think about the fact that
they will die and recognize that they are subject to
time.

In a way of knowing that values experience, time

and living is all human beings have because they have no
direct experience of timelessness or death.

To exist,

therefore, human beings must value life in the absurd
expectation of death.
Resisting the absurdity of human existence is a
function of human reason.

In this resistance to

absurdity, however, a disjuncture between reason and
experience becomes evident.

The disjuncture is natural

and necessary in order to make sense of experience, but
making sense of experience through reason necessitates an
attempt to control reality.

In this attempt lies the

danger of relying upon reason alone to negotiate an
absurd world.

In short, the human rational capacity and

the human experience of absurdity conflict when reason
attempts to overcome the absurd.
Camus understands that rational constructs are
consoling, but they are also dangerous.

He finds no real

^Here Camus validates Sartre's feeling of "nausea,11
but, as we will see, he dismisses Sartre's response to
that feeling. Compare Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea (New
York: New Directions Press, 1964). See also Germaine
Bree, Camus and Sartre: Crisis and Commitment (New York:
Dell, 1972).
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value in an ethic dependent on an illusory reality.

The

way of knowing Camus describes allows human character to
flourish mindful of its limits without positing or
submitting to a fabricated wholeness.

Camus calls the

process of substituting a constructed reality for
experienced reality "the act of eluding."
Eluding is the invariable game. The typical act of
eluding, the final evasion . . . is hope. Hope of
another life one must "deserve" or trickery of those
who live not for life itself but for some great idea
that will transcend it, refine it, give it a
meaning, and betray it.67
Eluding, for Camus, is an act of human imagination
masquerading as reason.

It defies the limits of human

cognition and denies our shared destiny (death).

Eluding

is the rationalization of the absurd in which the human
mind attempts to gain control over that which it cannot
control.

A confluence of reason and imagination is a

prerequisite to human knowing, but must not deteriorate
into the act of eluding.
The tendency to elude derives from the mind's need
to overcome the contradictions of absurdity.

"The mind's

first step is to distinguish what is true from what is
false," Camus writes, but "as soon as thought reflects on
itself, what it first discovers is a contradiction.1168

67Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 8.
“ ibid., 16.
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The contradiction parallels the dialogue of life with
death.

The impulse is to try to explain away

contradiction, but contradiction must be accepted.
wrote:

Camus

"The mind's deepest desire, even in its most

elaborate operations, parallels man's unconscious feeling
in the face of his universe:

it is an insistence upon

familiarity, an appetite for clarity."69 The mind must
accept that certain phenomena cannot be explained
comprehensively.

The mind that cannot accept this

reality yields to the temptation of eluding.
Camus's ethical thought is a response to this
tendency to elude.

That response is neither intellectual

nor moral relativism.

In his conception of the absurd

sensibility, Camus recognizes that human knowledge would
be useless without the ability to judge or make value
distinctions.
knowledge:

For Camus, ethics is firmly grounded in

to live is to judge, and making value

distinctions is unavoidable.

It is necessary only to

remain mindful that what human beings value determines
how they value.

Camus knew the valuation of order or

totality was a direct result of the human confrontation
with the disorder of perceived reality.

Imposing

totality on the world around us is a bid to order that
world.

This is natural and appropriate within limits.

69Ibid., 17.
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"Understanding the world for a man," writes Camus, "is
reducing it to the human, stamping it with his seal."70
This ordering, however, inevitably implies value:

to

articulate what is known, to fashion order, human beings
value one piece of information over another.

Value is a

product of human cognition and, therefore, a serious
responsibility.

Only retaining a sense of human

limitations can protect against inappropriate valuation.
Knowledge gained through the absurd sensibility retains a
sense of its limits:
If thought discovered in the shimmering mirrors of
phenomena eternal relations capable of summing them
up and summing themselves up in a single principle,
then would be seen an intellectual joy of which the
myth of the blessed would be but a ridiculous
imitation. That nostalgia for unity, that appetite
for the absolute illustrates the essential impulse
of the human drama. But the fact of that
nostalgia's existence does not imply that it is to
be immediately satisfied.71
The awareness of the limit is difficult to maintain in
the face of that essential human impulse, "that nostalgia
for unity."

It is all too human to forget that

knowledge, however useful in making the world
comprehensible, is limited by the contingencies which
make up that world.

70Ibid.
71Ibid.
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To Camus, the human appetite for clarity and the
nostalgia for unity reveals human beings for what they
are:

finite beings possessed of intellect in search of

solace.

What has not been grasped is that the intellect

alone is incapable of providing that solace.
attempts are made constantly.

Yet,

How else to explain the

human need and willingness to fashion mental constructs
to hide the fundamentally indifferent chaos of reality?
The disjunction felt between this reality and the lack of
comfort derived from mental constructs should convince
human beings of the inadequacy of these constructs.
Instead, Camus thought, through the act of eluding human
beings deny their inadequacy and take an emotional and
intellectual "leap" in order to mask reality.

The leap,

a kind of faith taking the mantle of reason, is intended
as consolation, but once the leap is taken, human life
and civilization become defined by it.

Relationships,

ethical behavior, and institutions must all reconcile
themselves to the consequences of the leap.

The result,

for Camus, is a self-deception at the core of modern
human ethical, political, and spiritual existence.

It is

this self-deception that Camus believes must be ferreted
out before human beings can begin to know and, by
extension, act ethically.
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The self-deception is native to two prevailing types
of knowing which can be derived from Camus's analysis of
inappropriate responses to the absurd.72 One category
of knowing tries to negate the relevance or presence of
the absurd, either by imposing totality from without, as
in religious faith or by imposing that totality from
within, as in scientific reasoning.

A second category

concedes the necessity of image or metaphor, but then
embraces the absurd itself as the totality of reality.
For Camus, both of these categories of human inquiry are
totalizing constructs and therefore inadequate.
Camus began with an interrogation of the problematic
issue of faith through a critical consideration of
Chrisianity.

"I shall never start from the supposition

that Christian truth is illusory," Camus told an audience
at a Dominican Monastery in 1948, "but merely from the
fact that I could not accept it."73

Though he knew and

respected certain Christians, Camus's attitude toward
Christianity was ambiguous at best.

He appreciated Jesus

as an ethical human being, but saw in him "just one more
innocent man whom the representatives of the God of

^Ibid., 18.
^Albert Camus, "The Unbeliever and the Christians,"
in Resistance. Rebellion and Death, translated by Justin
0,Brien (New York: Vintage, 1970), 69-70.
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Abraham tortured in a spectacular manner."74

In Camus's

understanding of Christianity, the presence of a perfect
God, whose very existence made acute the sinfulness of
human beings, seemed an unnecessary obstacle to human
fulfillment.75

From the perfection of God, Christianity

derived the incompleteness of human beings (sin).76 At
the same time, certain forms of Christianity held out the
possibility of a recovered completeness through salvation
at the end of time. The notion of the immortality of the
soul seemed to deny the finitude of human experience,
rendering the earthly pursuit of justice meaningless
apart from the seemingly selfish goal of personal
salvation.

This was the Christian truth that Camus

"could not accept."
It would be too easy to read Camus as simply another
twentieth century writer hostile to Christianity.

In

point of fact, Camus distrusted faith in any totality

74Camus, The Rebel. 34.
^The relationship of Camus's ambiguous attitude
toward Christianity to the rest of his thought is one of
the more enduring debates about his work. See, for
recent examples, Delwin Brown, "Grace: A Meditation from
Camus," The IIiff Review 43:1 (Winter 1986): 3-10; Robert
Cohn, "Camus's Sacred: The Growing Stone," Stanford
Literature Review 5:1-2 (Spring-Fall 1988): 151-60; and
Robert Duncan, "Judgment Without Redemption: Camus
Version of the Fall," Christianity and Literature 30:2
(Winter 1981): 43-50.
76See Camus's discussion of Kierkegaard in The Mvth
of Sisyphus. 39-41.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

45

inasmuch as that faith offered humanity the opportunity
to place its destiny in the hands of an external entity.
These totalities allowed human beings to avoid
responsibility for the way they conduct their lives.
Such reasoning, which Camus found in various forms in
theology, science, philosophy and political thought,
always claimed to ennoble human beings while in reality
denigrating lived human existence.

There was a further

danger in positing an ultimate source of all being and
becoming.

The existence of God makes possible the

theoretical negation of God.

Camus argues in The Rebel

that the presence of God cries out for a formulation of
His absence, that is, for metaphysical rebellion of the
sort which Nietzsche undertook:
When the throne of God is overturned, the rebel
realizes that it is now his own responsibility to
create the justice, order, and unity that he sought
in vain within his own condition, and in this way to
justify the fall of God. Then begins the desperate
effort to create, at the price of crime and murder
if necessary, the dominion of man.77
Such a dominion can only be claimed and not realized.
Nature inevitably confronts the metaphysical rebel and he
is forced to resort to violence.
The natural world was another locus of mystery Camus
believed modern human beings were trying to conquer
through a mislaid faith in human reason.

The conceit of

^Camus, The Rebel. 25.
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post-Enlightenment science posited the world as something
ultimately knowable in spite of its unpredictable power
and diversity.

In his critique of science, Camus

acknowledges the importance of mystery, for it is in the
scientific attempt to unmask nature that science degrades
human existence.

Science makes claims for knowing that

are nearly metaphysical in their explanatory
completeness.

Camus, like Nietzsche before him,

recognized this religious tendency in scientific knowing
as fraudulent and dangerous.

"During the last century,"

Camus wrote in The Rebel. "man cast off the fetters of
religion," but "hardly was he free, when he created new
and utterly intolerable chains."78 Though new, the
shackles of science bore a striking resemblance to those
of religion.

With the Enlightenment, Camus argues, the

tyrannical virtue of religious faith "dies but is born
again, more exacting than ever" in the guise of
scientific knowledge.79
Enlightenment belief in empirically observable
scientific fact implies that all human experience is
quantifiable.

Ironically, the methodology of modern

science comes to lack the humility before and respect for
nature present in some religious thought.

The conceit of

^Ibid., 279.
^Ibid.
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science, argues Camus cum Nietzsche, that it could
comprehensively explain all of reality, ultimately
dissolves into an image or metaphor.

For a time, Camus

writes in The Mvth of Sisyphus, science describes the
world with marvelous efficiency.

In his all too human

nostalgia for unity, "in my thirst for knowledge," Camus
must admit that the laws science enumerates are true:
You take apart its mechanism and my hope
increases. At the final stage you teach me that
this wondrous and multi-colored universe can be
reduced to the atom and that the atom itself
can be reduced to the electron. All this is
good and I wait for you to continue. But you
tell me of an invisible planetary system in
which electrons gravitate around a nucleus. You
explain this world to me with an image. I
realize that you have been reduced to poetry:
I shall never know.80
Scientific reasoning verifies the absurdity of the world
when it resorts to an image to describe the mystery it
encounters but cannot penetrate.

The most powerful form

of human reason cannot overcome the diversity of
existence.

Like Nietzsche, Camus embraced the difficult

truism that "a science that was to teach me everything
ends up in a hypothesis, that lucidity founders in
metaphor, that uncertainty is resolved in a work of
art."81

For Camus, however, this acceptance entailed

^Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 20.
81Ibid. Nietzsche, in The Birth of Tragedy [The
Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, translated
by Francis Golffing (New York, 1990)], 93, noted the
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neither existential despair nor nihilism.

Instead it was

an invitation to reconsider human knowing, taking
seriously that which can be described or depicted but not
explained.
The second category of knowing concedes the
necessity of image or metaphor, but then embraces the
absurd itself as the totality of reality.

Camus finds

that this form of philosophical knowing falls into the
trap of totality by positing the absurd as the ultimate
meaning of existence.

Two philosophies of great promise

from Camus's point of view, existentialism and
phenomenology, each embraced absurd existence and
criticized scientific rationality from the perspective of
absurd sensibility.

Neither, however, managed to avoid

the snare of metaphysics.

Together they represent a kind

of "philosophical suicide," which Camus describes as "the
movement by which a thought negates itself and tends to
transcend itself in its very negation."82

Enlightenment's hubristic "illusion that thought, guided
by the thread of causation, might plumb the farthest
abysses of being and even correct it." He continued,
" [t]his grand metaphysical illusion has become integral
to the scientific endeavor and again and again leads
science to those far limits of its inquiry where it
becomes art— which, in this mechanism, is what is really
intended."
82Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus, 41.
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The existential philosophies, Camus writes,
"starting out from the absurd over the ruins of reason,
in a closed universe limited to the human . . . deify
what crushes them and find reason to hope in what
impoverishes them."83

The embrace of the absurd leaves

the existential philosopher powerless to realize the
transcendent in which he so fervently believes.84
Contrary to his own disappointing experience, the
philosopher decides that his consciousness of this
universe "upset by failure" reveals the presence and not
the absence of transcendence.

Through a "blind act of

human confidence," the existential philosopher puts
forward the absurd as a god and "that inability to
understand becomes the existence that illuminates
everything."85
faith.

For Camus, this is not reason, but

The existential philosopher has taken a "leap";

he has made use of an almost mystical "device," which
eludes the reality that absurdity represents.

“ ibid., 32.
^Camus here is thinking of Karl Jaspers and the
branch of Existentialism which, owing to its relation to
Kierkegaard, leans heavily toward Christianity
represented by Gabriel Marcel among others. See Karl
Jaspers, Reason and Existence, translated by William
Earle (New York: Noonday Press, 1955) and Gabriel
Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, translated by
Manya Harari (New York: Citadel Press, 1991 [original
1956]).
8SCamus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 33.
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If there is an absurd, it is in man's universe. The
moment the notion transforms itself into eternity's
springboard, it ceases to be linked to human
lucidity. The absurd is no longer that evidence
that man ascertained without consenting to it. The
struggle is eluded.86
Camus believed that existentialism eludes the complexity
of the human condition by positing that complexity as a
discernable unity.

All attempts to elude the struggle

remove the possibility of meaning from human existence.
In this way, existential philosophy renders human
existence devoid of meaning.
Phenomenology similarly removes meaning from human
existence.87 The phenomenologist tries to overcome the
apparent chaos of human experience by attributing what
Husserl calls "intention11 to the objects of that
experience.

In this way, Camus writes,

Thinking is not unifying or making the appearance
familiar under the guise of a great principle.
Thinking is learning all over again how to see,
directing one's consciousness, making of every image
a privileged place. . . . Consciousness suspends in
experience the objects of its attention. Through
its miracle it isolates them. Henceforth they are
beyond all judgments.88

“ ibid., 35.
■ 87Hwa Yol Jung, "An Introductory Essay: The
Political Relevance of Existential Phenomenology," in
Existential Phenomenology and Political Theory; A Reader
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) is a useful
introduction to the political concerns of phenomenology.
“ Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 43. Compare Edmund
Husserl, Logical Investigations, translated by J. N.
Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970) and Edmund
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Intention privileges every image.

In so doing,

phenomenology balks at explaining the world, choosing
merely to describe "actual experience."

This universal

privileging denies human beings the ability to
distinguish the value of a given experience, robbing them
of the ability to compare what Voegelin calls "equivalent
experiences."89

Camus concedes that the impulse to

enumerate what it cannot understand is consistent with
the absurd sensibility.

To be viable, however,

phenomenology must go a step further and posit a value
which it cannot do without metaphysics.

Husserl, for

example, speaks of the "extra-temporal essences" to be
found in the objects of intention:
There is no longer a single idea explaining
everything, but an infinite number of essences
giving a meaning to an infinite number of objects. .
. . [H]ere thought hurls itself into an abstract
polytheism.
But this is not all: hallucinations and

Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology. translated by David Carr (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1970). A brilliant
overview of Husserl's thought and its context is the 1936
essay by Jan Patocka, "Masaryk's and Husserl's Conception
of the Spiritual Crisis of European Humanity," in Erazim
Kohak, Jan Patocka: Philosophy and Selected Writings
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
89See Eric Voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience and
Symbolization in History" in The Collected Works of Eric
Voegelin Volume 12: Published Essavs 1966-1985 edited by
Ellis Sandoz (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1990), 115-133.
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fictions likewise belong to "extra-temporal
essences."90
Husserl leaves human beings in a kind of relativism, a
world of ideals without hierarchy.

The world, Camus

writes, has ceased "to have its reflection in a higher
universe, but the heaven of forms is figured in the host
of images of this earth."91

Fabricated totality is now

posited as an infinite host of equally privileged
unities.

Existentialism and phenomenology claimed to

"solve" the problem of the indifferent diversity of
reality by positing that diversity as a unity whose
contingent elements are equally privileged.

This leap

leaves human beings with a doubly ineffective way of
human knowing.

Existentialism and phenomenology each

yield a way of knowing that succumbs to the temptation to
posit a totality.

At the same time, the claimed totality

cannot help human beings distinguish value and therefore
cannot help them know how to act.
A disappointed Camus found that these philosophical
forms partook of the all-to-human nostalgia for unity.
This dangerous nostalgia, however, had been most
materially and spiritually destructive in the realm of
modern politics, where the price paid could be counted in

90Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 45.
91Ibid. , 47.
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the millions of human lives.92

Camus isolated the

origins of this strand of political being in the French
Revolution and German Idealist philosophy.

From the

Revolution, he argues, Europeans learned the efficacy of
the politics of terror in imposing totality or
conformity, especially when accompanied by the rhetoric
of human liberation.

"When neither reason nor the free

expression of individual opinion succeeds in
systematically establishing unity,"

Camus writes of the

period, "it must be decided to suppress all alien
elements."93

Terror draws on a quasi-religious fervor

in order to turn opponents of the regime into heretics
who must be destroyed to maintain the purity of the
political entity.

This model of action, Camus observes,

is at least as old as the Inquisition, only now it is
justified by "reason" and not by "faith."

With terror,

Camus argues in The Rebel, reason is made an object of
faith and together they are a formidable justification
for action in the political world.

Camus concludes that

the coupling of terror to the language of human
liberation which Napoleon turns into an empire, parallels
the joining of reason to faith which Hegel turns into a
philosophical system.

92Camus, The Rebel. 3-11.
93Ibid., 126.
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German Idealism, Camus argues, introduced movement
to the fixed ideas of truth, reason and justice that
characterized the Revolutionary period.

Incarnate in the

world as elements of progress, these ideas "ceased to be
guides in order to become goals."94

In this context,

action becomes an end in itself performed in darkness
while awaiting some "final illumination."

A conception

of human progress as an unfolding totality emerges from
these actions and that unfolding is taken for the
substance of history.

The idea becomes even more

powerful when human progress is seen as a reflectionof
God's work in the world.

This tendency is given

philosophical expression in Hegel where:
Everything is reconciled, of course, in the
dialectic, and one extreme cannot be stated without
the other arising; there exists in Hegel, as in all
great thinkers, the material for contradicting
Hegel. Philosophers, however, are rarely read with
the head alone, but often with the heart and all its
passions, which can accept no kind of
reconciliation.95
Hegel's dialectic allows no way to make value
distinctions.

His fondness for world-historical figures

like Napoleon is ample evidence that the politics of
terror may be justified as part of the unfolding
reconciliation that is history.

Marx made the ethereal

94Ibid., 13 4.
^Ibid., 135.
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unity of Hegel material.

Camus finds that from Marx's

work the revolutionaries of the twentieth century derived
a "vision of a history without any kind of transcendence,
dedicated to perpetual strife and to the struggle of
wills bent on seizing power.”96 The totality of
progress begets the totality of history as the unfolding
of a consciousness at once human and divine.

"Cynicism,

the deification of history and of matter, individual and
State terror," Camus concludes, "these are the inordinate
consequences that will now spring, armed to the teeth,
from the equivocal conception of a world that entrusts to
history alone the task of producing both values and
truth."97
The difficulty in Camus's analysis is his apparent
ambivalence to a certain form of transcendence embedded
in conceptions of human knowing.

How can he criticize

modern revolutionaries for "a vision of history without
any kind of transcendence" and sustain his assault on a
religion which maintains the transcendent character of
its God and His grace?

The answer lies in his

immanentized understanding of transcendence.

Camus's is

a worldview seeking a transcendent principle of mundane
limits.

What Camus wants to articulate is a

96Ibid.
97Ibid., 146.
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transcendence of and in this world that pays homage to
the human condition.

The totalizing constructs Camus

identified each posited their transcendence by
disregarding the limiting exigencies of time:

in a God

beyond time; in a scientific method whose technical
acumen may claim the ability to defy time; in the absurd
itself which finds a unified vision in a chaotic reality
despite time; and in the unfolding of an historical
consciousness which will be manifest at the end of
historical time.

To Camus, these are all deceptions,

leaps, ways of eluding that reality in which we must
live.

Camus sought a way of being neither bound by nor

ignorant of the exigencies of time.
As his critique of contemporary ways of knowing
indicates, Camus found the purely rational approach to
human existence grossly inadequate.

Privileging "fact"

and the logical constructs to be built from fact leaves
too much of the human experience out at the beginning.
Human reason and its constructs inevitably confront
phenomena that they cannot explain.

They are then forced

to take a "leap" of near faith to cover their
deficiencies.

For Camus, these inexplicable phenomena

warrant more careful treatment.
in nature?

What of the inexplicable

What of the inexplicable in human

relationships (e.g., an act of kindness in which the
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actor has nothing material to gain from the act) ?

For

these Camus believed that modern science, philosophy and
political theory had no explanation.

Only Christianity

attempted to explain such things with its concept of
grace.

Camus would make use of the word "grace," but

remove from its definition any sense that grace had come
from God.98

Rather, Camus believed that when human

beings act so, they give fullest expression to their
humanity.

An act of grace by one human being serves as a

statement of what that person shares with the rest of
humanity.
For Camus, the notion of grace’is one among many
illogical symbols, the construction of which requires
imagination as well as recognition of human limits.

The

authentic reconstruction or rediscovery of these symbols
requires the imagination, perhaps the sensibility, of the
creative human being.

Camus's desire for this broader

conception of knowing is evident in his earliest
writings.

In "Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism,"

his dissertation, the young Camus observed that
it is a paradox peculiar to the human mind that it
can grasp the elements and be incapable of embracing
the synthesis; the epistemological paradox of a
science certain in its fact, but inadequate
nonetheless; adequate in its theories, but
nonetheless uncertain, or the psychological paradox

98Ibid., 3-11.
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of a self that can be grasped in its parts but is
inaccessible in its profound unity.99
By the time he wrote The

Mvth of Sisyphus.Camus's view

of human knowing embraced experienced reality as well as
the anxiety associated with that knowing.
I don't know whether this world has a meaning that
transcends it. But I know that I do not know that
meaning and that it is impossible for me just now to
know it. What can a meaning outside my condition
mean to me? I can understand only in human terms.
What I touch, what resists me— that is what I
understand. And these two certainties— my appetite
for the absolute and for unity and the impossibility
of reducing this world to a rational and reasonable
principle— I also know that I cannot reconcile them.
What other truth can I admit without lying, without
bringing in a hope I lack and which means nothing
within the limits of my condition?100
This recognition of the absurdity of reality did not make
that experience adequate as a basis for ethical action in
the world.

What Camus sought was ethical viability based

upon what human beings can know.

He sought a ground for

action in which it is possible to take seriously human
experience and reconcile it to some consistent conception
of truth, justice and beauty.

As will be discussed in

subsequent chapters, Camus found in the creative
articulation of the human encounter with reality a viable

"Albert Camus, "Christian Metaphysics and NeoPlatonism," translated in Joseph McBride, Albert Camus;
Philosopher and Litterateur (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1992), 152.
100Ibid., 51.
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way of knowing out of which he tried to fashion a viable
way of acting.
Before speaking of Camus's notion of creativity,
however, it must be recognized that he is carefully
mindful of human cognitive limitations.

By its nature,

creativity acts upon what the creator knows, briefly
valuing that which it depicts over the rest of creation.
Knowing enables the creative act.

The creative act is

the transposition of an idea we have of reality into a
concrete form within material reality.

Ideas and

therefore the ability to create are bound up with the
ability to know, that is, the ability to gain articulable
insights into reality.

These insights appear in many

different forms and are open to at least as many
different modes of interpretation.

Camus, as journalist,

novelist, philosopher, playwright, and essayist, uses the
several different forms of literary expression to
articulate and examine his own insights.

Articulation of

the insight and identifying the form that articulation
should take is impossible without the recognition that
one has experienced something that needs articulation.
The ability to recognize accompanied by the impulse to
expression is what Camus calls "lucidity."101

101The term appears in both extended philosophical
essays The Mvth of Sisyphus and the later The Rebel.
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The human capacity to know depends upon the
possession of a kind of openness to experience that Camus
understood as "lucidity.”

"Everything begins," he writes

in The Mvth of Sisyphus, "with a lucid indifference."102
For Camus, lucid indifference is the indifference that
accompanies the inevitability of death.
despair but acceptance.

It is not

It entails the kind of

psychological distance that can demand an explanation for
human suffering without believing that suffering can be
ultimately eradicated.

Lucid indifference characterizes

this orientation of openness to human experience.
Because it is human, this orientation is geared to
problem-solving, so the sufferings of human beings cannot
go unaddressed.

Creating workable responses to hunger,

pain, tyranny and other forms of human suffering and
oppression requires the insight gained through lucidity.
Confronting injustice, and by implication positing
an idea of the just, requires vision and the impulse to
address creatively the source of the injustice.

"Of all

the schools of patience and lucidity," for Camus,
"creation is the most effective."103

Lucidity lies at

the heart of Camus's conception of knowing.

It is the

driving force in the creative process, but defies precise

102Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 94.
103Ibid., 115.
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definition.

Camus's idea of lucidity is informed by his

immanent sense of grace.

In his thought, lucidity is a

sort of wisdom, barely rational and quite intuitive, but
no less a component of experience.
and vision, but it is more.

Lucidity is insight

It is an experience that

impels the human being to creative action in the
community.

"In other words," Camus wrote, at the very

moment when the creative being "chooses to share the fate
of all, he asserts the individual he is."104
The lucid encounter with reality impels the creative
being to demand an affirmation of human self-hood and
dignity from an otherwise indifferent (absurd) reality.
Action on the impulse requires rational freedom, but it
is not strictly rational.

"In the time of the absurd

reasoning," Camus writes in The Mvth of Sisyphus,
"creation follows indifference and discovery.

It marks

the point from which absurd passions spring and where the
reasoning stops."105

In the moment of lucidity, the

actor intuits that existence owes humanity some
affirmation of its dignity.

Once experienced, the actor

constantly seeks more lucid insight into (or encounters

104Camus, "The Artist and His Time: Create
Dangerously," in Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 266.
Camus here is referring specifically to the artist, but,
as we will see, he refers by analogy to the creative
actor in the world.
105Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 95.
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with) reality.

This the actor can do only through

repeated attempts at creative articulation of the
experience.

Inevitably finding the articulation exhibits

an incomplete understanding, the actor is motivated to
rearticulate the experience.

The quantitative desire for

greater understanding (rearticulation) is Camus's "ethic
of quantity" commentators find in The Mvth of
Sisyphus.106

Far from a nihilist indulgence concerned

only with pleasurable sense experience, however, the
ethic of quantity is the demand for a more complete
understanding.

The ethic of quantity, the need to

rearticulate the lucid encounter with reality, is for
Camus the dynamic of knowing and the root of ethical
action in the world.
Camus's sense of knowing turns on a reorientation
towards the human experience.

Human beings must be open

to reality in all its beauty and power, in all its grace
and terror.

Ethically, as will be discussed in the

balance of this essay, human beings must be suspicious of
consolation.

As evidenced by the rational constructs

106See Sprintzen, Camus: Bree, Camus; John
Cruikshank, Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1960); David Denton,
The Philosophy of Albert Camus: A Critical Analysis
(Boston: Prime, 1967); Jeffrey Isaac, Arendt. Camus and
Modern Rebellion (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992) and Pierce, "Albert Camus: Liberal Moralist," in
Pierce, Contemporary French Political Thought.
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Camus critiques and the inevitability of human reason to
seek comfort in a kind of faith, it is perfectly natural
for human beings to seek consolation.

Camus's conception

of knowing as an ongoing rearticulation of the human
experience, however, indicates a basic discomfort with
the explanations human beings offer for the inexplicable
in that experience.

Ordering reality is necessary

insofar as it enables human beings to make sense and use
of that reality.

In the reorientation to knowledge that

Camus suggests, human beings must remain ever mindful of
the contingency of that reality and of the order which
the mind imposes upon it.
IV.

Conclusion:

Knowing and the Beginning of Politics

The two perspectives on knowing exhibited in the
thought of Weil and Camus differ radically in their
presuppositions.

On the one hand, Weil's epistemology is

firmly grounded in metaphysics, dependent upon the divine
act of creation and the residual presence of decreated
reality.

On the other, Camus's perspective on knowing

issues from his encounter with absurd reality.

Devoid of

a meaningful conception of God, Camus's perspective is no
less dependent on a universalized conception of what
makes us human beings.

Beyond their differing

presuppositions, however, a markedly similar response to
created reality emerges in their separate considerations
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of knowing.

The shared response has two components.

The

first is a suspicion of totalizing intellectual
constructs.

The second is the belief that an

understanding of reason that denigrates imagination is
dangerous.

These two tendencies form the core of their

separate discussions of knowing and, as will be seen in
Chapter Two, make up the beginning of their critique of
modern politics.
For both Weil and Camus human knowing was limited to
human perceptions in created or absurd reality.

The

error of the last two centuries of human inquiry had been
precisely in forgetting this crucial limitation.

Human

beings often experience created or absurd reality as
chaotic and arbitrary, only occasionally as something
which can be ordered by laws and theorems.

For the most

part, the world as we experience it is composed of matter
in motion, fundamentally indifferent to human moral
strictures and a constant challenge for human
intellectual structures.

Drawing upon a natural human

need to order chaotic reality, human beings used their
reason to impose order upon and render useful the
elements of that reality.

Negotiating human existence,

that is, human relationships with nature and with other
human beings, requires that the mind somehow make the
world intelligible.

It is when the human mind
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substitutes the symbols with which it makes existence
intelligible for the reality itself, that is, when human
beings cease learning from nature in order to concentrate
on what is already "known," that they fall prey to what
Camus calls "eluding."

The mental leap that eluding

entails is the only way human beings can know or
articulate truth, but it comes at the cost of losing
perspective on the contingency of reality.

For Weil and

Camus, recasting politics requires that this perspective
is restored to human knowing.
Much as their diagnoses of the problem of knowing
are similar, the responses of Weil and Camus are, in a
general way, similar.

Owing to the influence of Bergson,

both want to supplement, not replace, the modern
understanding of human reason with other forms of
cognition.

For Weil, reason may be supplemented by human

intuition and the imagination drawn from the divine or
decreated part of every human soul.

Reason so conceived

requires an orientation toward knowing that does not fear
the intuited self-evidence of what she calls "simple
ideas" merely because those ideas cannot be explained
fully.

As discrete entities, these simple ideas are

inadequate to constitute knowledge.

Weil's conception of

human knowing also requires the discipline imaginatively
to add those simple ideas together to form series.
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series they produce must then be useful in describing the
human relationship to nature.

This imaginative addition,

which she calls ''intellectual attention," stops well
short of fantasy and stops long before it calls on the
individual to "re-create the world.11 Human knowing
always operates in the realm of thought for Weil.

When

human beings apply their ideas to the world, those ideas
are transformed into action and the limits of human power
are realized.

The limits of human power, then, mark the

limits of the applicability of human reason.

For Weil,

these limits find their intellectual representation in
physics.

There are physical limits (e.g., "gravity")

which human beings simply cannot transgress without the
help of machines.

The application of human reason to the

world as a tool, as will be discussed in Chapter Three,
is what Weil calls "work."
For Camus, the human encounter with the absurdity of
reality, the human inability to find solace, requires
that human beings recast their orientation to human
reason.

Like Weil, he wants to restore the imaginative

component to the understanding of human reason in order
to broaden the means of expression.

Only by restoring

imagination can what has become an all too mechanical
conception of knowing be humanized.

Mechanized reason,

Camus argues in The Rebel, greases its wheels with the
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blood of human beings.

The problem is that Camus, unlike

Weil, cannot seek the source of imagination in a
conception of the divine.

Lacking a belief in

cannot deal in a transcendence that is made up
something besides human beings.

God, he
of

Instead, he finds the

source of imagination in the possibility and limit that
all human beings hold in common:
absurd inevitability of death.

the joy of life and the
Once life is pursued

fully reconciled to death, a perspective on our own
existence is gained that no fictional totality can
provide.

This perspective engenders the awareness that

no truth is ultimate and that human happiness must be
sought if human beings are to retain the dignity that is
their birthright.

The value of what is known is

dependent upon maintaining this perspective.

Camus found

a model for attaining this perspective in his artist's
orientation to the world.

As will be seen in Chapter

Three, the creative being's temperament makes truths
accessible as temporary embodiments in works of human
beauty and makes a living human justice possible.
The refashioned conceptions of human knowing found
in the thought of Weil and Camus each entail a kind of
distance.

For Weil that distance requires confronting

the objects of knowledge from the level of the
"impersonal."

For Camus, the act of knowing entails the
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application of the artist's "lucid indifference."

For

both thinkers, these perspectives are diagnostic tools
and necessary preludes to ethical action in the world.
Before this discussion can proceed to the character of
ethical action, the next chapter must trace their
respective diagnoses of the defects of modern social and
political order.
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CHAPTER 2

THE CONTEXT OF POLITICS:
NECESSITY/ POWER AND FORCE
I.

Introduction

In their discussions of knowing, Weil and Camus each
recognized that any critical reconstruction of reality
that imposes order where there is none does violence to
the human experience of that reality.

The ordering

impulse, however, is an everpresent component of human
being.

Ordering to gain a functional understanding of

reality is a necessary step in problem-solving.

The

human ability to reason finds its value in this problem
solving capacity.

Ordering becomes dangerous when that

perceived order is substituted or mistaken for truth or
reality.

Truth claims justify dismissing or destroying

elements of reality that do not conform to their visions.
Such a dismissal, whether mental or material, reguires
the use of a kind of violence that Weil and Camus both
find incompatible with authentic human existence.
Weil and Camus knew that the violent reality
confronting the twentieth century human being was but a
distorted reflection of the human encounter with the
69
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natural world.

Reorienting human beings in their

relationship to that reality assumed primary significance
for both thinkers.

The post-Enlightenment conceit of

human beings as potential masters of nature was
dangerous.

Nature must be recognized for what it is:

the unpredictable environment in which all human activity
takes place.

Weil called this environment "necessity,"

the God-created realm of matter and motion of which human
beings are part and to which they are subject.

In their

scientific investigations, human beings perceived a kind
of moral disinterest in necessity's functioning which
they tried to imitate and call objectivity.

This

objectivity had become a disastrous ethical model for
modern human beings.

Weil believed that this moral

disinterest was a human perception.

The moral

indifference of necessity was an interpretation of our
encounter with reality that Weil could not reconcile with
her conception of a world created by a loving God.

Her

ethical thought is an attempt to bridge the gap between a
reality that appears morally indifferent and a political
world to which human beings must respond ethically.
Camus faced a similar dilemma from a different
perspective.

He too confronted a natural world that

appeared morally disinterested.

The human encounter with

the natural world could be violent, beautiful, terrifying
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or inspirational.
from such a mix?

What ethical imperative could be drawn
There was no God existent in the

background compelling human beings to act ethically out
of gratitude or a sense of grace.

Yet in the beauty of

the natural world and in the need of human beings to live
together, Camus discerned the possibility for ethics.
His task was seeking a principle which compelled human
beings to act ethically in the absence of the divine.
The discrepancy between this need to act ethically and
the apparent indifference of nature is what Camus
understood as the absurd.

Weil and Camus posited the

relationship to the natural world as critical to
understanding human behavior, and from this relationship
they each derived remarkably similar questions and
insights about ethics and politics.
II.

Necessity:

Order, Violence and Indifference

Weil and Camus worked from the shared premise that
modern political reality was material in character.

As a

consequence, the human capacity to reshape political
existence depended upon bringing non-material elements to
bear on this reality.

These non-material elements, of

which thought, imagination and human creative capacities
are good examples, inevitably expose the limitations of
materialism.

It is all too human to want to minimize

these limitations through human knowing, the process of

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72

ordering material reality and making it comprehensible
and useful.

But this ordering always takes place within

a larger context, the larger natural world whose beauty
and violence often defy the ordering impulse.

This

larger unpredictable world forms the context of politics
for both Weil and Camus.

Camus explored this context

through his investigation of the absurd.
crucial in that exploration.

His fiction is

It is Weil, however, who

gives the name necessity to this context, and suggests
mapping it as a prelude to understanding political
reality.
Weil's Necessity
Weil uses "necessity" as a blanket term to cover the
complexities of created existence.
necessity can be confusing.

Her references to

On the one hand, she refers

to created reality itself as necessity and, on the other,
believes that created reality is governed by mathematical
necessity.1 Further, any one of a number of human

1To illustrate, Weil wrote in "Draft for a Statement
of Human Obligations" that "The reality of this world is
necessity. The part of man which is in this world is the
part which is in bondage to necessity and subject to the
misery of need" in Selected Essays. 221. Of mathematical
necessity Weil wrote in the essay on the Pythagorean
Doctrine: "Necessity is constituted for us by the
quantitative laws of variation in the appearances. Where
there is, strictly speaking, no quantity, there is
something analogous; a quantitative law of variation,
that is a function. Function is what the Greeks called
number or relationship, arithmos or logos, and it is also
this which constitutes limit" in Intimations of
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endeavors each exhibit their own necessity.

At various

places in her work she identifies mathematical necessity,
economic necessity, political necessity, the necessity of
power, the necessity of war and the necessity of peace.2
From the free use she makes of the term, it is clear
that, for Weil, interaction with necessity defines
mundane human existence.

Any discussion of Weil's

political thought must begin, therefore, by unravelling
her notion of necessity.
Necessity as the God-created arrangement of the
world, Weil writes, "constitutes an order whereby each
thing, being in its place, permits all other things to
exist."3 Necessity is the interconnected wholeness
existent among the elements of nature.
wholeness that science seeks to uncover.

It is this
Necessity

challenges science by manifesting itself in the natural
world as volatility, violent and arbitrary one moment,

Christianity. 179.
Respectively, for mathematical necessity see the
essay on "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of
Christianity. 179; for the necessities of economics and
politics, see Oppression and Liberty; for the necessity
of power, see "The Power of Words" in Selected Essays.
168; for the necessity of war, see Iliad or the Poem of
Force. translated by Mary McCarthy (Wallingford, PA:
Pendle Hill Publications, 1956), 21; for the necessity of
love, see the essay on "The Pythagorean Doctrine," 181.
3Weil, "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of
Christianity. 185.
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beautiful and forgiving the next, and often all of these
at once.

Human beings try to shield themselves from this

volatility by making it intelligible and articulable,
that is, by scientific investigation and fabrication.

To

make sense of this volatile reality, science discerns
tendencies and posits laws and maxims concerning what is
observed.

Given the limitations of human knowing and the

inevitability of new experience, these findings are
always subject to revision.
knowledge is as it should be.

This fluidity in human
Confronting nature as an

adversarial or coercive presence, however, is dangerous.
It places the human being outside of nature and poses
necessity as something to be overcome, not embraced as
the human context.
Human beings cannot fully comprehend necessity.
Human knowing can provide insights into its functioning,
with mathematics (exhibited in geometry and physics)
being the best model of that.4 Each human activity,
however, has its own necessity, that is, each has
contingent elements that must be present and ordered in a
certain way for that activity to occur.

The basic

observable characteristics of necessity were the
effortlessness with which its presence is manifest and

4See her discussion of mathematical necessity in
"The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of
Christianity.
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the apparent moral indifference of that manifestation.
Weil argued that this moral indifference was not present
in God's creation, but rather reflected the inadequacy of
human perception.

Failure to make this crucial

distinction led modern humanity to value its own
knowledge too highly.

Weil cited attempts to discern the

"natural laws" of economics and politics as giving human
beings a confidence that what they were articulating
could not be otherwise.

The consequence of this false

confidence was an ideological disregard for the
appropriate relationship of means to ends, resulting in
the atrocious sacrifices Weil saw made for the sake of
words with "capital letters."5
Misreading the character of necessity, that is, as
an adversarial or coercive presence to be overcome, had a
profound impact on the ethical sense of modern humanity.
The coercive presence of the natural world appeared
effortless, morally neutral or objective.

In its

apparent neutrality, necessity became a compelling model
for human behavior after the Enlightenment.

The

imitation of necessity's apparent indifference (i.e.,

5In her essay "The Power of Words" (1937), Weil
writes: "For our contemporaries the role of Helen is
played by words with capital letters. If we grasp one of
these words, all swollen with blood and tears, and
squeeze it, we find it is empty." In Weil, Selected
Essavs. 1934-1943. 156.
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"objectivity") resulted in attempts to distance the human
actor from the moral implications of the human act.
Objectivity justifies the act without demanding
responsibility for the consequences of the act.

This

kind of justification disregarded concerns about the
moral efficacy of human acts.

"We have understood

nothing," Weil wrote, "so long as we do not know what
difference there is, as Plato says, between the essence
of the necessary and that of the good."6

Necessity is

the necessary; what is cannot be otherwise.

To impute

value, good or evil, to natural necessity is strictly a
human imposition.

Therein lies the danger inherent in

the attempt to imitate the apparent objectivity of
natural necessity.

Human beings cannot act without

reference to a value.
possible.

Acting with objectivity is not

Distinguishing between good and evil in human

action is the ethical obligation of every human being.7
Weil suggested that a lack of diligence in making this
distinction in religion, politics, and economics
accounted for the destructiveness of these activities
over the course of human history.

^eil, "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of
Christianity. 189.
7Simone Weil, The Need for Roots, translated by
Arthur Wills (New York: Putnam, 1952) and the antecedent
document "Draft for a Statement of Human Obligations" in
Selected Essavs. 219-227.
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Each human act involves a moral choice, a fact which
is obscured by the pretense to objectivity.

The apparent

indifference of necessity, the objective ideal, is not
just an obstacle to human action.

While it can be a

hindrance, a more appropriate orientation to natural
necessity could also provide the opportunity for
authentic human freedom:
Living man can on no account cease to be hemmed in
on all sides by an absolutely inflexible necessity?
but since he is a thinking creature, he can choose
between either blindly submitting to the spur with
which necessity pricks him on from the outside, or
else adapting himself to the inner representation of
it that he forms in his own mind; and it is in this
that the contrast between servitude and liberty
lies.8
There are three responses to the presence of necessity,
but only one is compatible with the exercise of human
freedom.

The first is to parrot what has been observed.

Modern humanity had taken this imitative course, seeking
the objective ideal in ethics, while ignoring the
limitations of human perception and action.

The second

response is to withdraw from reality into a mystical or
nihilist fantasy.
ideologue.

This is the approach taken by the

The third approach, Weil's, is to attempt to

live within the limits of necessity, to address evil with
reference to the good knowing all the while that the

8Simone Weil, Oppression and Liberty, translated by
Arthur Wills (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953),
86.
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human understanding of these basic concepts is never
comprehensive.
Weil grounds her idea of consent in this orientation
to necessity.

Living within the limits of necessity

entails acceptance of the natural world as it is.
Accepting necessity in all its apparent ambiguity enables
human beings to choose without reference to changing that
which cannot be changed.

"Necessity is precisely the

intermediary between our nature and our infinitely small
faculty of free consent," she writes later, "for our
nature is submissive to it and our consent accepts it."9
Necessity is matter in obedience to God, so our consent
to necessity is our obedience to God.

Only in such

obedience can there be liberty "for to be free for us is
to desire to obey God.

All other liberty is false."10

Natural necessity, then, is the context of political
life.

Embracing it in the manner Weil suggests means the

human being discerns a harmony of interests with the
world and with other human beings.

The embrace does not

mean trying to replicate the moral indifference human
beings perceive in necessity, for God's creation is not
morally indifferent and human beings cannot be or act

’Weil, "Pythagorean Doctrine" in Intimations of
Christianity. 185.
10Ibid. , 186.
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with moral disinterest.

Rather, Weil's ethical

imperative is that human beings must oppose the evil they
can oppose and accept those elements of necessity that
cannot be changed.

There is in the apparent indifference

of natural necessity, however, an analog to just
political action.

She writes,

Justice for man presents itself first as a choice,
choice of the good, rejection of evil. Necessity is
the absence of choice, indifference. Yet it is the
principle of coexistence. And basically the supreme
justice for us is acceptance of the coexistence with
ourselves of all creatures and all things which make
up the existent.11
Between the inimitable indifference of necessity and the
inevitable choice required by justice lies the realm of
ethical action.

The ethical actor must navigate between

the God-created world and the apparent moral indifference
of the reality discerned by human beings.

Weil's

response is to respect the tension revealed in these two
perspectives.

As a prelude to speculation on the nature

of politics, she cautions against human arrogance toward
the natural world and encourages the appreciation of the
tension human investigation of the natural world reveals.

n Ibid., 189. Compare Weil, "Are We Struggling for
Justice?" translated by Marina Barabas Philosophical
Investigations 10:1 (January 1987): 1-10.
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Camus's Absurd Necessity
Weil's conception of necessity as a model of
"objective” human ethical action finds reflection in
Camus's conception of the absurd.

In his early fiction,

Camus has his characters confront difficult natural
environments that color and complicate ethical decision
making.

These depictions demonstrate Camus's need to

come to grips with the difficulty of making ethical
decisions and creating justice in the face of an
apparently indifferent (absurd) reality.

Like Weil with

necessity, Camus recognized that the absurd had become a
problematic ethical model, and he sought to remedy that
through his conception of rebellion.

The rebellion he

describes in The Rebel is an ethical manifestation of the
frustration of human beings in complex situations.12
Camus fashions rebellion as an attempt to turn that
frustration into positive action.
Camus recognized rebellion as an ethically
problematic response to absurdity.

Two forms this

rebellion took in the nineteenth century had been
catastrophic for the twentieth.

Marx and Nietzsche each

responded to a world without God by trying to reconceive
God, Marx in history and Nietzsche in the self.

Like all

metaphysical and historical rebels, the two thinkers

12Camus, The Rebel.
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reached beyond their human capacities, attempting to
create a world more intelligiblethan the absurd one
inhabited.

they

Of such rebels Camuswrote:

The great rebel thus creates with his own hands, and
for his own imprisonment, the implacable reign of
necessity. Once he had escaped from God's prison,
his first care was to construct the
prison of
history and of reason, thus putting
the finishing
touch to the camouflage and consecration of the
nihilism whose conquest he claimed.13
Here Camus echoes Weil:

it is in the attempted imitation

of an apparently disinterested necessity that the search
for justice is derailed.

The apparent indifference of

necessity manifests itself in the natural world as
sunshine, storms, earthquakes, floods, and plagues.

The

apparent effortlessness of these phenomena, however, is
what traps the ambitious rebel into erroneously believing
he can transfigure the world by influencing it in the
same way.

The attempt to imitate the absurd, Camus

argues, only further subjects the actor to the absurd
with devastating ethical consequences.
Camus began his interrogation of this dangerous
phenomenon with the figure of the Roman emperor Caligula
in his play of the same name.14 Camus's Caligula mocks
the indifference of the world which has taken the life of

13Ibid. , 80.
14Albert Camus, "Caligula" in Caligula and Three
Other Plavs. translated by Stuart Gilbert (New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1958).
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his beloved Drusilla.

In so doing he takes the role of

fate or destiny upon himself.

Caligula's justice will be

necessity's apparent justice.

"Bring in the condemned

men," he demands early in the play, "I must have my
public.

Judges, witnesses, accused— all sentenced to

death without a hearing."15

Caligula executes his

subjects without cause or warning in imitation of the
deaths that await all human beings.

He creates a social

and political environment in which natural disasters like
famine become the object of imperial decree.
emperor is no ordinary tyrant.

But this

It is Cherea who

recognizes the uniqueness of Caligula's project:

"You

can take arms against a vulgar tyrant, but cunning is
needed to fight down disinterested malice.

You can only

urge it on to follow its bent, and bide your time until
its logic founders in sheer lunacy."16 Caligula's
intention to imitate necessity's disinterest keeps him
from becoming a force of necessity himself and "capturing
the moon."

Caligula meets the end of all human beings

who overreach:

he is assassinated, like no more or less

than a "vulgar tyrant."

His death cry, "I'm still

alive," does not indicate the persistence of absurd

15Ibid., 17.
16Ibid., 22.
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necessity, for that is a given.17 Rather, it cautions
that the human impulse to a tyranny masquerading as
indifference or disinterest is a permanent part of the
human experience.
Like a post-Enlightenment scientist, Caligula takes
on necessity as if it were an opponent to be overcome.
His weapons are what he perceives to be the weapons of
necessity:

absolute power exercised arbitrarily.

Yet

Camus's absurd, like Weil's necessity, is the context of
human life, not an opposition to life.

The apparently

coercive presence of necessity against which Caligula
rebels is exercised naturally, without discernible will.
Caligula wants to act without will, naturally, with the
same power and capriciousness he perceives in necessity.
As a human being, however, Caligula cannot act without
will.

All his acts are acts of human will and thus lack

the innocence, even elegance, of necessity.

His attempt

to thus duplicate the indifferent power of necessity
brings destruction to those he rules and himself.
Camus's art suggest that there is a benignity in nature
that does not translate to the human relationship with
the natural world or to human beings' relations with each
other.

Depicting the absurd was a matter of

communicating this inherently benign character of the

17Ibid., 74.
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natural world and the sometimes absurdly malignant
consequences of human existence in it.
Caligula makes the mistake of trying to imitate the
inimitable.

As necessity, however, the natural world is

an ethically ambiguous presence in Camus's fiction.
Necessity is a stifling atmosphere that seems to restrict
the ethical options of Camus's characters.

For example,

the sun is the most powerful and oppressive presence in
The Stranger.18 The chief human presence, Meursault, is
an incidental presence for much of the first half of the
novel.

It is the sun which occupies a central place in

the narrative.

Only after Meursault's incarceration,

when he has been taken out of the sun, does Meursault
become the center of the narrative.

Camus's use of the

sun is not surprising given his strong Neo-Platonic
roots.19 At a minimum, the sun in Plato's Allegory of
the Cave represents the highest sort of knowledge, that
toward which the philosopher is led.

The philosopher

cannot live in the sun, nor can he gaze upon it directly.

18Albert Camus, The Stranger, translated by Matthew
Ward (New York: Vintage, 1988). The Stranger was a
later manifestation of an idea begun in an earlier
manuscript that Camus abandoned incomplete. See Camus, A
Happy Death, translated by Richard Howard (New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1972).
19See Camus's dissertation, "Neo-Platonism and
Christian Metaphysics," translated in McBride, Albert
Camus: Philosopher and Litterateur. 77-174.
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He must be led back down into the cave, back into the
world of necessity.

The most he can glean from the

presence of the sun is the knowledge that truth exists,
and he should be compelled to take advantage of the
perspective and insight that knowledge imparts.

In The

Stranger, Meursault wants to live in the sun, above
necessity, at one with his particular understanding of
truth.

He cannot.

Meursault's commitment to his truth proves to be his
downfall.

Exceedingly honest about his lack of real

human feeling, Meursault shuns considerations of the
socially appropriate.

He refuses the trip back into the

cave and chooses to live in the sun's physical presence.
The sun's presence overwhelms him.

At his mother's

funeral, the sun's heat distracts him from the solemnity
of the occasion.

Later, on the beach, he loves the feel

of the sun on his skin after a swim.

Yet, the sun itself

forces Meursault to deal with life in the cave.

In the

fateful confrontation with the Arab on the beach,
The sun was starting to burn my cheeks, and I could
feel drops of sweat gathering in my eyebrows. The
sun was the same as it had been the day I buried
Maman, and like then, my forehead especially was
hurting me, all the veins in it throbbing under the
skin.
It was this burning, which I couldn't stand
anymore, that made me move forward. . . . And this
time, without getting up, the Arab drew his knife
and held it up to me in the sun. . . . The
scorching blade slashed at my eyelashes and stabbed
at my stinging eyes. That's when everything began
to reel. . . .
My whole being tensed and I squeezed
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my hand around the revolver. The trigger gave; I
felt the smooth underside of the butt; and there, in
that noise, sharp and deafening at the same time, is
where it all started. I shook off the sweat and the
sun. I knew that I had shattered the harmony of the
day, the exceptional silence of a beach where I'd
been happy.20
The sun makes life possible, but it can also be an
unbearable presence.

The light and heat seem to drive

Meursault to kill the Arab.

The sun's presence in The

Stranger is liberating and oppressive and neither.

It

conveys the sense of natural necessity in all its
ambiguity.

The truth with which Meursault lives is the

non-human truth of the perceived indifference of
necessity.

When he shows himself indifferent to the

Arab's life, society shows itself indifferent to his.
Upon his arrest, Meursault is dragged back into the cave
to await his sentence.
The sun is a persistent symbol, but there are other
elements of nature in Camus's fiction, like the sea and
pestilence, that are equally ambiguous representations of
necessity.

In The Plaaue. the sea has a spiritually

cleansing capacity.

Yet in the same work it is also the

sea which, after the outbreak, isolates Oran from other
communities of human beings.

Similarly, the plague,

itself a manifestation of necessity, for a time appears
all-powerful.

Its mere presence transforms relationships

20Camus, The Stranger. 58-59.
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among human beings, to their place, and to time.

All

that went before is rendered unintelligible in the midst
of the plague.21

But the town outlasts the plague and

when it disappears "normal" life is resumed.
Normalcy itself is a reflection of the absurdity of
life subject to natural necessity.

In The Plaque, a

"normalcy" returns to the natural world that human beings
duplicate by falling back into old habits.

Habit, for

Camus, becomes a more subtle form of man-made necessity.
Modern civilization in Oran is one of habit.

Human

beings habitually proceed as if they were indifferent to
each other, but there is in that indifference a value.
It is impossible for human beings to live without making
choices, without positing values.

The habits of modern

Oran have spiritual, social and political consequences
for its inhabitants.

The plague subjugates those old

habits, but they are gradually replaced by new plague
time habits.

Like other elements of necessity, habit has

a resilient but ambiguous character.

It can be a trap,

but is also necessary as a human coping mechanism in

21Albert Camus, The Plaaue. translated by Stuart
Gilbert (New York: Vintage, 1991 [originally 1948]).
Compare the conduct of daily life in Part One of The
Placrue before the epidemic to that the narrator describes
at the beginning of Part Four in the depths of the
plague.
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Camus's work.22 Habituation is a kind of indifference
that allows us distance on a dreary or violent existence.
For instance, it makes Sisyphus's scorn possible.23
Habit's capacity to render us emotionally or spiritually
numb can be valuable in circumstances like plague or the
death of a beloved.

Like Meursault's attempt to live

only in the sun, however, Camus suggests that to live
only for habit, that is, in apparent imitation of
necessity, is inhuman and ultimately impossible.
Necessity's function in the work of both Weil and
Camus is essentially didactic.

Its presence should serve

to remind human beings of their limitations.

The attempt

by human reason to unmask the mysteries of nature, to
treat the natural world as a puzzle that ultimately can
be solved, or an opponent to be overcome, obscured a
truism that both thinkers thought should be preserved:
though human beings have it in their power to shape their
environment, that environment never ceases shaping human
existence.

Unlike human actions, necessity is morally

22In The Plaque, their habits help the inhabitants
of Oran cope with the daily horror of life amidst the
plague, but also kept them at a distance from their
spiritual needs before the outbreak. In The Stranger,
his habits allow Meursault to exist independent of real
human emotion until his murderous act breaks the harmony
of the day. Habit is a kind of rhythm in Camus's fiction
that can be valuable as well as stultifying.
^Camus explores these aspects of the absurd in the
philosophical essay The Mvth of Sisyphus.
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benign and lacks will.

Necessity is simultaneously

beautiful, deadly powerful, and indifferent to human
conceptions of good and evil.

The indifference of

necessity, its ethical objectivity, makes it a compelling
model for human behavior, a model for ethics beyond good
and evil.

The human propensity to create these models

were the focus of Nietzsche's diagnosis.

Weil and Camus

each recognized that it was this temptation wrapped in
the cloak of power to which several tyrants in the
twentieth century fell.
III.

Power and the Problem of Oppression

The ethical appeal of necessity's apparent
indifference finds dangerous reflection in the
institutional arrangements of human civilization.

As

human constructs, institutional arrangements can only
aspire to the impartiality exhibited by necessity.

Weil

and Camus each acknowledged that institutions give
structure and order to our civilization, but both feared
the power thereby vested in these institutions.24
Because our institutions, whether political
(legislatures, laws) or cultural (rituals, customs), are
human constructs, they are insufficiently motivated or

24For both thinkers, the presence of an objective
"science" of politics, justifying these institutional
arrangements as natural, contributed to this basic
distrust of institutions and the conceits of human
knowledge.
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equipped to be self-regulating.

Institutions left

unattended yield the possibility of tyranny, that is, the
possibility that their power will be usurped by an
ambitious individual or group.

To Weil and Camus,

leaving this possibility unchecked was a fundamental flaw
of twentieth century politics.
Weil's concern was the effect of institutional power
on the human spirit.

In her early work she uses Marx's

methodology in order to unmask the socially oppressive
power concealed by contemporary political and economic
institutions.25
itself.

Weil recognizes that power serves only

All who come in contact with power, either as

wielders or subjects, are susceptible to its debilitating
effects.

Camus found oppression in institutional

25See for example Weil, "Critical Examination of the
Ideas of Revolution and Progress" in Oppression and
Liberty. 134-40; "The Great Beast: Reflections on the
Origins of Hitlerism" in Selected Essays. 89-140; "Is
There a Marxist Doctrine?" in Oppression and Liberty.
169-95; "Prospects: Are We Heading for the Proletarian
Revolution?" in Oppression and Liberty. 1-24;
"Reflections concerning Technocracy, National-socialism,
the U.S.S.R. and certain other matters" in Oppression and
Liberty. 25-9. The secondary literature on Weil's
Marxist influence is extensive. The most thorough booklength studies are Lawrence A. Blum and Victor J.
Seidler, A Truer Liberty; Simone Weil and Marxism (New
York and London: Routledge, 1989) and David McLellan,
Utopian Pessimist. See also Dietz, Between the Human and
the Divine, especially Chapter 3; and Staughton Lynd,
"Marxism-Leninism and the Language of Politics Magazine:
The First New Left...and the Third" in George Abbott
White, editor, Simone Weil: Interpretations of a Life
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981), lll36.
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arrangements, and he, like Weil, is convinced of our need
for them.

In his fiction, however, he depicts the

limitations of political and cultural institutions,
underscoring their limited responsiveness to the needs of
individuals and their vulnerability to abuse.

Power, in

Camus's work, is the inevitable product of all
institutional arrangements and though his literary
approach differs from Weil's philosophical approach, they
both recognize power as the core of institutional
relationships and as the root problem of institutional
politics.
Weil:

Power, Marx and Institutional order
Necessity exerts an influence through the natural

world that can appear benign or coercive to human beings.
Human political relationships, at both the institutional
and the interpersonal levels, reflect this human
encounter with the apparently capricious environment that
is necessity.

The coercive power manifest in human

relationships reflects the coercive presence of
necessity.

Weil discerns two categories of this coercive

power in human relationships.

She calls the coercive

component in interpersonal relationships "force" and the
coercive component of human institutional relationships
"power."

Though they differ in character it is important
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to remember that they derive from the same phenomenon:
the human encounter with necessity.
Weil distinguishes force from power in the following
way:

"Power, by definition, is only a means, or to put

it better, to possess a power is simply to possess a
means of action which exceeds the very limited force that
a single individual has at his disposal.1,26 Power,
thus, is the potentially oppressive ability to command
another individual's disposition of force.

Weil's

understanding of power took shape as an analysis of
institutional oppression.

In her early essay Oppression

and Liberty. Weil borrowed from the Marxist critique of
socially oppressive structures, concerning herself with
the effects of structural oppression on the human
spirit.27

Human beings attempt to shield themselves

from the capriciousness of necessity with structures or
institutions.28 But these structures become founts of
power in themselves and breed oppression.

"Wherever in

the struggle against man or nature," Weil writes,

26Weil, Oppression and Liberty. 69.
27Weil, Oppression and Liberty.
28A number of scholars have labelled Weil's early
concern with institutional relationships "functional
sociology." See the discussions in Pierce, "Simone Weil:
Sociology, Utopia and Faith" in Contemporary French
Political Thought: McLellan, Utopian Pessimist; and
Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine.
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"efforts need to be multiplied and coordinated to be
effective, coordination becomes the monopoly of a few
leaders as soon as it reaches a certain degree of
complexity."29

With this centralization, the power

exerted by these institutions may be manipulated and
abused.

Power means the ability to command the

disposition of force.

This ability to command usually

relies on coercion and a material superiority.

Power

that depends upon the control of matter, argues Weil, is
unstable.

The exercise of power, determined by the

possession or lack of possession of the material wealth
of society, arbitrarily divides that society into those
who command and those who obey with the result that "the
whole of social life is governed by the struggle for
power, and the struggle for subsistence only enters in as
one factor, indispensable to be sure, of the former."30
The recognition of the dialectical relationship of
power to the possession of material wealth belies Weil's
early debt to Marx who also found the source of
oppression in the material arrangement of society.

Weil,

like Camus and many of their contemporaries, found the
spirit of Marx's project compelling, but his theoretical
inadequacies impossible to ignore.

"Marx, it is true,

^ e i l , Oppression and Liberty. 64-65.
30Ibid., 71.
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never had any other motive except a generous yearning
after liberty and equality,” Weil writes, "but this
yearning, once separated from the materialistic religion
with which it was merged in his mind, no longer belongs
to anything except what Marx contemptuously called
utopian socialism.1,31

In his desire to transform

material reality into a less oppressive form, Marx
inverted the Hegelian fallacy and attributed the
qualities of mind to matter.

He put his faith in

material transformation of their environment to save
human beings from themselves.

"Marx's truly great idea,"

Weil argues, "is that in human society as well as in
nature nothing takes place otherwise than through
material transformations."32

In his revolutionary

thought, however, Marx had abandoned his otherwise useful
materialist method.

Weil sought to reclaim Marx's method

and to focus on the conditions and limits indigenous to
human culture.
Weil's misgivings about Marx's conflation of mind
and matter derive from his revolutionary goal:

the

emancipation, not of human beings, but of the forces of
production.

Through his "scientific method," Marx

believed that a modern technique (emancipated production)

31Ibid., 45.
32Ibid., 45.
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would liberate humanity.

Weil argues that Marx's faith

in modern technique reveals his dependence upon the
methods of the capitalist system he so wishes to see
dismantled.

She argues of Marx:

In his view, modern technique, once freed from
capitalist forms of economy, can give men, here and
now, sufficient leisure to enable them to develop
their faculties harmoniously, and consequently bring
about the disappearance, to a certain extent, of the
degrading specialization created by capitalism; and
above all the further development of technique must
lighten more and more, day by day, the burden of
material necessity, and as an immediate consequence
that of social constraint, until humanity reaches at
last a truly paradisal state in which the most
abundant production would be at the cost of a
trifling expenditure of effort and the ancient curse
of work would be lifted; in short, in which the
happiness of Adam and Eve before the fall would be
regained.33
Capitalism is dependent on a technique, the division of
labor, which subjugates the needs of human beings to the
needs of the "naturally" functioning market.

Marx, Weil

shows, simply intended to replace one technique with
another.

Productive forces may be liberated, she argues,

but human beings will still be imprisoned in their
discrete, spiritually vacuous tasks.
By invoking the Adam and Eve story, Weil underscores
her understanding of the mythopoeic character of Marx's
analysis.

She also reveals her suspicion of his faith in

33Ibid., 43.
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technique.34 Marx imaginatively assumes that there is
some secret, intrinsic virtue to productive forces that
will enable human beings to overcome the obstacles of the
material world.

Attributing the imaginative qualities of

mind to matter makes this assumption possible.

While

Weil believes that a certain kind of imagination serves
humanity well, Marx's imagination, which he calls
"science," yields a dialectic the function of which is
the ceaseless improvement of modes of production.

This

ideal of material progress Weil finds incompatible with
respecting the limits of human capabilities.

Ironically,

Marx's unceasing aspiration to improve production mirrors
the aspiration to efficiency that forms the very core of
capitalism.

In Marx's thought the aspiration is a faith

in the liberation of productive forces and results in a
kind of religion.

"The term religion may seem surprising

in connection with Marx," Weil writes, "but to believe
that our will coincides with a mysterious will which is
at work in the universe and helps us to conquer is to
think religiously, to believe in Providence."35

^Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Mvth in Karl Marx
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961) and David
McLellan's "Introduction" to Karl Marx, The Grundrisse
(New York: Harper, 1971) both make this point forcefully
and persuasively.
35Weil, Oppression and Liberty. 44.
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The problem of the present order, as Weil diagnosed
it, was that human beings had been made to adapt to the
needs of instruments (like technique) originally created
to serve them.

Weil later felt the physical consequences

of this as a laborer in various factories.

A preliminary

solution, she argues, is to have techniques, including
instruments of labor and governance, adapted to the needs
of human beings.

She wondered whether "it is possible to

conceive of an organization of production which though
powerless to remove the necessities imposed by nature and
the social constraint arising therefrom, would enable
these at any rate to be exercised without grinding down
souls and bodies under oppression."36

Weil never

believed that reorganizing production would completely
liberate human beings from oppression.
inevitably requires some constraint.

Human community
She did think that

reorganizing production could make human existence less
physically and spiritually debilitating.

Though her

emphasis changed in her later work, the well-being of
those "souls and bodies" remained Weil's focus in her
social and political thought.

The ambiguity of human

nature dictates the need for governing political, social
and economic structures.

The task was to bring those

^Ibid., 56.
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structures in line with the needs of human beings qua
human beings.
Weil concedes that power is the inevitable residue
of the functioning of social and political institutions.
Limiting that power, especially in its negative effects,
was the responsibility of both those subject to it and
those wielding it.

Limiting power in the social sphere

is the province of the individual human being who through
reason possesses the capacity for autonomy.

Weil thought

Marx bequeathed modern humanity a useful starting point:
the conditions of existence do determine the limits and
methods of social reform.

Human beings must, Weil

believed, seek social evolution in the daily efforts of
the individual human being, mindful of the limits
represented by human nature, temperament, education,
routine, customs, practice, natural or acquired needs,
and environment.37

In short, human beings must remain

mindful of their relationship to nature and suspicious of
the project of mastering it.
Growing knowledge of the natural environment coupled
with the human ability to convert simple ideas into tools
to maximize labor made nature more useful but also
stripped it of its divine character.

When this happens,

the ignored divinity takes more of a human shape, and

37Ibid. , 59.
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human beings falsely declare themselves emancipated from
nature's dominion.
appearance.

But that emancipation is only an

Human beings must eat, sleep and reproduce

and so remain subject to immediate natural necessity.

In

"mastering" nature, however, human beings had learned the
lessons of necessity well.

Their social relationships

have come to mirror the appearance of necessity.

But

while the relationships of necessity are ruled by a
disinterested influence, those of the social order
modelled on necessity can only be ruled by directed power
or force.

To the degree that humanity is no longer

harried by nature, Weil argues, "man escapes to a certain
extent from the caprices of blind nature only by handing
himself over to the no less blind caprices of the
struggle for power."38
Power is the non-physical material substance of
human society exercised by material means.39 Though the
exercise of power is limited by the material conditions
from which it issues, power, by its nature, seeks to

M Ibid., 83.
39In his work on Weil, David McLellan aptly
describes force as a kind of "non-physical matter" whose
chief characteristic, we might add, is movement. See
McLellan, Utopian Pessimist. 75. The concept of "non
physical" matter is a difficult one, but essential to
understanding Weil's thought. A non-political example
might be the way we sometimes think of love as a thing we
are in or not.
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transform those material conditions.

Beyond this, power

seeks its own self-preservation and can only do that
through expansion.

To expand, it must increase the

amount and quality of material available to it.

Several

loci of power attempting to preserve themselves at the
same time create an atmosphere of competition very much
akin to war.

Weil argues that this atmosphere of war is

inevitable because every power consciously strives to do
three things:

1) to improve production and control in

its own sphere; 2) to limit or destroy its competitors;
3) to extend to the farthest possible limit the social
relations on which it is based.40

If Weil is right and

the problems of the social order are tied to the exercise
of power, then those problems cannot be addressed without
adjusting the way power is viewed.

Nineteenth century

notions of progress lacked an appropriate understanding
of the nature of power.

A system based on power will

only create new resources for its own expansion, not for
some utopian transformation at the end of history.41
"In general," Weil writes, "one can only regard the
world in which we live as subject to laws if one admits
that every phenomenon in it is limited; and it is the

40Weil, Oppression and Liberty. 72.
41Ibid., 73-75.
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same for the phenomenon of power, as Plato
understood."42 The arbitrary exercise of power ignores
this limitation.
its own growth.
itself.

It is in the nature of power to seek
Power cannot be expected to regulate

In competition with other loci of power it

reaches beyond the limits of what it can effectively
control.

This internal contradiction is the seed of

destruction carried by all oppressive power-based
systems.43

There is, then, a fundamental opposition

between the limited material bases of power and the
unlimited character of the race for power considered as a
relationship among human institutions.44 The human
drive to acquire power eventually outstrips the limited
material bases of power with cataclysmic results.
Primitive man was a slave to necessity.

Now, Weil

writes, "collective dominion transforms itself into
servitude as soon as one descends to the scale of the
individual, and into a servitude fairly closely
resembling that associated with the primitive conditions
of existence.1,45 The lesson to be learned, argues Weil,
is that in spite of claims of "progress," human beings

42Ibid., 75.
43Ibid., 75.
“ ibid., 76.
45Ibid., 79.
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are still subject to an even more exacting necessity than
that found in nature.

They are subject to the human-made

necessity of power.46
Camus:

The Limits of Power— Ritual and Institutions

Like Weil, Camus distrusted institutional
arrangements and the power they wielded, but he could not
envision human society without them.

The fragility of

human existence required the protective devices embodied
in social institutions like governing structures and
rituals.

These structures and rituals are the vessels in

which the substance of a civilization are borne.

They

embody the principles upon which society is based.
Ritual acts, from political rituals like jury trials and
voting to more basic communal rituals like burial, are a
renewed public recognition of those principles.47

In

46Ibid., 83.
47See David I. Kertzer, Ritual. Politics and Power
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). The
scholarship on the relation of ritual to politics is
extensive. See, for example, the discussions in Murray
Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1964); David Kowalewski,
"The Protest Uses of Symbolic Politics: The Mobilization
Functions of Protester Symbolic Resources," Social
Science Quarterly. Volume 61 (1980): 95-113 and J.G.A.
Pocock, "Ritual, Language, Power: An Essay on the
Apparent Meanings of Ancient Chinese Philosophy,"
Political Science. Volume 16 (1964): 3-31. For the
problem of the use of the term "ritual" see, for example,
Jack Goody, "Against 'Ritual': Loosely Structured
Thoughts on a Loosely Defined Topic," in Sally F. Moore
and Barbara G. Meyerhoff, eds., Secular Ritual (Assen:
Van Gorcum, 1977), 25-35.
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Camus's novels, he uses ritual to demonstrate the
emergence of the unsatisfactory use of a political power
that eschews considerations of meaning for those of
material control over its subjects.
Rituals, especially those having to do with the
disposition of the dead, appear in Camus's work as a
reminder that a community cannot derive its identity only
from its political structures.

Camus suggests that in

extraordinary circumstances the institutions and rituals
of the political order overwhelm and supplant elder
communal rituals.

In these circumstances, communities

must define themselves by the political power they wield
and find they have nothing to fall back on when that
power is inadequate to the task before it.

In the

abrogation of the ritual, the meaning upon which
political authority is based has been abrogated out of
existence.
Besides being repositories of meaning, rituals have
another function.

They can be made to serve society's

interest by defining "norms" and justifying their
enforcement.48 This punitive-preservational function

^ h i s is an implied concern of Emile Durkheim, The
Elementary Forms of Religious Life, translated by Joseph
Swain (Glencoe: Free, Press, 1974). See also Kertzer,
Ritual. Politics, and Power and Sean Wilentz, editor,
Rites of Power: Symbolism. Ritual and Politics Since the
Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1985).
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renders ritual susceptible to manipulation.

Camus

portrayed this manipulation in his fiction, suggesting
that ritual meaning can be abrogated under the aegis of
the legitimacy granted governing authority.

In

abrogating communal rituals, political power endangers
communal meaning.

Such power must necessarily become

coercive and, as suggested above, it must undercut
itself.
In his early novels The Stranger and The Plaaue. one
ritual in particular, the funeral, concerns Camus.49
That the disposition of the human body is very important
to Camus reflects his orientation to the natural world.
His affection for the physical aspects of human existence
and his indifference to the question of an existence
after death made the fate of the physical self critical.
For Camus, the body shown reverence in life is worthy of
similar reverence in death.

Lack of respect for the

physical self becomes, for Camus, an indication of the
state of civilization and a commentary on its use of
power.
work:

There are two central funeral images in Camus's
the funeral of Meursault's mother at the beginning

of The Stranger and the apparent digression on burials in

49Camus, The Stranger and Camus, The Plaque.
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Part Three of The Placrue.50

An examination of these

images as confrontations between communal meaning and
political power shed light on Camus's understanding of
the dangers of modern conceptions of political power.
In The Stranger, the funeral is used as a coercive
tool by authorities seeking Meursault's conviction for
murder.

Meursault's disinterest in his mother's funeral

is the crime for which he will really be convicted and
sentenced to death in the novel.

His weapon is not the

gun he uses to kill the Arab, but the cold indifference
with which he kills expectations of human emotion.
novel's famous first line demonstrates:
today.

The

"Maman died

Or yesterday maybe, I don't know."51

Meursault's is an indifference not born of cruelty, but
rather of his own unwillingness to lie to himself for the
sake of public appearances or for the comfort of
others.52

He refuses to express a sense of loss that he

does not feel, but by doing so places himself outside of
the community, which rituals like the funeral are

50Camus, The Stranger. 3-14 and Camus, The Plaaue.
165-185.
51Camus, The Stranger. 3.
52For a good cross-section of commentary on The
Stranger see Adele King, editor, Camus's L'Etranaer:
Fifty Years on (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992) and
the older, but still useful essays in Germaine Bree,
Camus: A Collection of Critical Essays (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962).
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supposed to sustain.

The funeral, a ritual designed to

honor the dead, to console the living and to allow one to
publicly make peace with the death of a loved one, is for
Meursault not a source of consolation but rather a
necessary chore.

Viewing the body, conversing with the

funeral director, the long, hot walk to the burial site,
and the sweating undertaker's helper are all part of the
oppressive environment of the funeral Meursault endures
with a studied lack of interest.
Meursault's indifference is viewed as inappropriate,
even, as the reader later learns, dangerous.

Certainly

his murder of the Arab validates the view that
indifference like Meursault's can be dangerous.

But

here, as later at his interrogation and trial, a
structure, the funeral ritual, interposed between
Meursault and the accepted mores of society, fails.

Much

is made at trial of Meursault's cool disinterest in his
mother's funeral.

This "evidence" is supposed to reveal

the character of a man the judge calls "Monsieur
Antichrist" each day after questioning him.

Since the

funeral ritual cannot glean the appropriate response out
of Meursault's indifference, political authority sees fit
to use the funeral, despite its religious significance,
for social coercion, as a manifestation of societal power
and judgment.

In this respect the ritual is compromised
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by the authorities either to try to coax some
"acceptable" response from Meursault or to bring him to
judgment.
Meursault's response to the funeral ritual calls
into question the adequacy of the ritual to serve its
function in this social environment.

That it fails to

elicit the appropriate response from Meursault is
troubling but not decisive.

Camus implies that a

responsive social order would have recognized his lack of
a need for consolation, honored the dead, and not held
Meursault accountable for the way he mourned.

While

society cannot be disinterested about its rituals, it
must be careful not to overstep boundaries of its
authority; that is, it must be cautious in construing the
relationship of political power to fundamental rituals.
In this case, the attention paid at Meursault's trial to
his actions during and after the funeral strip the ritual
of its sacrality and show society's investment in
coercing Meursault into behaving "normally" through the
ritual.

It also compromises the more secular trial

ritual by disregarding the sacrality of the funeral and
emptying the funeral of its content except as evidence of
Meursault's character.53

53Camus, The Stranger. 98-107.
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Meursault's profound indifference to the sacrality
of the funeral ritual is thus mirrored by the
authorities.

In the extraordinary circumstance of a man

who would not cry at his mother's funeral, the ritual is
compromised by the society whose meaning it helps define.
Meursault's behavior at the funeral becomes a measure of
his suitability to live in society, and the ritual
thereby becomes another instrument of social coercion.
Meursault is tried and convicted by a society which, in
its willingness to compromise its rituals, values its own
power and preservation over any commonly-held meaning
(sacred or political) of the community.
Camus further delved into the complexities of the
interaction of political authority and communal meaning
in his post-World War II novel The Plaque.

In the middle

of the chronicle, Part Three, as the effects of the
plague reach their height, the narrator undertakes an
apparent digression on burials:
The narrator cannot help talking about these
burials, and a word of excuse is here in place. For
he is well aware of the reproach that might be made
him in this respect; his justification is that
funerals were taking place throughout this period
and, in a way, he was compelled, as indeed everybody
was compelled, to give heed to them. In any case it
should not be assumed that he has a morbid taste for
such ceremonies; quite the contrary, he much prefers
the society of the living and— to give a concrete
illustration— sea-bathing.54

54Camus, The Plague. 172.
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This part of the novel is seething with an
uncharacteristic irony.

The plague has isolated Oran

from the rest of the world and now it isolates the people
of Oran from each other.
for fear of infection.

Social interaction is minimized
Plague pays no heed to the human

need for consolation and so pays no heed to the human
need for ritual ceremonies like funerals.

In these

circumstances, the authorities have no choice but to
acknowledge the disturbing reality.
choice troubles Camus.

This choiceless

There are times, as in the

different circumstances surrounding Meursault, when
rituals are inadequate.

Their power to ground human

existence is undeniable, but that power is limited and
can be compromised.

However efficacious it may be to do

away with or alter such a communal ritual, Camus
suggests, a society must not do so lightly.

Without

meaningful ritual, civilization is imperilled.
In the initial stages of the plague, the funeral
ritual, from hospital to earth, is reduced to fifteen
minutes.

People are not allowed to die in the presence

of loved ones.

The sick are taken to hospital to die

alone and loved ones are then quarantined.

When the sick

die, they are whisked away to the graveyard where a
familiar scene is repeated.

No sooner, the narrator

writes,
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had the priest begun to sprinkle holy water than the
first sod rebounded from the lid. The ambulance had
already left and was being sprayed with
disinfectant, and while spadefuls of clay thudded
more and more dully on the rising layer of earth,
the family were bundling into the taxi.55
As the intensity of the plague increased, even these
formalities were dispensed with.

A coffin shortage

precipitated reuse of the coffins available.
were refused access to the burials.

Relations

For public health

reasons, mourning the dead became a crime.

They kept

patrols of the areas around the burial sites to prevent
loved ones from sneaking in to mourn.

Then came the all

too familiar image of mass burials:
In a patch of open ground dotted with lentiscus
trees at the far end of the cemetery, two big pits
had been dug. One was reserved for the men, the
other for the women. Thus, in this respect, the
authorities still gave thought to propriety and it
was only later that, by the force of things, this
last remnant of decorum went by the board, and men
and women were flung into death-pits
indiscriminately. Happily, this ultimate indignity
synchronized with the plague's last ravages.56
The imagery of Nazi atrocities is powerful, but Camus
invites us to consider whether the circumstances in
reality and fiction are really as different as they
appear.

By invoking the image, Camus alludes to the

rational institutional arrangement of the extermination
of European Jews by the Nazis and invites us to consider

55Ibid., 174.
56Ibid., 175.
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whether political power has usurped the ritual in the
creation of a horrific new secular form of ritual.57
The question of this transformation of ritual is
critical.
The death camp imagery becomes even more explicit
when the available cemetery space runs out.

The

cemeteries are dug up, their former occupants taken to a
crematorium and the plague victims buried in their place.
During the plague's worst ravages, plague victims
themselves are taken by street-car to a crematorium set
up on the outskirts of town where their earthly remains
are incinerated.

Doctors try to convince residents that

the ashes and odor from the crematorium are not harmful,
but
the residents of this part of town threatened to
migrate in a body, convinced that germs were raining
down on them from the sky, with the result that an
elaborate apparatus for diverting the smoke had to
be installed to appease them. Thereafter only when
a strong wind was blowing did a faint, sickly odor
coming from the east remind them that they were
living under a new order and that the plague fires
were taking their nightly toll.58

570n the organizational nature of the extermination
camps, see, for example, Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and
the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991)
and Richard L. Rubinstein, The Cunning of History; The
Holocaust and the American Future (New York: Harper,
1978).
58Camus, The Plague. 178-179 (my emphasis). In
images such as these one sees where commentators derive
their sense of the novel as a parable of the Second World
War. See Shoshana Felman, "Camus's The Plague: Or a
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In the plague narrative, public health considerations
supplant communal meaning and the ritual.

The fever

breaks before the local authorities have to devise
further ways to deal with the number of bodies.

"Happily

it grew no worse," the narrator writes, "for otherwise,
it may well be believed, the resourcefulness of our
officials, not to mention the burning capacity of our
crematorium, would have proved unequal to their
tasks."59
Though different, the two cases of assault on
ritual, and therefore on communal meaning and identity,
reflect dangerously inappropriate uses of political
power.

In the one case, public order required the

compromise of the ritual, but another ritual

of that

order, the trial, is also compromised in the process.

In

the other case, the indifference of plague to public
health meant the authorities had to dispense with the

Monument to Witnessing" in Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub,
editors, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature.
Psychoanalysis and History (London: Routledge, 1991), 93119; Steven Kellman, The Plaque: Fiction and Resistance
(New York: Twayne Publishing, 1993); Roger Quilliot, Sea
and Prisons: A Commentary on the Life and Thought of
Albert Camus, translated by Emmett Parker (University,
AL: University of Alabama Press, 1970); Philip Thody,
Albert Camus: 1913-1960 (London: Hamish Hamilton,
1961); Raymond Stephanson, "The Plague Narratives of
Defoe and Camus: Illness as Metaphor," Modern Language
Quarterly 48:3 (September 1987): 224-41.
59Camus, The Plaque. 179.
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ritual itself during plague-time.

The result of the

abrogation of ritual may be a perverse transformation of
the elder ritual, stripping it of its sacr«ixity and
giving it over to the preservation of governing
authority.

Or, it may be a simple sacrifice of meaning

to other more immediate ends, as in Meursault's trial.
In either case, the ritual is transformed and the
community's self-understanding will have to be recreated
before legitimate political power may be exercised.
The impotence of basic rituals in the face of
natural necessity (like plague) is one thing, but their
impotence in the face of political authority seriously
troubles Camus.

The political world Camus depicts values

public order above all else including questions of
meaning and identity.

The more serious the threat to

that order, the more drastic the measures human beings
are willing to take to combat it.

In the case of Camus's

plague narrative, one protective device (the funeral
ritual) gives way to another (political institutional
power) as the meaning of the burial ritual becomes
subject to the discretion of authorities who find they
must ultimately do away with the ritual if the community
is to survive.

Camus understands the need to subjugate

ritual to governmental regulation in extraordinary
circumstances, but the fragility of basic rituals clearly
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disturbs him.

In neither The Stranger nor The PIague is

an effort made to preserve the truth or meaning embodied
in the ritual.

Governing authorities know that ritual is

essential, but freely disregard it when it hinders the
(extra-)ordinary functioning of the political community.
Defining the parameters of a community's needs and
limiting the power of those entities entrusted to
preserve them is a problematic proposition at best.
Camus suggests that the roots of a community, including
the meaning and identity embodied in their rituals, are
an important source of protection against tyranny and
should be preserved as such.
The depiction of confrontations between a sacral
ritual like funeral and governing authority (even
ritualized as in the trial) in Camus suggests his concern
with the nature of political power and authority in the
twentieth century.

The confrontation is between communal

meaning, rooted in the traditions and history of a
society, and the institutional forms that meaning takes
in governing structures.

Camus finds governing

structures far too willing to compromise communal
meanings.
situations.

There are degrees of culpability across
Certainly the prosecution of a murderer and

the implementation of public health measures during
plague are not the same in scope or content.

But the
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implication is the same in both cases:

when governing

forms begin ignoring the content of communal rituals,
when communal meaning is no longer a factor in the
administration of the state, all that remains are the
forms of that administration.
When only the forms remain, the question becomes one
of the legitimate exercise of political power.

When

governing forms ignore basic communal rituals, they
deprive themselves of the communal meaning upon which
their authority is based.

Forms without deeper meaning

lose their power to claim willing obedience from those
they rule.

Forms without substance are forced to command

obedience through more coercive means.

Camus's

depictions suggest that the communal meaning embodied in
ritual is one of the limits of the power of government.
The question is not whether the authority of communal
rituals may be compromised by the exercise of political
power.

These rituals are, after all, human constructs

and susceptible to some regulation.

Camus's real concern

seems to be the character of that regulation.
Weil and Camus each see political power and its
exercise for what it is:
of political community.

necessary to the preservation
They also recognize that power

can take on a life of its own.

Human beings are subject

to that power, but must also subject that power to
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limits, as in Camus's concern with the "appropriate" use
of that power when confronted by communal meaning.

For

both, then, power is a part of the natural world and thus
a part of the political world.

Unlike necessity's

influence, power in the political world can and must be
regulated.

Forms of government can mitigate the abuses

of power, a system of "checks and balances" come to mind,
but it is the human being exercising political power who
must ultimately regulate its uses.
IV.

Force, Agency, Abstraction and the other

The need shared by Weil and Camus for a responsible
human presence in the exercise of power expresses not so
much a faith that this check will suffice, but rather a
demand for human responsibility in the use of power.
Weil and Camus each wrote out of a context in which the
power of political institutions was uncontrolled by any
other value save the acquisition of more power.

This

conception of power justified itself with abstractions,
treating the human presence itself as an abstraction.
Each human being, however, possesses "agency," that is,
each exerts an influence on the natural and political
world.

Weil and Camus concerned themselves with the

character of that agency, specifically conceiving human
agency as a counter to the enormous power of political
institutions.
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Weil:

The Objectifying Capacity of Force
In Weil's thought, the apparently coercive presence

of necessity manifests itself as power on the level of
human institutions.

Weil uses the term "force” to

describe relationships in which one person exercises
control over the existence of another.

The effect of

this type of force on human beings is a recurrent theme
throughout Weil's political thought.60

Her most

profound discussion of the effects of force on the human
spirit occurs in The Iliad, or the Poem of Force.61
”The true hero, the true subject, the center of the
Iliad,” Weil writes, "is force."

In the Greek epic Weil

finds force employed by man, enslaving man, and having
accordingly adverse effects on the human spirit.

Weil

believed the poem vividly illustrated what certain people
in her own century had forgotten:

that the human spirit

"blinded by the very force it imagined it could handle"
ends up "deformed by the weight of the force it submits
to."62

^See for example Weil's essays "Human Personality"
and "The Power of Words" in Selected Essays. 9-34 and
154-71 respectively.
61Weil, The Iliad or the Poem of Force.
62This and earlier quote, ibid., 3.
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Weil defines force as "that x that turns anybody who
is subjected to it into a thing."63

Her use of the

algebraic unknown x is significant, for what she has
called a definition is actually more of a description of
an inexpressible.

Force is the unknown factor in human

relationships that determines the value of those
relationships.

It closely resembles the Nietzschean

"will to power" in that it held the potential for use in
the most productively creative ways or in the most
heinous and cruel ways imaginable.64 As the nominal
subject of the Iliad is war, specifically the Trojan War,
it is force in its more violent aspects that Weil finds
at work in the epic.

The presence of force in its

destructive aspects, however, does not preclude the
possibility of justice and love, and herein lies the
value of the poem to Weil and her discussion of force in
general.
Weil depicts force as a power possessed and abused
by individual human beings.

In the Iliad, there are

countless encounters on the battlefield and in the ranks

“ ibid.
^See Alphonso Lingus, "The Will to Power" in D.B.
Allison, editor, The New Nietzsche (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1985), 37-63. Weil balked at discussing Nietzsche
though she acknowledged his greatness as a thinker. See
her letter to her brother Andre in Seventy Letters cited
in Chapter One.
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of command in which one individual holds force to the
neck of one he has taken as an adversary.

This is force

in its most summary form— "the force that kills."65

The

abusive inappropriate exercise of force makes the other a
thing, as in killing a man, an act which turns the human
being into a corpse.

But there is a more cruel way to

use force, to turn a human being into a thing without
killing.

"How much more varied in its processes, how

much more surprising in its effects is the other force,"
Weil writes, "the force that does not kill, i.e., that
does not kill just yet."66

In this species of force,

the other is at the utter mercy of the wielder of force.
Death can come at any moment, or not.

In this

circumstance, the other becomes a contradiction, a thing
with a soul.

"He is alive, he has a soul," she writes,

"and yet— he is a thing."67
live inside a thing.

The soul was not meant to

In being held hostage through the

use of force, human being and soul are deprived of the
dignity that is the birthright of each human being.
Human being as thing is an unacceptable
contradiction for Weil.

The human presence exercises a

certain influence over other human beings by virtue of

65Weil, Iliad. 4.
“ ibid.
67Ibid., 4-5.
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that presence as human.68

The human presence is owed

consideration simply because it is human.

This

consideration, the pause human presences should produce
in each other, Weil calls reflection.
command reflection.
attention.

Things do not

Only the human commands such

Of the unfortunate creatures who are made

things but deprived of death, Weil writes, "their days
hold no pastimes, no free spaces, no room in them for any
impulse of their own. . . they are another human species,
a compromise between a man and a corpse."69

The life of

the thing is meaningless to all but the thing.

"This

thing constantly striving to be a man or a woman, and
never achieving it," Weil writes, "here, surely is death
but death strung out over a whole lifetime; here surely
is life, but life that congeals before abolishing."70
The person on whom force is used becomes a thing, but the
possessor of that force too suffers the consequences of
that possession.

Weil, in an echo of the Hegelian

master-slave discussion in the Phenomenology. finds that
the person as a thing is no longer able to see the

“ Simone Weil, "Essay on the Notion of Reading,"
translated by Rebecca Fine Rose and Timothy Tessin,
Philosophical Investigations 13:4 (October 1994): 297303.
69Weil, Iliad. 8.
70Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

121

possessor of force as a human being, and the question of
the humanity of the wielder of force is broached.71
"Force, in the hands of another," Weil argues,
"exercises over the soul the same tyranny that extreme
hunger does; for it possesses and in perpetuo the power
of life and death."72 Human beings are unfit to wield
this kind of power.

All through the Iliad, the pressure

of assuming this kind of power over others takes its
toll.

Force, Weil writes, "is as pitiless to the man who

possesses it, or thinks he does, as it is to its victims;
the second it crushes, the first it intoxicates.1,73
This kind of force, like the power native to
institutional relationships, lives only to replicate
itself.

Its exercise robs the human being of that which

could mitigate its effects, the power of reflection:
The man who is the possessor of force seems to walk
through a non-resistant element; in the human
substance that surrounds him nothing has the power
to interpose, between the impulse and the act, the

71See Hegel's discussion of lordship and bondage in
Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 111-19.
Essential commentaries include Alexandre Kojeve,
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, translated by James
H. Nichols, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1969) and George
Armstrong Kelly, "Notes on Hegel's 'Lordship and
Bondage,'" in Kelly, Hegel's Retreat from Eleusis:
Studies in Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978), 29-54.
^Weil, Iliad. 10.
^Ibid., 11.
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tiny interval that is reflection. Where there is no
room for reflection, there is none either for
justice or prudence. . . Thus it happens that those
who have force on loan from fate count on it too
much and are destroyed.74
Force blinds its possessor, hubristically self-identified
as indestructible, to an inevitable undoing.

So

intoxicated, wielders of force assume complete license in
dealing with other human beings who take on the aspect of
so many objects.

"And at this point they exceed the

measure of the force that is actually at their disposal,"
Weil writes, "now we see them committed irretrievably to
chance; suddenly things cease to obey them."75 At the
point of overreaching, the wielder of force is undone;
naked to misfortune.
Force is a component of all human relationships, but
when human beings overreach and use it to make others
submit to their will they have sown the seeds of their
own destruction.

"Violence," Weil writes, "obliterates

anybody who feels its touch."76

But because it is part

of the fabric of human relationships, Weil maintains the
possibility of the moderate use of force either to
counter or correct another's excessive use of it or

74Ibid. , 13.
^Ibid., 14.
76Ibid., 19.
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simply to act in accordance with love or justice.

Even

the moderate use of force, however, can be double-edged:
A moderate use of force, which alone would enable
man to escape being enmeshed in its machinery, would
require superhuman virtue, which is as rare as
dignity in weakness. Moreover, moderation itself is
not without its perils, since prestige, from which
force derives at least three quarters of its
strength, rests principally upon that marvelous
indifference that the strong feel toward the weak,
an indifference so contagious that it infects the
very people who are the objects of it.77
The illusion of indifference provides a distance on human
actions that permits the justification of any action,
just or hideous, that can be carried out.

Only the self-

conscious, moderate exercise of force can counter the use
of force that is like a will to power.

Only in a self-

awareness of the consequences of individual actions can
human beings behave justly and with a sense of obligation
to others.

Such moments of self-awareness, resembling

what Camus calls lucidity, Weil calls miraculous
manifestations of grace.
In the context of force, the possibility exists for
the creative use of the force human beings possess.
These moments Weil understands as "grace."

The value of

the Iliad lies in its ability to represent, in the midst
of an environment of unrelenting force, "those brief,

^Ibid.
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celestial moments in which man possesses his soul."78
She writes,
The soul that awakes then, to live for an instant
only and be lost almost at once in force's vast
kingdom, awakes pure and whole; it contains no
ambiguities, nothing complicated or turbid; it has
no room for anything but courage and love.79
Moments of grace and self-possession are few in the
Iliad.

The notable exceptions, she argues, are the

scenes of friendship which are the only redeeming product
ofthis violent world

of force.

Without the courage and

love of friendship, Weil believes, justice is not
possible.
Justice and love, which have hardly any place in
this study of extremes and of unjust acts of
violence, nevertheless bathe the work in their light
without ever becoming noticeable in themselves,
except as a kind of accent. Nothing precious is
scorned, whether or not death is its destiny;
everyone's happiness is laid bare without
dissimulation or disdain; no man is set above or
below the condition common to all men; whatever is
destroyed is regretted.80
For Weil, the Iliad demonstrates that the precious in
each human life must be preserved.

Subjecting the human

spirit to force is turning the non-corporeal into matter.
What is then destroyed is our access to the decreated
part of reality.

The threatened subjection of the human

78Ibid., 27.
^Ibid.
“ ibid., 30.
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spirit is the common human lot and is borne differently
by each according to his or her virtue.

To offset the

effects of this subjection, Weil believes that human
beings must strive to resist the impulse to control their
environment, including the human substance of that
environment, for "only he who has measured the dominion
of force, and knows how not to respect it, is capable of
love and justice."81
The issue with which Weil grapples in her discussion
of force in the Iliad is the nature of human action in
the world or human agency.

Her analysis reflects her

concern that modern human relationships, economic, social
and political, are run through with power considerations.
The consequence, and this does not change from Oppression
and Liberty to the essay on the Iliad, is the warlike
conduct of all forms of human intercourse.

Read in this

way, Weil's analysis of force and human agency in the
Iliad becomes a sharp critique of human agency and ethics
in the contemporary world.82 The warlike conduct of

81Ibid., 33 (my emphasis) .
82Weil was an avowed pacifist until the world in
which she lived forced her to alter her stance on the
subject. See Weil, Oppression and Liberty. 114-115;
Weil, "Cold War Policy in 1939," in Selected Essays. 17794; Weil, "East and West; Thoughts on the Colonial
Problem," in Selected Essays. 195-210; Weil, "A European
War Over Czechoslovakia?" in Formative Writings. 264-68;
Weil, "The Next World War," International Review 3:1
(1938): 35-43.
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human affairs is incompatible with an ethical way of
being in the world.

Because in Weil's analysis

competition consumes all the time and energy at one's
disposal, little of either is left for the stillness and
reflection, that is, reflection upon the human presence,
that could potentially bring order and calm to human
affairs.

Weil's task, insomuch as she was concerned with

mundane political matters, was to formulate a way of
being in which reflection could be reintroduced as a
priority in the conduct of human affairs.
Camus:

Institutional and Human Agency

As Camus's primary political concerns are ethical,
his depictions of human agency also reflect a concern
with what Weil calls "force."

At least two kinds of

human agency are present in Camus's fiction.

The first,

which can be called institutional agency, draws heavily
on his understanding of power and derives its authority
from institutional representation.

Institutional agency

brings to bear the authority of an abstraction on
concrete situations, and often compromises the integrity
of human interaction.

The second form of agency, which

can be called human agency, involves this interaction and
the relationship of individuals to each other in the
mutually supportive pursuit of common interests.

In this

type of relationship the means of force are never
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distinct from their ends, whether those ends are
comprehension and action, compassion and understanding,
or love.

In the first form, agency means literally

acting as the agent of an institutional entity.

In the

second, agency means acting as the agent of mankind.
Camus finds the first is often necessary, but he
questions its legitimacy.

The second kind of agency he

found increasingly rare, but its recovery is essential to
a healthy, functional political order.
Camus believed that institutional authority is
necessary to the maintenance of order in human community.
The power these institutions wield must be brought to
bear by human agents.

In institutional agency, these

actors interpret the interests of the institution and
through their actions further those interests.

Against

the potential objection that this agency is simply an
extension of the institution's power, it must be recalled
how the power of the funeral ritual was compromised by
agents of the law in both The Stranger and The Plaque.
Institutions, like law and ritual, exert an authority by
their very functioning that is distinct from the force
brought to bear by individuals in the name of these
institutions.

In The Stranger. The Plaque and his play

"The Just Assassins," Camus tests the efficacy of
institutions and the principles upon which they are
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founded by placing their agents in complex, almost
Sophoclean, situations.

The outcome is nearly always an

unsatisfactory compromise from the perspectives of the
individuals involved and the needs of human community.
Institutional agency, like the power of the institutions
themselves, is portrayed at the limits of its efficacy,
and the consequence is the use of force to compel an
unsatisfactory end to an unresolvable predicament.
In Camus's fiction there are two principal
mainsprings of institutional agency:
the law.

Christianity and

No one is condemned without the offer of

salvation from one or both of these sources.

The pairing

of Christianity and the law is instructive because both
are attempts to institutionalize the practice of an
ethical or moral way of being.83 Each projects itself
as a bearer of what Western civilization understands as
the good and the just.

Camus finds neither adequate to

this task, but he finds this neither surprising nor
necessarily a weakness.

His portrayals of Christian and

legal authorities are therefore ambiguous.

The force

they bring to bear is appropriately limited; Camus asks

^Camus makes uses this pairing as late as his novel
The Fall in the person of Clamence the judge-penitent.
See Albert Camus, The Fall, translated by Justin O'Brien
(New York: Knopf, 1956).
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only that the agents of this force recognize those
limitations.
Christianity posed real difficulties for Camus.84
Nowhere in his work is this more evident than in the last
chapter of The Stranger where Meursault is offered the
chance to confess to the chaplain in his jail cell while
awaiting execution.

The chaplain ignores Meursault's

requests to be left alone and finally pushes Meursault to
verbal and physical assault.
I grabbed him by the collar of his cassock. I was
pouring out on him everything that was in my heart,
cries of anger, cries of joy. He seemed so certain
about everything didn't he? And yet none of his
certainties was worth one hair of a woman's head.
He wasn't even sure he was alive, because he was
living like a dead man.85
The chaplain had come to offer consolation in the form of
a confession.

What he achieved by his persistence was a

purgation, but not the kind he anticipated.

After

Meursault finishes his tirade, he is somehow liberated.
When the guards tear the chaplain away from Meursault,
the chaplain can only look at Meursault with tears in his
eyes and walk out of the cell.

From his perspective, the

w What Camus's ambiguous attitude toward
Christianity means to the rest of his thought is one of
the more enduring debates about his work. See, for
recent examples, Brown, "Grace: A Meditation from
Camus"; Cohn, "Camus's Sacred: The Growing Stone"; and
Duncan, "Judgment Without Redemption: Camus Version of
the Fall."
85Camus, The Stranger. 120.
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perspective of Christianity,

the chaplain has failed. He

has failed to lead Meursault

to God.

Meursault's perspective, the

encounter has been

cathartic.

But from

It was, he thinks, "as if that blind rage had

washed me clean, rid me of hope; for the first time, in
that night alive with signs and stars, I opened myself to
the gentle indifference of the world."86

The encounter

with the chaplain, intended to bring Meursault comfort
and the chaplain satisfaction, serves only the former,
bringing Meursault a kind of peace with his own fate, a
"happy" fate devoid of hope.
The encounter of the chaplain with Meursault
underscores one of the problems with institutional
agency;

measuring success by the goals of the

institution which are often inapplicable to the
situation.

The chaplain, owing to the source of his

authority, had his own goals going into the encounter.
They were to offer Meursault consolation, "allow" him to
confess his sins, and to bring him to a relationship to
God.

Given Meursault's worldview, these goals are

unrealistic and doomed to failure.

There is nonetheless

a purgative value of the encounter for Meursault, which
is lost on the chaplain who must judge the outcome based
on his original goals.

Had the larger goal of the

“ ibid., 122.
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chaplain been to offer Meursault a purgative release, the
chaplain may have been able to leave the cell in a
different frame of mind.

The chaplain sees a doomed

soul; Meursault feels a free man.

Meursault refuses

consolation, but embraces the cathartic effect of his
outburst.

He can now face the judgement of the court

with the scorn he associates with overcoming the human
condition.
Camus's ambiguous depiction of Father Paneloux in
The Plague further illustrates the complexity of
Christian institutional agency in trying circumstances.
Father Paneloux's first sermon following the outbreak,
for all its weaknesses, offers the first comprehensive
reading of the plague's meaning. In his first sermon,
Father Paneloux reveals the plague as the judgement of
God on the citizens of Oran.

His is the first

explanation of its causes and the first suggestion that
the plague is somehow manageable.87

You, he tells the

people of Oran, have brought this upon yourselves.
Paneloux, as messenger, assumes the perspective of God
and places himself above the community.

He also implies

that an adjustment in the way the people of Oran live
their lives will mitigate the effects of the plague.

His

reading makes the causes and consequences of the plague

87Camus, The Plaque. 93-99.
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intelligible and places the responsibility for the plague
on the people of Oran.

The sermon creates a negative

sense of belonging among the citizenry, evoking a general
state of unrest akin to madness.88

In an attempt to

offer an explanation of and implicit solution to the
plague, Father Paneloux worsens the situation.
Father Paneloux's Christian reading of the plague is
counterproductive.

The disillusion in the community that

follows is incompatible with battling the plague.

The

priest is not moved to change his position until he
witnesses the particularly painful death of the
magistrate Othon's young son.

A frustrated Dr. Rieux

confronts Paneloux with the child's innocence, but
Paneloux responds "perhaps we should love what we cannot
understand."89 Rieux, like Ivan Karamazov, is not
convinced:
love.

"No, Father.

I've a very different idea of

And until my dying day I shall refuse to love a

scheme of things in which children are put to
torture."90

It is Rieux, however, who observes "We're

working side by side for something that unites us— beyond
blasphemy and prayers.

And it's the only thing that

“ ibid., 100-101.
89Ibid. , 218.
90Ibid., 218. See Camus's discussion of
Dostoevsky's Ivan Karamazov in The Rebel. 55-61.
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matters."91

Paneloux misinterprets Rieux's as a

statement about salvation.

The doctor responds,

"Salvation's much too big a word for me.
high.

I don't aim so

I'm concerned with man's health; and for me his

health comes first."92

Paneloux knows he has not

convinced Rieux to love what he cannot understand, but
Rieux and the experience have convinced Paneloux to
reconsider his first reading of the plague.
Paneloux's second sermon is entitled "Is a Priest
Justified in Consulting a Doctor?"93

This sermon is not

a refutation of his first, but the tone has changed.

His

voice is quieter and he refers to "We" instead of "You."
His first sermon, he argues, was true but lacked charity.
All human trials work together for the good of those who
believe.

Some things we can grasp as touching God, while

others we cannot.

There is no reason for the suffering

of a child, but we must believe or deny everything.

The

religion of plague-time is not the religion of everyday.
We must choose all or nothing, embrace or deny the
humiliations that go with our existence.
his religious ethic an "active fatalism."

Paneloux calls
Each of us

must be the one who stays and fights in the name of the

91Camus, The Plaque. 219.
92Ibid., 219.
93Ibid., 220-228.
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difficult love that is God's.

Paneloux concludes that it

is illogical for a priest to call on a doctor, and dies
of an illness that resembles but cannot be confirmed as
being plague.
With the second sermon, Father Paneloux embraces his
own impotence, but refuses to attribute the same weakness
to the God of the Church he serves.

His contribution to

the effort against the plague is the realization that
there can be no final reading of the source of evil.

The

force any single individual can bring to bear in plague
time must remain aware of its limits, and embrace the
consequences of those limitations.

His first sermon,

lacking charity, also lacked an awareness of his own
limitations, that as a human agent of the Church he was
incapable of assuming God's perspective.

The

inexplicable and painful death of an innocent rendered
his initial reading of God's will in the plague
meaningless.

The second sermon reflects Paneloux's

realization that the force and perspective he brought to
bear on the plague was institutional and human, not
divine.
The limitations of Christian agency are secondary to
the larger issue of the limitations of institutional
agency.

This is underscored by a look at agents of the

law in Camus's fiction and their attitude toward justice.
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During Meursault's interrogation, the judge and
prosecutors decide, based on his apparent indifference to
societal norms, that he is evil incarnate.

At the end of

a session, "the judge would lead me to the door of his
office, slap me on the shoulder, and say to me cordially,
'That's all for today, Monsieur Antichrist.'

I would

then be handed back over to the police."94 Can there be
another outcome besides death for one so judged?
Likewise, in The Plaoue. the magistrate Othon initially
has a particularly harsh understanding of justice.

When

Tarrou and Rieux encounter Othon, Tarrou asks the
magistrate if his work has increased owing to plague
conditions.95 Othon replies that criminal cases are
down and that most inquiries regard the new regulations.
Tarrou suspects that the reason for this apparent anomaly
might be because by contrast ordinary laws appear to be
good ones.

Othon replies, "What does that matter?

not the law that counts, it's the sentence.
something we must all accept."96

It's

And that is

In the minds of

Meursault's prosecutors and Othon, justice cannot take
account of extenuating circumstances.

Law works most

efficiently for them if the case is decided before it is

94Camus, The Stranger, 71.
^Camus, The Plaoue. 145-146.
96Ibid., 146.
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brought to trial.

Camus believed that this was an

irresponsible position for institutional agents to take.
Law thought of in this way is dangerous and resembles
absurdity itself.

The sentence on each human being is

death, but if, as Othon holds, the law does not count,
what transpires before death is of no real consequence.
All may well be permitted provided one is not caught.
In the "Just Assassins," Kaliayev, in jail for
political assassination, is approached by the magistrate
Skuratov to make a deal:

betray his comrades and he will

not die for assassinating the Grand Duke.
dismisses Skuratov as a "flunky."

Kaliayev

Skuratov accepts

Kaliayev's hostility, but ably defends his own position:
"One begins by wanting justice— and one ends by setting
up a police force."97 Kaliayev counters that the
assassination was in accordance with the dictates of
justice, but Skuratov replies "Appearances
notwithstanding, I am not your enemy.
that your ideas are wrong.
murder."98
his crime.

I won't even say

Except when they lead to

Kaliayev does not make a deal and dies for
But Skuratov effectively answers Kaliayev's

revolutionary rhetoric by pointing out its legal and
moral consequences.

The audience is left unable to trust

97Camus, Caligula and Three Other Plavs. 281.
98Ibid., 281.
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Skuratov, but also sure of the justice of his position
and the inevitability of Kaliayev's end.

With Skuratov,

in a play written after both The Stranger and The Placrue.
Camus offers an example of effective institutional
agency.

He is an intelligent, articulate foil for

Kaliayev's revolutionary zeal.

Unable to convince

Kaliayev to make a deal, he successfully clouds the issue
for the audience by questioning Kaliayev's contention
that justice and taking human life can be compatible.
In the cases of Meursault's judges and Othon the
magistrate, the justice enshrined in law is circumscribed
by the actions of its agents.

In the case of Skuratov,

the agent makes a compelling justification for upholding
the law based on the impermissibility of murder.

Othon's

outlook changes upon the death of his son from plague,
but the lesson is learned:

the character of the agent

determines the effectiveness of institutional power in a
given situation.

The agent's job is to make the

institutions they represent effective.

In extraordinary

circumstances, those agents may be called upon to take
unique measures to meet the exigencies of those
circumstances.

They must do so without compromising the

integrity of the institution.

When this last condition

is not met, institutional agency discovers that its rules
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of engagement are inadequate.

Only then is it "the

sentence that counts.1,99
The limited effectiveness of institutional agency
lies in its grounding in abstraction.

The choices made

by its agents refer to some principle or set of
principles that may or may not be shared by the actor and
may or may not be shared by the community.

The other

form of agency, human agency, always confronts
abstraction; that is what life in the absurd means.

The

obligation of human agency is not to choose against
abstraction, but to recognize that living entails
choosing among abstractions, and living ethically means
choosing the right abstraction.

In Camus's fiction, the

right abstraction is always the one that refers to the
specifically human.

In his fiction, especially The

Plague, Camus contends that the ethical actor should
always err on the side of human being.100
For Camus, abstraction entails disengaging the human
through the application of an idea or symbol, especially
in this case, some goal or interest that presents itself
as being at odds with the specifically human.

The

ambiguities of abstraction are vividly illustrated in The

"Camus, The Plaque. 146.
100,,Human being" refers to those sharing the
condition of being human. The term itself is an
abstraction, thus the need to choose among abstractions.
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Plaque when the journalist Raymond Rambert approaches
Doctor Rieux about getting out of the quarantined
Oran.101

The quarantine has left Rambert isolated from

his girlfriend back in France.
return to her.

He seeks desperately to

To this end, he approaches the doctor

about being certified plague-free.
no one can be so certified.

Rieux refuses because

Rambert bargains, but Rieux

replies that "the law was the law, plague had broken out,
and he could only do what had to be done."102

Incensed,

Rambert accuses Rieux of "using the language of reason,
not of the heart," of living "in a world of
abstractions."103

He accuses Rieux, who unknown to

Rambert is also isolated from his wife, of putting the
public health before the "more human" needs of those who
are separated from loved ones.

Rieux can only

acknowledge that this is so, but that it is more
complicated than that.

The two part company, but Rieux,

exhausted from his work, is stung by Rambert's words.
Rambert sets abstraction off as the opposite of love.
Abstraction, to Rambert, privileges the non-human over
against the human.

Rieux reflects:

101The account is in Camus, The Plaque. 83-92.
102Ibid., 87.
103Ibid.
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Could that term "abstraction" really apply to these
days he spent in hospital while the plague was
battening the town, raising the death-toll to five
hundred victims a week? Yes, an element of
abstraction, of a divorce from reality, entered into
such calamities. Still, when abstraction sets to
killing you, you've got to get busy with it.10A
Abstraction is impersonal, but no less real for Rieux.
He sees the negative ethical implications of regarding
others as abstractions, but in the context of plague, to
enter emotionally into each case would be suicide.
could not serve his function as doctor.

He

Rieux concludes

that there are different varieties of abstraction, that
in certain situations, abstraction is a necessary part of
the human armor.

What could be more abstract than the

anonymous, random suffering and death meted out by
plague?

To meet the exigencies of such a situation, that

is, "to fight abstraction," Rieux thinks, "you must have
something of it in your own make-up."105
There is another kind of abstraction, that which
Rambert thinks he encounters with Rieux.

It entails

adhering to abstract rules and regulations in an effort
to keep "special" cases to a minimum.

In this process,

those whose immediate interests are impeded by those
regulations have the specifics of their case disregarded
in the name of some public safety issue or other.

As a

10AIbid. , 88-89.
105Ibid. , 91.
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consequence, they feel as if authority has reduced them
from the status of human beings to that of abstractions.
There are times, as The Plaque vividly illustrates, when
it is necessary to conduct the polity in this way, that
is, constricting the needs of the one in the name of the
needs of the many.

But in situations that fall outside

the parameters of regulations, the limitations of those
regulations are reached, and decisions become matters of
personal judgment.

The decision becomes personal as the

line between the institutional response and the human
response is blurred.

This is what Rambert believes he

has confronted in Rieux.

From Rambert's perspective,

Rieux has fallen back on regulations to avoid dealing
with the specifics of Rambert's case.

A Sophoclean

conflict emerges as Rieux responds to Rambert's talk
about love with considerations of law, health and the
public good.

But Rambert's love is specific, and as the

reader learns, Rieux takes the law in this case to be a
generalized love encompassing all of humanity.

By not

acquiescing to Rambert's demand, Rieux prevents the
spread of the plague to innocent populations.

In Camus's

portrayal, abstraction, though dehumanizing, can be the
humane response to inhuman circumstance.
In his depiction of the episode between Rambert and
Rieux, Camus exhibits sympathy for both.

Rambert's
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personal rebellion against the abstractions of civil
society is not so different from Rieux's personal
rebellion against the epidemic.

It is when Rambert's

appeals are exhausted and he joins forces with Rieux and
the others to combat the effects of the plague that he
comes to understand the real nature of the fight.

The

point of the battle with the plague is not victory, for
the pestilence cannot be overcome, but survival, for it
can be outlasted.

Outlasting an ambivalent evil like

plague may be done one person at a time, but is better
done collectively.

This is the value of the struggle

depicted in The Plague over that depicted in The
Stranger, as Camus reminded Roland Barthes:
Compared to The Stranger. The Plague does beyond any
possible discussion, represent the transition from
an attitude of solitary revolt to the recognition of
a community whose struggles must be shared.
If
there is an evolution from The Stranger to The
Plague, it is in the direction of solidarity and
participation.106
The transition in the second novel represents not a
repudiation but an expansion, a further articulation of
the ethical path Camus began seeking with his earlier
work.

Camus seeks an ethical way of being in which the

cry of Rambert and the struggle of Rieux are embraced and
bound by communal and legislative norms.

Individuals

participate, but they can do so in the context of others

106Camus, Lyrical and Critical Essays. 339.
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through cooperation and a sense of purpose.

The struggle

against the oppressive use of power in politics need not
compel the resistor to use the methods of the oppressive
power.

The mistake of modern political actors had been

to resist tyranny by creating another form of tyranny.
Like Weil, Camus recognized that power begets either more
power or destruction.
approach was needed.

Old ways would not do; a new
For Camus, that new approach to

ethics had to embrace both the solitary (human beings die
alone) and the solidary (human beings all die alone) in
each human being.107
V.

Conclusion:

Prelude to an Ethic of Positive Force

Though their emphases differ, the ethic at work in
Camus's The Plaque mirrors the ethic emergent in Weil's
essay on the Iliad.

In rough outline, a number of

critical developments characterize this ethic of positive
force.
First, both Weil and Camus emphasize the
relationship of understanding or diagnosis to action.
Weil looks beyond the savagery of the battle in the Greek

107See Albert Camus, "The Artist at Work" in Exile
and the Kingdom, translated by Justin O'Brien (New York:
Knopf, 1957), 158. The painter Jonas undergoes a period
of spiritual and creative exile which ends when he puts
down his brushes. The story ends with the image of a
canvas "completely blank, in the center of which Jonas
had merely written in very small letters a word that
could be made out, but without any certainty as to
whether it should be read solitary or solidary."
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epic to see moments of friendship bathing the poem with a
kind of grace.

Camus's Doctor Rieux shuns final decision

over what to call the epidemic.

Instead, he chooses to

act on it to mitigate its effects.

He recognizes, like

Weil does in her essay on "The Power of Words," that
arguments over naming have become an excuse not to act in
modern political life.108 Others in Camus's novel, like
Tarrou, the civil servant Joseph Grand, and Rambert each
embrace Rieux's approach to one degree or other.
Second, there is a balancing of the needs of the
many and the needs of the one seen at work in the RieuxRambert encounter.

This was not an unquestioned

subjugation of the individual to the force of the state,
but rather an acknowledgment that the good of the
community often serves the good of the individual.

The

moments of friendship Weil finds in the Iliad similarly
obscure questions of state loyalty in the name of a
broader conception of human being.
Third and finally, in both Weil's essay on the Iliad
and Camus's The Plaque, there is a generalized love of
humanity that impels the members of opposing armies on
the one hand, and the medical community and the
sanitation squads on the other to meet the overwhelming
adversities of war and plague-time.

The presence of this

108Weil, "The Power of Words," in Selected Essays.
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generalized love demonstrates that even in the face of
extraordinary adversity, compassion, cooperation and
understanding can and do breed friendships, like that
which develops between Rieux and Tarrou, and concern for
the specific other, like Grand's looking after the
criminal Cottard.

Compassion, cooperation, and concern

for the other are missing in the political world as Weil
and Camus depict it and thus become the seeds of ethical
being for both thinkers.
In a context in which institutional force is
inadequate but necessary, the force of human
relationships evolves in connection with the struggle.
For Weil, these human relationships spring from
reflection, the pause that another human presence
produces.

That pause can be an eternity, the difference

between a measured response to a situation and a brash,
violent one.

Reflecting on the presence of every other

is a trying and difficult undertaking.
makes it appealing to Weil.

This fact alone

An ethical life is not

possible without effort; it is not possible in the
absence of this kind of reflection.
Camus portrays this kind of reflection in The
Plague.

It is friendship and the sense of their being

comrades-in-arms which makes the struggle against the
plague bearable for the characters in Camus's second
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novel.

Human agency is brought to bear through effective

joint and solitary action.

The characters draw a sense

of identity from their work, but their work manifests and
does not determine their humanity.

Humanity uses

abstraction to shield itself from necessity in its most
virulent forms.

But abstraction alone is inadequate as

Camus illustrates by having Rieux and Tarrou use their
passes to take a swim.

They escape to the beach and

begin swimming side-by-side "isolated from the world, at
last free of the town and of the plague."109 A calm
settles from this shared moment away:
They dressed and started back. Neither had said a
word, but they were conscious of being perfectly at
one, and the memory of this night would be cherished
by them both. When he caught sight of the plague
watchman, Rieux guessed that Tarrou, like himself,
was thinking that the disease had given them a
respite, and this was good, but now they must set
their shoulders to the wheel again.110
Here is a beautiful, vivid illustration of the positive
force possible and necessary between human beings.

It is

the positive force of shared belonging that Camus
illustrates in The Plaque and Weil refers to in her
discussion of the Iliad as love.

The remainder of this

essay will be an examination of how Weil and Camus in
different ways attempted to mold this admittedly vague

109Camus, The Plaoue. 257.
110Ibid.
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concept into concrete ways of being in the world.

The

next chapter will illustrate how each began their
positive response with the image of the creator that lies
at the core of their separate conceptions of work and
art.

Each, with differing emphases, offered the

attentive, creative engagement of our spiritual, social
and political environment as the best response to the web
of power relationships in which modern human beings were
enmeshed.
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WORK, ART AMD REVOLT:
THE CREATIVE USE OF FORCE
I.

Introduction

Simone Weil and Albert Camus shared a sense of the
presence of force in human relationships.

In human

contact with the natural world ("necessity"), in human
social and political arrangements ("power"), and in human
contact and interactions with each other ("force"), the
implied coercion of force colored all human
relationships.

The problem posed by this worldview was

not how to rid ourselves of the presence of force, but
rather how to make constructive, creative use of the
force that penetrates every facet of existence.
The thought of Karl Marx and the appeal of
revolutionary socialism indicated that the source of most
human beings' daily contact with what Weil calls "force"
could be found in their work experiences.

What Weil and

Camus found in modern labor was a mind-numbing
degradation in the name of efficiency and profit.

Each

suggested that a restoration of creativity to the process
of work and, by extension, to everyday existence, could

148
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counter the degrading effects of our contact with force.
The idea of creativity is a neglected aspect of the WeilCamus intellectual relationship, particularly in their
political thought.

Of the significant studies of the

relationship of Weil's political thought to that of
Camus, Fred Rosen's "Marxism, Mysticism, and Liberty"
most directly addresses the issue.1 Rosen demonstrates
the extent to which Camus adopted Weil's critique of
Marxism in The Rebel and based his conception of the
rebel as "artisan" on that critique.

Rosen concludes

from this that their differing conceptions of freedom and
justice reflect their mutual concern with and distrust of
the impulse in modern man to seek and impose absolute
values.

In The Rebel. Rosen argues, Camus draws heavily

on Weil's original and authoritative analysis of the
sources and effects of oppression in the modern world.
Modern technology, in Weil's judgment, renders impossible
the realization of Marx's twin visions:

the end of the

1Fred Rosen, "Marxism, Mysticism and Liberty: The
Influence of Simone Weil on Albert Camus," Political
Theory 7:3 (August 1979): 301-319. Two other comparisons
of Weil and Camus tend to be religious studies concerned
with the spiritual connections in the two thinkers. See
Stewart Sutherland, Faith and Ambicruitv (London: SCM
Press, 1984), chapter 4; and John Dunaway, "Estrangement
and the Need for Roots: Prophetic Visions of the Human
Condition in Albert Camus and Simone Weil," Religion and
Literature 17:2 (Summer 1985). Pierce's analytical
history Contemporary French Political Thought contains a
sweeping and valuable historical account of the two
thinkers' political theory.
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separation of intellectual and manual labor and the
universal availability of knowledge.

The rationalization

of productive forces, specialization and increased
division of labor had transformed the lot of the worker.
"Active, creative workmen who understood their work and
machines," Rosen writes, "were replaced by passive
automata who were ignorant of the nature and
technicalities of their work and performed simple
repetitive operations."2 Weil correctly concluded that
the problem would not be remedied by fostering false
hopes of the liberation of workers, but rather must be
overcome through re-organizing production in such a way
as to restore to the worker a lost dignity.
Camus's use of Weil's critique went beyond a mere
reconsideration of Marxist thought.

Rosen finds that

Camus's conception of the rebel issues directly from
Weil's critique and is manifest in Camus's discussion of
art and the artist.

"Like the rebel, and, in opposition

to the nihilist revolutionary," Rosen writes, "the artist
both negated the world as he found it and consented to
use it in his own creative synthesis."3

The artist,

living in this tension between negation and consent,

2Rosen, 3 03.
3Ibid., 305.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151

"provides the foundations of civilization itself."4
Camus did not propose to turn civilization over to
artists, but rather to transform industrial workers into
artisans, in this way restoring their human dignity.
Rosen argues that this conforms to Weil's vision in which
the worker became an artisan when he united intelligence
with execution.

"It is not clear," writes Rosen, "how

Camus intended artistic creativity to enter, for example,
into precision engineering.

But Camus might have

followed Simone Weil's conception of the artisan worker
as one part of civilization of which his own conception
of the creative artist formed another indispensable
part."5 Rosen contends that if Camus intended to have a
civilization based "solely" on artistic creativity, he
would have a hard time reconciling it with industrial
labor, even were he able to salvage the idea of the
artisan.

By way of comparison, Rosen argues that

creativity played no significant role in Weil's thought.
She did not, he contends, concern herself with trying to
reconcile such disparate modes of being as art and labor
with or without a conception of the artisan.

Her main

concern, Rosen writes, "was with individual autonomy and
liberty and not with the simplicity of life and honest

4Ibid., 305-306.
5Ibid., 306.
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virtue traditionally associated with the peasant cobbler
and carpenter.1,6 As the present discussion will
demonstrate, however, creativity is an important part of
Weil's political thought and a conception of the artisan
played a significant role in her thought.

It is the

precise relationship between work and art, and the
creative component that these two forms of activity
share, that is the keystone of the political theory of
both Weil and Camus.
Rosen correctly stresses the importance of work and
art in the thought of Weil and Camus.

By not exploring

the relationship of work to art, that is, by keeping them
as discrete categories and not thinking about them
relationally, he misses the importance of the creative
sensibility to both writers.

As a result, Rosen, among

others, reads Camus far too literally on the point of the
artist's role in politics and disregards Weil's use of
the image of artistic creation especially in discussions
of political reform.7 Their conceptions of creativity

6Ibid., 308.
7A discussion of the creative aspect of Weil's
thought is sorely missing from the secondary sources
except in discussions of her emphasis on work. Among the
best of these are McLellan, Utopian Pessimist: Dietz,
Between the Human and the Divine; and Winch, Simone Weil;
The Just Balance. There are, however, extended
discussions of the affect of Camus's conception of
himself as artist on his political thought in Hanna, The
Thought and Art of Albert Camus who set the tone for
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draw on the image of the artist while transcending
considerations of art.

As Rosen's analysis indicates,

each wished to imbue labor with a creative component as a
way of restoring dignity to the mass of human beings.

If

Weil and Camus agree on a conception of the artisan, it
is in the sense that all human beings can be, within
limits, artisans of their own political existences and
their own political environments, the form of government
under which they choose to live and its legal and
institutional manifestations.

A creative sensibility

empowers the ruled, but also benefits the ruler, provided
appropriate limits are respected.

Weil and Camus each

sought to restore this limiting creative sense of the
political to modern politics.
Augmenting the work of Rosen and others, this
chapter will explore how Weil and Camus integrated the
creative into their considerations of both labor and
politics.

The next section will outline the critique of

the relationship of workers to revolt inherited from
earlier thinkers and which they saw in the revolutionary
movements of the day.

Neither Weil nor Camus believed

further discussions in Bree, Camus; John Cruikshank,
Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt (New York;
Oxford University Press, i960); Sprintzen, Camus; A
Critical Examination; and Isaac, Arendt. Camus and Modern
Rebellion. My own analysis relies heavily on these
works.
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the relationship of modern labor and revolution had
survived modern working conditions.

Their response to

this realization was not to abandon work, but rather to
recast it in a way that each worker could know his or her
self through work.

Changing the conditions of the

factory would not suffice.

The idea behind their

recommendations regarding labor was to free up mental and
physical space for the worker.

Responsible, engaged

citizenship was incompatible with the life led by the
miserable automatons the modern factory system had
created.

If the "spare" time created by their

recommendations was to be valuable, then a more general
reorientation to human existence would have to be made.
To this end, both thinkers emphasized valuing the
"creative" element in human social and political
existence.

Camus explored the creative through his own

artistic abilities.

He considered artistic creation the

purest form of revolt.

Weil too used the image of the

artist to capture the sense of the creative, albeit from
a subtly different perspective.

The third part of this

chapter will explore the image of the artist and the role
of the creative in the political thought of each thinker.
The chapter will argue for their attempt to integrate the
reconception of work and the image of the creator as a
foundation of individual political ethics.
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II.

Revolt and the Reconception of Work

The Presence of Marx
As Rosen suggests, Camus explicitly admired Weil's
thoroughness in analyzing modern working conditions.

"It

is.only fair to point out that this era of technocracy,"
he insisted in The Rebel, "was described about twenty
years ago by Simone Weil in a form that can be considered
complete."8 Camus's familiarity with Weil's writings on
modern labor stems from his editorial responsibility for
the publication of her works after her death.9

This

section will demonstrate Camus's affinity for Weil's
thought as she built on the Marxist critique of
capitalism and then applied it to her own experience in
the factories of Paris.

Both thinkers found modern

industrial labor akin to slavery in its degrading effects
on the worker.

An elder economy of craftsmen had given

way to an economy of job-holding wage slaves.

Both

thinkers believed that this slavery should have
engendered revolt.

That it did not was one of their

chief shared concerns.

Despite the rhetoric of

socialists and other political activists, modern slavery

8Camus, The Rebel. 216.
9This work includes an unsigned introduction to
Weil's La Condition ouvriere (Paris: Gallimard, 1951).
His thoughts there are reflected in his comments on her
work in The Rebel. 214, 216 discussed below.
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engendered only resignation.

The prevailing economic

order denied the worker a consciousness of self which
might have borne a sense of autonomy and human dignity.
The unconsciousness of the modern worker left him or her
nothing in the name of which to revolt.

The task, as

Weil and Camus understood it, was not to lead the workers
in revolution, but rather to restore dignity in work.
This section will conclude with an overview of the three
ways in which Weil and Camus proposed to reconceive work.
Their shared concern with the plight of the modern
worker and the revolutionary implications of that plight
issued from their early critical encounter with the
thought of Karl Marx.

Each in turn, Weil in Oppression

and Liberty (1934) and Camus in The Rebel (1951),
embraced the impulse driving Marx's thought but rejected
his nearly religious conclusions about the historical
inevitability of a worker's revolution resulting in the
downfall of capitalism and the establishment of a
classless society.10 Their doubts about the prophetic
efficacy of Marx, however, did not prevent either from

10The religious content of Marx's analysis is
recognized in Weil, Oppression and Liberty. 40-56 and
Camus, The Rebel. 209-215.
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taking his critique of capitalism seriously and retaining
work at the center of their political concerns.11
Weil believed that Marx had failed to follow his own
valuable methodology.

Erroneously assuming that

productive forces necessarily increase and that social
institutions adapt in the interest of creating a good
society, Marx lost sight of the role human beings play in
the material transformation of the world.12 The
decisions human beings make about the use of resources
and of force, not the "forces" themselves, determine
whether a structure or condition is oppressive or not.
"Productive forces" have no instrinsic value of their
own.

They are the product of human initiative.

If shown

to be oppressive in the exercise of their power, steps
should be taken to ensure more positive use of that
power.

For Weil, Pierce argues, human initiatives "are

in no way determined by the conditions of existence, but
the conditions of existence render ineffective all

11Valuable discussions of the thought of Karl Marx
on that of Weil can be found in McLellan, Utopian
Pessimist; Deitz, Between the Human and the Divine and
Winch, The Just Balance. Equally useful discussions of
Marx's influence in Camus's thought can be found in Fred
Wilhoite, Beyond Nihilism; Albert Camus' Contribution to
Political Thought (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1968); Bree, Camus; Sprintzen, Camus: A
Critical Examination: and Isaac, Arendt. Camus and Modern
Rebellion.
12Weil, Oppression and Liberty. 45-46.
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initiatives not compatible with them."13 Her affinity
for Marx's project sheds doubt on the first part of this
conclusion, but there is little doubt that she believed
successful initiatives demanded compatibility.
Though Camus found in Marx a revolutionary prophecy
failed, he believed that Marx was owed credit for
identifying the despair of the contemporary world:

"that

when work is a degradation, it is not life, even though
it occupies every moment of life."14 Marx appreciated
that the degrading conditions of modern work were reality
for most people.

He had done humanity a service "by

demanding for the worker real riches, which are not the
riches of money but of leisure and creation.1,15 Marx
only failed by succumbing to the temptation to prophecy
and leaving himself open to misinterpretation.

Marx's

demand for justice was dependent upon the success of his
prophecy and not upon an "ethical justification of
justice."

Therefore, the relationship between ethics and

justice disappears in Marx's prophecy when as "good and
evil are reintegrated in time and confused with events,
nothing is any longer good or bad, but only either

13Pierce, 95.
14Camus, The Rebel. 209.
15Ibid., 209.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

159

premature or out of date."16 Marx's material dialectic
was incompatible with a theory of revolution dependent on
the actions of those dead souls who labored in the modern
factory.

He passed this failure on to those who took his

name and his method into the twentieth century.

Camus,

with great sympathy for socialist movements and their
concern for the worker, did not share their faith that
political maturity would come out of the extreme poverty
of the modern worker.17
Work, Slavery and Revolt
In at least one respect, Weil and Camus agreed, Marx
had been right.

A sympathy for and an understanding of

the experience of work was a necessary beginning to
recasting human social and political existence.

Only at

the point of contact with force might one discern how to
make constructive use of it to rebuild a civilization
nearly destroyed by two global conflicts in thirty years.
Weil's was the most direct contact with the problems of
the laborer.

An activist for workers' rights while a

young professor, she undertook a year of factory work
during which time she tried to take the living conditions
of her fellow workers as her own.

The experience

profoundly changed her attitude regarding the means and

16Ibid.
17Ibid. , 215.
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limits of social reform.

Camus's early experience as a

journalist in the poor quarters of urban Algeria exposed
him to the misery of the laborer and elicited a sympathy
he would maintain throughout his life.

Like Weil, he was

very active in socialist labor movements early in his
career and though he soon grew suspicious of "movements,"
as Parker and others show, he never stopped concerning
himself with the plight of the modern worker.18
Weil found in the structure and relationships of the
factory the categories of force she later identified in
her essay on the Iliad, namely "the force that kills" and
"the force that kills but not just yet."
pervasive in the modern workplace.

Both were

Addressing the

effects of force on the worker, Weil believed, required
sharing their lot firsthand.

As she told her philosophy

students at Roanne in 193 3:
Human beings are so made that the ones who do the
crushing feel nothing; it is the person crushed who
feels what is happening. Unless one has placed
oneself on the side of the oppressed, to feel with
them, one cannot understand.

18See Emmett Parker, Albert Camus: The Artist in
the Arena (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1965); Ian Birchall, "The Labourism of Sisyphus: Albert
Camus and Revolutionary Syndicalism," Journal of European
Studies 20:2 (June 1990): 135-165; and Fred Wilhoite,
Bevond Nihilism.
19Simone Weil, Lectures on Philosophy, translated by
Hugh Price (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1978), 139.
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Weil embraced this classroom rhetoric by working a number
of factory jobs in Paris from late 1934 until late summer
1935.20

A self-consciously undertaken experiment, the

impact of this experience on Weil's thought cannot be
overstated.

Throughout the period, Weil, as frail and

weak of constitution as she was perceptive, kept a
journal in which she jotted down her feelings during and
after her fourteen-hour days.21

She also wrote a series

of letters which reflected her journal and in which she
added further insight into her experience.22 Her
perspective on the relationship of work and revolution
profoundly changed during this period of intensive labor,
but it also strengthened her resolve that refashioning
civilization required rethinking modern attitudes toward
work and the worker.

20From December 1934 until 1 April 1935 she worked
in the factories of the Alsthom company, manufacturers of
electrical equipment for trams and underground railroads.
Upon leaving Alsthom, she was hired at the factory of J-J
Carnaud et Forges de Basse-Indre at Boulogne-Billancourt
where she was engaged in metal-stamping. Dismissed from
this job on 7 May without explanation, she got another
factory job at Renault on 5 June which she held until she
left voluntarily, as she had planned, on 22 August.
McLellan, Utopian Pessimist. 93-117, and Petrement,
Simone Weil: A Life are most valuable biographical
discussions of this experience.
21Weil, "Factory Journal" in Formative Writings.
149-226.
22Weil, Seventy Letters.
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Weil conceived work as the application of the mind
as a tool to the matter which makes up created reality.
Through work, that is, through the methodical action of
reason, human beings bring usable order to matter.23
Weil initially found that immersion into factory life
liberated her from such abstract formulations.

"I feel

that I have escaped from a world of abstractions," she
wrote to a pupil in 1935, "to find myself among real
men— some good and some bad, but with real goodness or
badness."24

But she also found an environment organized

with little regard for human needs.

The human need to

apply mind to matter through work was swallowed up by the
modern factory.

What went on in the factory was not

work, but rather an oppressive and spiritually deadening
repetition of mechanical movement.

Weil wrote to a

friend and the wife of a prominent trade-unionist,
Albertine Thevenon:
I have learnt quite a lot about the organization of
a firm. It is inhuman; work broken down into small
processes, and paid by the piece; relations between
different units of the firm and different work
processes organized in a purely bureaucratic way.25

^See the discussion of the methodical action of
reason in Chapter One.
24Weil, Seventy Letters. 11.
25Ibid., 15.
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A replaceable part in a larger machine, the worker was
constantly at the mercy of a mechanical form of
necessity.

The work itself reflected the inhuman context

in which it was performed:
One's attention has nothing worthy to engage it, but
on the contrary is constrained to fix itself, second
by second, upon the same trivial problem, with only
such variants as speeding up your output from 6
minutes to 5 for 50 pieces, or something of that
sort.26
The repetition of the work and

the fixity of one's

attention on a minute fragment of the process denied
worker any sense of accomplishment or completion.

the

Weil

found the emphasis rather on efficiency, more pieces
finished in less time.

Any increase in efficiency was

met only by expectations of further increases in
efficiency.
Factory conditions produced effects on human beings
akin to slavery in the sense that the worker was acutely
aware of being nothing in him- or herself and completely
obedient to overseers.

Weil discerned two elements to

the slavery of work in the factory:

"the necessity for

speed and passive obedience to orders."

In the first

instance, "one has to repeat movement after movement
faster than one can think, so that not only reflection

26Ibid.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

164

but even day-dreaming is impossible.1,27 Each day, for
as long as one worked, "the worker has to annihilate his
soul, his thought, his feelings, and everything.1,28 In
the case of work orders, "from the time he clocks in to
the time he clocks out he may at any moment receive any
order; and he must always obey without a word."29 The
certainty of dismissal and the near impossibility of
getting another job discouraged the worker from any
response beyond the most passive obedience.

The

spiritual effects of industrial servitude, Weil mused,
might be worse than those of actual slavery.

"I have

sometimes thought it would be better to be subdued to
that sort of obedience by external compulsion, such as
the whip," Weil wrote Auguste Detouef in 1936, "rather
than have to subdue oneself to it by repressing all that
is best in oneself."30
Camus found the de facto slavery of the modern
worker an enduring concern as well.

By the time he

published The Rebel, he had come to full sympathy with
Weil's analysis of the oppression of the modern worker.
"The passages by Simone Weil on the condition of the

27Ibid., 22.
28Ibid.
^Ibid.
30Ibid., 56.
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factory worker," Camus insisted there, "must be read in
order to realize to what degree of moral exhaustion and
silent despair the rationalization of labor can lead."31
"Every worker," he wrote in echo of Weil, "has been
brought to the point of performing a particular function
without knowing the overall plan into which the work will
fit."32 Workers so employed were denied the sense of
involvement and achievement with their work that had been
the hallmark of an older understanding of work.

Those

who oversaw the worker assumed a social position over and
above the worker.

As in a form of slavery, the

overseer's presence reminded the worker of his or her
status as something less than human.

In this sense, the

overseers, Camus argued, had become "a class whose social
importance is decisive.1,33 Weil, Camus believed, had
added oppression by occupation to the traditional
understandings of oppression by armed force and by
wealth.

"The Marxist plan to abolish the degrading

opposition of intellectual work and manual work," Camus
believed, "has come into conflict with the demands of
production."34 The consequence was the rise of the

31Camus, The Rebel. 216.
32Ibid., 214-15.
33Ibid., 215.
^Ibid., 214.
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manager and the precedence of the accumulation of capital
over human fulfillment.

Weil, Camus concluded, was

right; "the worker's condition is doubly inhumane in that
he is first deprived of money and then of dignity."35
Though The Rebel reflects his appreciation of Weil's
analysis of the condition of the worker, Camus's own
experience of the servitude of the working class dated
from his upbringing in Algeria.

Living side-by-side with

other poor colons and poorer Moslems, Camus early grasped
the connection between work and survival, between hard
work and futility, between poverty and being viewed as a
barely human thing.36

His early journalism tended to be

a crusade against the conditions endured by the working
class.

The young Camus quickly denounced French

government crackdowns on strikes.

In 1938, new Premier

Edouard Deladier sent 10,000 French riot police into the
Renault factory in Paris to break up a sit-down strike.
The police, using tear gas against the non-violent
strikers, were successful.

In response, Camus used

bitter irony to chastise Deladier in a December 12, 1938
article for Alcer-Republicain for his use of "those
instruments of democracy called troops, militia and

35Ibid., 216.
^See Lottman, Albert Camus; A Bioaraphv on Camus's
childhood. Also instructive is the newly released semiautobiographical final work of Camus, The First Man.
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counsels of war.1'37 By his action, Deladier had shown a
complete lack of compassion and understanding of what it
meant to be a worker.

The incident only confirmed for

Camus that politicians
have no idea how difficult it is to be simply a man.
To live, without being unjust, a life filled with
inequities, on 1200 francs a month, with a wife, a
child and the certainty of dying without being
inscribed in the textbooks of history.38
Camus had little doubt that Deladier could justify his
action in the name of one governmental necessity or
other.

His concern was that this justification could

only be known to the worker, in whose interest Deladier
was supposed to exercise the powers of his public office,
in the form of "layoffs, factory shutdowns and the loss
of my 1200 francs."39
Camus gave his sense of the absurdity of the
worker's condition further expression four years later by
choosing the figure of Sisyphus as the "absurd hero" in
his first extended philosophical essay.40

In the myth,

Sisyphus is condemned for loving life to the detriment of

37Albert Camus, "Dialogue Between a Premier and a
Worker Earning 1200 Francs a Month," Alger-Republicain,
December 12, 1938, translated in Parker, Artist in the
Arena. 18.
38Ibid., 18.
39Ibid.
40Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus and Other Essays.
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his reverence for the gods.

His punishment is

"ceaselessly" to roll a rock to the top of a mountain,
"whence the stone would fall back on its own weight."
The gods judged the futility of the punishment
appropriate to the crime:

they "thought with some

reason," Camus wrote, "that there is no more dreadful
punishment than futile and hopeless labor."41

For

immortal gods this would indeed be true, but it was clear
to Camus that the immortals of the myth failed to
appreciate that which Sisyphus comprehended all too well.
What the gods imagined to be "dreadful punishment" was
precisely what Sisyphus (and Camus) understood as absurd
existence.
labor.

The modern workplace was one of Sisyphean

"The workman of today," Camus writes, "works

every day in his life at the same tasks, and this fate is
no less absurd."42 The tragedy of this condition is
that the worker, like Sisyphus, is conscious of his fate,
but he feels helpless in the face of it.

Camus

distinguished this conscious helplessness from the latent
power of Sisyphean revolt:
Sisyphus, proletarian of the gods, powerless and
rebellious, knows the whole extent of his wretched
condition: it is what he thinks of during his
descent. The lucidity that was to constitute his

41Ibid., 110.
42Ibid., 121.
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torture at the same time crowns his victory. There
is no fate that cannot be overcome by scorn.43
Turning that scorn into revolutionary political action
was the goal of the political activists of the period,
for whom Camus, like Weil, had great admiration but
little hope.

Rather, Camus's use of Sisyphus, at least

one commentator has suggested, "is to opt for piecemeal
economic struggle" against a more sweeping vision of
revolution.44
Camus's optimism for the future of the working class
reached a highpoint in the aftermath of the liberation of
Paris.

In an editorial for Combat. he argued that the

"immediate realization of a true popular democracy"
depended upon support for the working class.

"We believe

that any politics separated from the working class is
futile," he wrote, "and that the future of France is the
future of its working class."45

Camus's disillusionment

with the postwar world issued directly from the failure
of the new order to respond to the needs of those who
built it.

The postwar French government was no more

43Ibid., 121.
44Birchall, 146.
45Camus, editorial, Combat. October 1, 1944, in
Albert Camus, Between Hell and Reason: Essays from the
Resistance Newspaper "Combat" 1944-47. translated by
Alexandre de Gramont (Hanover: Wesleyan University
Press, 1991), 58.
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responsive to the needs of its working people than the
unmourned Third Republic.

Worse, neither that neglect

nor the terror and murder of the previous three decades
had generated the "no" that would turn the worker from
slave into rebel.

His disappointment was the impetus for

Camus's conception of rebellion:
What is a rebel? A man who says no, but whose
refusal does not imply a renunciation. He is also a
man who says yes, from the moment he makes his first
gesture of rebellion. A slave who has taken orders
all his life suddenly decides that he cannot obey
some new command. What does he mean by saying 'no'?
. . . [H]is no affirms the existence of a
borderline.46
Workers who had taken orders all their lives had not been
able to summon the courage or strength to say "no" when
the time came following the liberation.

Camus

nonetheless retained some hope, and twenty years after
abandoning the Communist Party and partisan politics in
general, his concern for the oppression of the worker
remained in the foreground of his political thought.

In

an article for L'Express in November 1955, Camus
protested the treatment of the working class and issued a
warning to a France indifferent to their struggle.

The

French people must, he wrote,
neither scorn reforms in the name of some fardistant society, nor forget when reforms are
proposed that our final goal is the reintegration of
the working class into all its rights through the

46Camus, The Rebel. 13.
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abolition of the proletariat. Sooner or later the
resistance of privileges will have to give way
before the general interest.47
Camus continued to believe that when "the existence of a
borderline" could finally be affirmed, the general
interest would be served.

The problem for Camus and Weil

was why the modern worker had been unable to say "no."
Camus's "no" required a consciousness of self as
human being that Weil found the factory worker could not
afford.

The temptation, to which Weil herself succumbed,

was to work in a condition of unconsciousness in order to
shield the self from suffering.

This was easier than

remaining conscious, which meant waging an unceasing war
with inhuman conditions.

"I do not say it is impossible

to retain the lucidity, self-responsibility, and dignity
appropriate to a human being," she wrote to Detoeuf, "but
it means condemning oneself to a renewed fight every day
against despair."48

Surviving modern industrial labor

meant enduring a dialectic of humiliation and reaction.
Factory work
means a daily struggle with oneself, a perpetual
self-mutilation and sense of humiliation, and
prolonged and exhausting moral suffering for all the
time one must be abasing oneself to satisfy the
demands of industrial production and then reacting,
so as not to lose one's self-respect and so on

47Camus, editorial, L'Express. November 25, 1955
quoted in Emmett Parker, Artist in the Arena, 151.
48Weil, Seventy Letters. 57.
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indefinitely. That is the horror of the modern form
of social oppression; and the kindness or brutality
of one's superiors makes little difference.49
The consequences of enduring this dialectic were physical
and spiritual exhaustion.
experience invaluable.

Yet Weil found the factory

Her factory journal concludes

with an assessment of the violence the factory
perpetrates against the human being:
Gained from this experience? The feeling that I do
not possess any right whatever, of any kind (take
care not to lose this feeling). The ability to be
morally self-sufficient, to live in this state of
constant latent humiliation without feeling
humiliated in my own eyes; to savor intensely every
moment of freedom or camaraderie, as if it would
last forever. A direct contact with life.50
The ability to be morally self-sufficient was a critical
discovery for Weil.

She found it essential to surviving

the soul-numbing conditions she encountered in the
factory.

Here Weil found that the choice for self is not

always the choice for nihilism.
choice for survival.

Sometimes it is the

Weil found that among those who had

made this choice, her fellow workers, a correlation
between "generosity of heart and aptitude for general
ideas" existed.

She discerned that a human being "always

needs to have some external signs of one's worth for
oneself" and that "the main fact isn't the suffering but

49Ibid., 39.
50Weil, Formative Writings. 225.
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the humiliation."51

External signs of worth, signs as

modest as being trusted with the knowledge of the process
in which work is done, were completely lacking from the
modern work experience.
Weil's writings on her factory experience reveal
that the conditions in factories were even worse than the
young workers' rights activist had imagined.

From her

ignorance of the reality of factory life, her political
activism, she realized, had been grossly inadequate.

In

the future for Weil, no sound conception of politics
could ignore the condition of the modern worker.

In

January 1935, she wrote to Albertine Thevenon:
Only when I think that the great Bolshevik leaders
proposed to create a free working class and that
doubtless none of them— certainly not Trotsky, and I
don't think Lenin either — had ever set foot inside
a factory, so that they hadn't the faintest idea of
the real conditions which make servitude or freedom
for the workers— well, politics appears to me a
sinister farce.52
Weil found the structure of the factory oppressive, the
work itself oppressive and worse, those oppressive

51Ibid.
52Weil, Seventy Letters. 15 (Weil's emphasis). Weil
had a very unsatisfactory meeting with Trotsky in late
December 1933. Petrement, 188, writes: "Simone took
advantage of Trotsky's presence [in the family apartment]
to have a discussion with him. The discussion quickly
turned into a quarrel; in the adjoining room, where they
were seated, the Weils heard a series of loud shouts.
(The shouting was most likely done by Trotsky. Simone
always spoke calmly; she never got excited during a
discussion.)"
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conditions deadening the souls of the workers.

Robbed of

the will to think or to live in any way that could be
called human, they became non-beings.

The sinister farce

of revolutionary politics was that it believed that these
soulless, beaten creatures were the vanguard of anything
more than a next generation of industrial slaves.

Weil

concluded that "an obviously inexorable and invincible
form of oppression does not engender revolt as an
immediate reaction, but submission."53
That the oppression of modern industrial labor
squelched the human revulsion toward oppression was a
serious matter.

The realization undermined a line of

revolutionary thought dating back to the nineteenth
century.

Weil retained her revolutionary hopes but now

found it necessary to reexamine the means.

In an

important letter to Monsieur Bernard, the technical
director of a factory at Rosieres, Weil wrote:
I long with all my heart for the most radical
possible transformation of the present regime, in
the direction of greater equality in the relations
of power.
I do not at all believe that what is
called revolution nowadays can bring this about.54
The reasons were simple:

the conditions of the factory

were not conducive to thought, much less to
considerations of human dignity, to outrage over denial

53Weil, Formative Writings. 226.
54Weil, Seventy Letters. 40.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

175

of that dignity or to thoughts of revolution.

Even were

this not the case, she believed, no "so-called workingclass revolution" could overcome the environment of
passive obedience.

Workers would go on obeying passively

so long as their survival demanded they work in the
current system of production and "so long as the system
of production is based on passive obedience.1,55
Weil claimed that her pessimism did not put her
"against the parties described as revolutionary."

It was

just that all political action, whether it called itself
revolutionary or not, seemed dependent upon the same two
factors.

The first was "the subordination and dependence

which are implied in modern forms of technique and
economic organization; and the other is war."56

Free

human action was impossible in the presence of current
forms of either.

The increasing rationalization of labor

and the preparation for war, as demonstrated in the
discussion of power, amounted to the same thing:
maximizing efficiency and eschewing considerations of
human dignity to the ends of production and the
acquisition of more power.

As to issues of subordination

and dependence, Weil saw the problem of the factories
quite independent of the political regime:

"to progress

55Ibid.
56Ibid.
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from total subordination to a certain mixture of
subordination and co-operation, with complete co
operation as the ideal."57 A revolution of slaves would
only create a new tyranny.

Any change in the political

order required change in the situation of the worker and
either change would have to be incremental.

"The only

way to preserve one's dignity under inevitable physical
and moral sufferings is to accept them," she wrote M.
Bernard, "to the precise extent that they are
inevitable.1,58

But acceptance and submission were very

different things for Weil.

Acceptance could lead to

collaboration among the oppressed, whereas submission
bred only complete subordination.

"To induce men to

proceed from a state of total subordination towards a
certain measure of collaboration, one must surely begin,"
it seemed to Weil, "by encouraging them to hold up their
heads.1,59
Artisanship and the creative Reconception of Work
In the minds of both thinkers, work was a necessary
part of human existence and essential for the survival of
the species.

Modern approaches to work, not work itself,

had produced the debilitating conditions each diagnosed

57Ibid., 41.
58Ibid.
59Ibid.
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in the modern factory.

Work must be revalued and thus

reconceived as an essential human activity.

For Weil,

reconceiving work meant doing so in a form challenging
the worker's mind without destroying the worker's body.
This reconception would mean making structural changes to
the workplace itself, making it a more human environment.
It would also mean adjusting the modern approach to work
in terms of the artisan.
craft.

Work must be approached as a

Overcoming the gap between manual and

intellectual labor, that is, engaging the worker in his
labor on the intellectual and emotional levels, would
give work meaning beyond the wage paid.

A worker who

appreciated his or her work as a craft might see that
work as an activity with meaning, as a vocation.

"Our

age," Weil wrote in The Need for Roots, "has its own
particular mission or vocation— the creation of a
civilization founded upon the spiritual nature of
work."60 The failure of modern working conditions to
allow meaning in labor indicated a flaw at the core of a
modern civilization she found "sick because it doesn't
know exactly what place to give physical labor and to

“Weil, The Need for Roots. 96. In the concluding
sections of this work, Weil argues that the spirituality
of work consists in the fact that work and death are the
two things that make each of us human and make our return
to decreated reality possible.
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those engaged in physical labor."61

In the artisan,

with a period of apprenticeship and the resulting sense
of self as craftsman, human beings possessed a model of
how labor might be rendered meaningful.

The abolition of

the "proletarian lot" she believed depended "upon the
creation of forms of industrial production and culture of
the mind in which workmen can be, and be made to feel
themselves to be, at home."62
To alleviate prevailing forms of suffering, Weil
recommended specific changes in factory organization.
Her goal throughout was to counter the objectification of
the worker by reintegrating thought and imagination into
the work process.

Denying human beings the opportunity

to think and solve problems for the bulk of their waking
existences and then expecting them to be thoughtful,
careful citizens seemed absurd.

Weil suggested that

communities and factories should see to the education of
their workers.

Labor should be only a part of a worker's

larger culture of mind.63 Workers should be allowed to

61Ibid., 299.
62Ibid., 72.
^ e i l thought one way to do this was to make
literature available to all workers in an easily
digestible form. To that end she made the effort of
"popularizing" Sophocles' Antigone for the workers at
Rosieres. M. Bernard discouraged these efforts after the
strike of 1937. See Weil, Seventy Letters. 36 and Weil,
"Antigone" in Intimations of Christianity. 18-23.
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know the process of which their tasks were a part.

They

should work shifts at the various tasks and be given a
part in decision-making about the process itself.

The

resulting sense of process would give each a perspective
on the importance of their task and a sense of identity
with the larger operation.

These steps toward

circumventing the division of labor, however, were not
sufficient in and of themselves.

Weil also suggested the

reconfiguration of tools so that they could be worked
without exhaustion and were flexible enough to avoid
monotony, yet challenging enough to engage a fully
qualified worker.64

Each of her suggestions was

intended to transform the workplace into one in which
workers could invest their intellectual and spiritual as
well as their physical energy.

The goal was to escape

the brutal constraint of necessity Weil herself had
experienced in the factories of Paris and later in the
fields of the surrounding countryside.65
In her emphasis on the worker's culture of mind, on
education, and on knowing the process, Weil suggests a
kind of modern artisanship.

This artisanship is complete

^Weil, The Need for Roots. 57.
65Much as she had with factory work, Weil sought out
the experience of work in the fields in the summer of
1941. See Gustav Thibon's preface to Weil, Gravity and
Grace, 3-45.
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with the hard work, caring and connectedness of
apprenticeship, converting the master-slave relationship
of modern labor to a craftmaster-understudy relationship.
Her focus on the nature of work itself is a reflection of
her lost faith in the efficacy of collective movements to
address factory conditions.

Camus found her self-

professed apolitical project essential to his own
rethinking of ethical life.

Though he too distrusted

collective movements, Camus found in the trade-union or
syndicalist movement evidence that a reorientation to
their work could be an avenue to human political
empowerment.66

In revolutionary trade-unionism, Camus

found a political activism in the name of the work
itself, "an example of a revolutionary practice which
kept intact the values of revolt."67

In The Rebel.

Camus wrote, "it is this movement alone that is
responsible for the enormously improved condition of the
workers from the sixteen-hour day to the forty-hour
week.1,68 The key for Camus was the organization of
these unions by trade or craft.

There, forms of work

created a sense of shared identity that groups of human

66 See Wilhoite, Bevond Nihilism. 180-183;
Cruikshank, Literature of Revolt. 115; and Birchall, "The
Labourism of Sisyphus."
67Cruikshank, 115.
^Camus, The Rebel. 297.
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beings found worth risking their well-being over.

In

trade union activism Camus found the artisan-mentality at
work in the political world.

The reforms exacted by the

movement had been necessary but were hardly adequate.
They were a critical initial step, which, for Camus, were
evidence enough that political action through the
commune-like structure of trade unions was an effective
antidote to the ideology-driven revolutionary movements
of the twentieth century.

"Trade-unionism,11 Camus wrote,

"like the commune, is the negation, to the benefit of
reality, of bureaucratic and abstract centralism.1,69
The affinity for the trade union movement means that
the artisan, as Rosen argues, must be central to the
reconception of work proposed by both Weil and Camus.
The artisan has studied the craft as an apprentice.

When

problems arise, the artisan has the manual and
intellectual acuity to address them.

The choice of craft

and the period of training, usually at a critical time of
character development, mean that a great part of the
artisan's identity derives from the chosen craft.

Weil,

through her emphasis on the worker's craft and education,
and Camus, through his affinity for syndicalism, each
point to artisanship as a way to counter what they found
to be the wage-driven economic life of the modern worker.

69Ibid., 298.
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The distinction between craft and job is decisive.
are interchangeable on the marketplace.

Jobs

A lost job means

lost money and thus lost security.

These are difficult

enough matters in their own right.

To lose the privilege

of practicing one's craft because of technological
advance or to be humiliated for that privilege, by low
pay or faulty, inadequate equipment, crushes the human
spirit.

Its appreciation of the importance of the

artisan is the reason Camus finds the revolt represented
by trade-unionism appealing.

In his admittedly

idealistic conception, trade unions were groups of
people, bound together by their identity as artisans,
taking a political stand in the name of a critical source
of their identity.
singular.

Their actions are collective, but

They are motivated not by "gain" in the

material sense, but rather by preservation, of self and
craft.

It is the value of preservation that Camus and

Weil try to restore to the conduct of modern economic and
political existence by their emphasis on the importance
of the artisan.
Camus had no illusions about embracing revolutionary
syndicalism as a cure for modernity's problems.

It was,

like the other forms of revolt he identifies, an image of
what properly motivated revolt could look like and
accomplish.

He explored the strengths and shortcomings
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of artisanship and trade-unionism in his oft-overlooked
novella "The Silent Men."70

Roger Quilliot writes of

the story that "if Camus wanted to prove that he, too,
was capable of sticking to his narrative and, as he said
jokingly one day, of writing 'socialist realism,' he
certainly won his wager."71

However lightly Camus took

'socialist realism' the story is central to any
discussion of his attitude toward artisanship and
collective action.

Quilliot concludes that

There is nothing to say about "Les Muets" except
that the novella can be read at a sitting, and that
the characters impose themselves upon us through
their presence, their shabby happiness, their
artisans' pride, their bursts of anger and their
impotence.72
In the context of this discussion, however, they impose
themselves upon us in the way that concern for their
condition imposed itself upon Camus.

Quilliot's

conclusions, though intended to be cursory, are an
instructive prelude.
The story takes place in the aftermath of a failed
workers' strike at a small cooperage.

Cooperage is an

embattled craft, threatened by trucks and other faster

70Camus, Exile and the Kingdom. 62-84. This
connection is suggested but not explored in Birchall,
"The Labourism of Sisyphus."
71Quilliot, Sea and Prisons. 253.
^Ibid., 253.
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forms of transportation.

The shop was not making enough

money to cover expected profits so the difference had to
come out of the pay of the workers.

Yvars, an old

employee that Camus uses for continuity, muses
The boss was not giving any raise; the strike had
failed. They hadn't managed things right, it had to
be admitted. An impetuous walkout, and the union
had been right to back it up only half-heartedly.
After all some fifteen workers hardly counted; the
union had to consider the other cooper's shops that
hadn't gone along.73
The commune-like unity of purpose and action is missing
from the cooper's strike.

Whatever the needs of the

workers, in the absence of the cooperation of the union
or the other cooper's shops, the strike had been illadvised.

They had been unable to counter the boss's

offer to "take it or leave it."

They took it, returning

to work, but in the silence of humiliation.74
Camus's narrative reveals a violation of intimacy
that speaks to the problem of the artisan and identity.
One takes a craft for a lifetime.

Lasalle, the boss, had

grown up in the shop and known several of the workers
most of his life.

His attitude toward them had been a

kind of paternal benevolence.

"He liked his workmen, no

doubt, and often recalled the fact that his father had
begun as an apprentice," thinks Yvars, "but he had never

^Camus, Exile and the Kingdom. 65.
74Sprintzen, Camus, 257.
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gone to their homes; he wasn't aware."75 The sense of
extended family nonetheless persisted until the strike.
In Lasalle's handling of the negotiations, he treats his
employees as they would be treated in a factory, that is,
like replaceable machine parts.

By taking a position of

absolute power, Lasalle breaks the strike but also
destroys the sense of extended family holding the shop
together.

Camus tellingly has Lasalle's daughter become

deathly ill on the day the workers return silently to
work.

The workers, on learning of the little girl's

death, are embarrassed by the relative importance of
their own grievances.

But their ability to respond with

anything other than silence has been destroyed by
Lasalle's assumption of the role of master and dealing
with them as if they were slaves.76 The limited
intimacy, the civility which had existed before is gone.
The price for all involved is high.

The workers are

humiliated and the two places in which Lasalle exercises
paternal authority, the shop and his daughter, are
destroyed on the same day.
Camus's "The Silent Men" reintroduces trade or craft
into the constellation of concerns, which Weil will call
"roots," including family and place of origin, through

^Camus, Exile and the Kingdom. 67.
76Sprintzen, Camus, 257.
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which human beings define themselves.

At the same time,

the story gives us a devastating picture of the problems
of modern economic relationships and the inadequacy of
even the most efficacious of our solutions (e.g., tradeunions and the importance of craft to identity). The
underlying sense that their lot will improve when all
workers learn a craft, loses something in the
confrontation with technological advances that mandate
the disappearance of certain trades or crafts.

As an

assault on identity, this situation exacts an emotional
as well as financial toll on the artisan that may be as
bad as that experienced in the factory.

Collective

revolt in the name of a craft, itself, is doubly
threatened by the disappearance of the craft and by the
loss of perspective that usually attends collective
action.

Camus's "The silent Men" illustrates the deeper

issues of human relationship at stake in the persistent
economic changes of the twentieth century.

Obsolescence

and efficiency often render vocation a very problematic
source of human identity and, therefore, dignity.
Through the reconception of work, Weil and Camus identify
this tendency and seek a value to counter it.
Discerning this countering value requires addressing
the question of syndicalism.

Despite his acknowlegement

of the successes of the trade-union movement, Camus, like
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Weil, distrusted collective action.

Both thinkers

acknowledged the value of having a group from which to
draw a part of one's identity, but each also knew the
danger of such affiliations.

Their ideas of resistance

were formed during World War II, that is, in the context
of resisting collectivities that embraced the choiceless
choice of "assimilation or destruction" as their raison
d'etre.

Because collectivities are susceptible to

intolerance, Camus's affinity for trade-unionism appears
problematic.

In this regard, however, it is important to

recall the that Weil and Camus were each members of the
French Resistance.

There are times when one must stand

with a collection of other individuals to face down a
clearly recognized evil.

What if the evil to be faced

down is not so apparently malevolent, as in the case of
modern working conditions and the collective response of
trade-unionism?

A preliminary response might be that

there is a deeper value present in their appreciation for
craft-based trade unions.

That value is derived not from

the collectivity, but rather from the shared recognition
of the value of the work itself.

For Weil and Camus,

the appeal of an artisan-based mode of labor was the reintroduction of a self-involved creative element to even
the most rudimentary forms of labor.

"Work in which one

can have an interest," Camus wrote in The Rebel.
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"creative work, even though it is badly paid, does not
degrade life."77 The artisan does creative work in a
context, the context being the knowledge of a craft.

A

job done well often requires a certain amount of
innovation, even if that innovation takes place within
well-established parameters.

An excellent example is Dr.

Rieux's organization of the sanitation squads in The
Plague.78 Weil believed that this sort of innovation
entailed an immanent form of beauty intersecting the
beauty of decreated reality.

"What is required is that

this world and the world beyond in their double beauty,"
she wrote in The Need for Roots, "should be present and
associated in the act of work.1,79 Proper instruction
and work undertaken in a certain spirit, here Weil
alludes to the relationship of knowing to apprenticeship,
offered the best way to achieve this association:
Such an association can be achieved by a mode of
presenting thoughts which relates themdirectly to
the movements and operations peculiar to each sort
of work, by a process of assimilation sufficiently
complete to enable them to penetrate into the very
substance of the individual being, and by a habit
impressed upon the mind connecting these thoughts
with the work movements.80

^Camus, The Rebel. 216.
^Camus, The Plague.
^ e il , The Need for Roots. 95.
“ ibid.
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Creative work, then, is neither random nor nihilistic.
The work of the artisan presumes material limitations and
rules of proceeding.

It also presumes an everpresent

consciousness of the work being done and a near perpetual
engagement of mind and body that both Weil and Camus
believed could serve as a powerful ethical model.
Weil and Camus both saw the value of this type of
creativity in its applicability to the problems of the
"order of the world."

"The order of the world is the

same as the beauty of the world," Weil wrote, "all that
differs is the type of concentration demanded, according
to whether one tries to conceive the necessary relations
which go to make it up or contemplate its splendor."81
By locating the difference between work and art in the
type of concentration demanded, Weil reveals her belief
that the difference between the two activities was one of
degree, not of kind.

By considering artistic creation

rebellion "in its pure state" in The Rebel. Camus
expressed a similar sentiment.

In their political

thought, the artisan brought mindful creativity to labor
and craft could thus be used as a source of political
identity and as a source of political action.

Similarly,

both Weil and Camus saw that the artist's orientation to
the world might become a powerful metaphor for ethics.

81Ibid., 295.
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The image of the creator, present in their conception of
the work of the artisan, is also central and perhaps more
at home in considerations of artistic creation.

It was

the individual as creator, of his or her existence, of
his or her political order, that Weil and Camus sought to
place at the center of political ethics.

The discussion

must now explore the suggestion, implicit in Weil and
explicit in Camus, that the artist's quest to articulate
the encounter with reality creatively through the
depiction of beauty may be transformed into an apt
metaphor for political ethics.
III.

Artistic Creation and Political Ethics

A creative element is essential to the reconception
of work as craft.

The realm of art provides another

forum to explore the concept of creativity.

To this end,

Weil and Camus each examined the vocation of the artist
in their search for a model of ethical being.
politics seem to share very little.

Art and

In the minds of Weil

and Camus, these apparently disparate pursuits had much
to say to each other and the ethical life.

For each

thinker, the presence of beauty gave life meaning.
fills the human need to articulate beauty.

Art

In the

context of brutal necessity, Weil and Camus in different
ways believed political order should also reflect this
human need to express the beautiful.

Applying the
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standard of beauty to political order would require not
only rethinking politics, but also rethinking the
beautiful.

The value of the artist's quest for beauty to

ethical being is as an image of the political actor's
search for justice.

The artist aspires to a creative

expression of beauty which requires a discerning openness
to reality that Weil and Camus each found wanting in
contemporary political practice.

This section will

demonstrate that the references to politics in their
separate considerations of art are not coincidental, but
rather intelligible as the manifestation of their search
for a creative approach to political life.
Weil's Political Artist:

Beauty and Political Vision

All human activities have value for Weil to the
precise extent that they further the human aspiration to
make contact with decreated reality.

It is incumbent on

human beings to conduct their activities— in science, in
art, in politics— in the manner of a search for contact
with the good.

Weil knew that bringing this quest for

transcendence into the mundane reality of politics was
vulnerable to an unacceptable messianism and thus
required an extraordinary image of human conduct that
would value the end without denigrating the process.
Beauty, sought and articulated by the artist, was for
Weil "one of the openings through which the breath and
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the light of God may penetrate.1,82 She wrote sparingly
on art and the artist, but it is significant that many of
her speculations on the subject came in reference to
politics.

The political world Weil encountered and

described in her work was in dire need of beauty.
The object of art for Weil was the expression of the
good through the depiction of beauty.

Weil conceived

beauty as a source of value, as a bridge between the
decreated and the created, as evidence of the presence of
decreated reality in mundane created reality.

Recognized

as a mystery by Weil, beauty was nonetheless a fact.

A

powerful presence in the human imagination, beauty was
already an authoritative fount of value.

"All human

beings," Weil observed, "use words that refer to beauty
to designate all the things they rightly or wrongly give
value to, whatever the nature of the value might be.

One

might believe that they regard beauty as the supreme
value.1,83

Beauty could bestow value because it

expressed the unity of created and decreated reality:
"there is here below but one single beauty that is the

“ Simone Weil, "The Pythagorean Doctrine" in
Intimations of Christianity. 166. The other "openings"
were the pure "core of theoretic science" as discussed in
Chapter One and "affliction" which will be addressed in
Chapter Four.
“ ibid., 190.
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Beauty of the World."84

Like all human constructs,

however, the value derived from beauty was susceptible to
faulty interpretation.

But even faulty interpretations

reflected the unity in human experience.

All other

beauties, Weil argued, in science, in art, in politics,
"are reflections of that one, be they faithful and pure,
deformed and soiled, or even diabolically perverted."85
Though our capacity to apprehend beauty lay in the
decreated part of our souls, the value of beauty to
ethical existence lay in its appeal to the created part.
"Doubtless the very essence of the perception of beauty,"
she wrote, "is itself the sentiment of that necessity one
of whose facets is brutal constraint and the other
obedience to God."86 Weil believed that "this truth is
made manifest in the carnal part of our soul, and even in
some sort to our bodies."87

In much the same way that

the pervasive force of necessity drains the human spirit
of energy and hope, discovering the beauty of the world
in our activities nourishes the spirit, actually feeding
the carnal part of the soul via the decreated part.
literally conceived beauty as a food for the spirit.

“ ibid., 190-191.
85Ibid., 191.
“ ibid.
87Ibid.
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"Beauty," she wrote in The Need for Roots, "is something
to be eaten; it is a food."88

As human beings need food

to survive, so human beings need beauty to live.

It was

thus imperative for every human endeavor to try to give
expression to beauty.
Like everything touching the decreated, beauty
defied precise definition.

"Beauty," Weil wrote in

Gravity and Grace, "is the harmony of chance and the
good."89

The conciseness of this description belies its

complexity.

The embrace of beauty entails a guest for

the transcendent. Because we are human that quest
involves materiality, which is to say chance,
impermanence and risk.

Weil was exceedingly aware of the

impermanence of things material.

Yet, what is expressed

endures even if its physical embodiment does not.90

The

risk is that the expression of the beautiful may in fact
be grotesque or dangerous.

This risk can be partially

offset if human beings remember that to know the good
through beauty requires attention to necessity and that
the object of knowing will defy ultimate comprehension.
Beauty, then, is the recognition, through imagination and

^eil,

The Need for Roots. 93.

89Weil, Gravity and Grace. 204.
90This insight is critical to Weil's conception of
rootedness as will be seen in Chapter Four.
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reason, of necessity in the good.

"Beauty," Weil wrote,

"is necessity which, while remaining in conformity with
its own law and with that alone, is obedient to the
good."91

Beauty in necessity is the inevitable counter

to the force of necessity.

"The beautiful in nature,"

Weil wrote, "is a union of the sensible impression and of
the sense of necessity.

Things must be like that (in the

first place), and precisely, they are like that."92
Recognizing beauty as a counter to the force of
necessity is critical to understanding Weil's ethical
thought.

In her last work, Weil wrote:

The great instigators of violence have encouraged
themselves with the thought of how blind, mechanical
force is sovereign throughout the universe. . . .
We shall find a more powerful encouragement in the
thought of how these innumerable blind forces are
limited, made to balance one against the other,
brought to form a united whole by something which we
do not understand but which we call beauty.93
The perception of beauty balances the apparently blind
force perceived in necessity.

Attention to beauty offers

the possibility of limiting the effect of force.

In its

balancing capacity, beauty not only produces pleasure in
perception, but also reveals an elegantly ordered
functionality.

In the recognition of beauty, the

91Weil, Gravity and Grace. 204.
92Ibid.
93Weil, The Need for Roots. 11.
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ordering faculty of knowing finds its positive, creative
function.

To know the world is to be able to recognize

and articulate the beautiful.

"The subject of science,"

Weil wrote, "is the beautiful (that is to say, order,
proportion, harmony) in so far as it is suprasensible and
necessary.1,94 Similarly, "the subject of art is
sensible and contingent beauty discerned through the
network of chance and evil.1,95 The beauty sought
through knowing in science, art, and as Weil later
demonstrates, politics, is the beauty of order,
proportion and harmony rooted in her Platonic conception
of the good.

In politics, this beauty of order,

proportion and harmony is manifest as justice.

Weil

recasts the goals of political life in terms of this
justice, that is, she desires a functional polity, rooted
in the good, exhibiting the attributes of beauty.
It is significant that this conception of beauty
(and justice) and the applicability of art to political
life appears in Weil's last work, The Need for Roots.

In

this work, she argues that "uprootedness," that is, the
deprivation of human beings' need to exercise real,
active, natural participation in the life of a community,
is the product of the violence of unlimited force and the

94Weil, Gravity and Grace. 204.
^Ibid., 204.
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fundamental cause of human misery in the twentieth
century.96

Communities, whose members are cut off from

their own identity, use aggression as a substitute for
self-reflection.

The accompanying violence coupled with

the absence of self-reflection inevitably translates into
suffering.

Weil's early pacificism led her to believe

that it is the inability to reflect that leads them to
sacrifice their lives in the name of a soulless
collectivity.

By restoring the reflective to the social,

Weil sought to recast political life in the nearly
Kantian terms of obligations owed to human beings:
"There exists an obligation toward every human being for
the sole reason that he or she is a human being."97

For

Weil, the pause felt

when confronting another human being

was an invitation to

reflection.98 The result ofthat

reflection could only be the affirmation of the
obligations owed all human beings.

Acting in conformity

with these obligations would revalue all human being.
Revaluation of the individual over and above the
collectivity necessitates a critical reconsideration of
the founding principles of a community.

A successful

reconsideration of those principles engenders

an

96Weil, The Need for Roots. 43.
97Ibid., 5.
98Weil, "Essay on the Notion of Reading," 297-303.
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appreciation of the beauty therein expressed, grounding
that community more deeply in its place and in its
traditions.

Weil called this amalgam of place and

traditions the "vital medium."
be a source of prejudice.

The vital medium must not

She wrote, "There is one's own

particular vital medium; but there are others besides.
It has been produced by a network of causes in which good
and evil, justice and injustice have been mixed up
together, and so it cannot be the best possible one."99
Institutional manifestations of the vital medium should
be preserved as long as the beauty therein can be
discerned, that is, as long as the institutions reflect
the nutritive character of the vital medium.

When those

institutions cease serving that function, the
articulation of the vital medium can be altered, but the
beauty expressed in the vital medium must be preserved.
The capacity to alteration requires a fecund environment
in which the imagination is nurtured and the human soul
is nourished.100 The chief adversary of this fecundity

"Weil, The Need for Roots. 161.
100This brief discussion of rootedness will be
expanded in Chapter Four.
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is cultural stagnation and the associated violence of
internal oppression or external expansion.101
Bringing a creative imagination, that is, one
attentive to beauty, to bear on the maladies of the
polity is a critical component of Weil's conception of
the "political art."

In a 1937 essay called "A Note on

Social Democracy" Weil began articulating her vision of
the "political art."102

In this brief essay, politics

appears as the work of the artisan, dependent upon the
creative faculties of knowing.

Here, the effective use

of the imagination to counter the "collective
imagination" emerges as the centerpiece of any political
action.

Weil describes imagination as the "fabric of

social life and the dynamic of history."103

She writes,

The state of men's imaginations at a given moment
dictates the limits within which power can be
effectively used, at that moment, so as to produce

101Weil uses her understanding of Marxism to analyze
the nature of oppression in her early work Oppression and
Liberty. The inevitable expansion of such regimes was
the root of war and equally problematic for Weil. She
addresses this question in the Need for Roots and also in
earlier political essays like "Cold War Policy in 1939,"
"The Great Beast: Reflections on the Origins of
Hitlerism," and "East and West: Thoughts on the
Colonial Problem," in Selected Essays. 177-94, 89-140,
and 195-210 respectively.
102Simone Weil, "A Note on Social Democracy," in
Selected Essavs. 150-53.
103Ibid., 150.
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real results. Once the moment has passed, different
limits come into operation.104
The ability to govern depends upon possession of a vision
that allows discerning these often subtle shifts in what
is possible and necessary.

It is imperative that the

political actor maintain a critical distance on the
collective imagination, acting in conformity to its
needs, without succumbing to the temptation to be at the
mercy of its desires.

The creative use of this political

faculty Weil called "methodical action."

Methodical

action "does not mean taking measures at the moment when
they will be effective; it means choosing the moment when
they are possible, in anticipation of the one when they
will be effective."105

Of the political actor lacking

"this art of seizing the right moment," Weil wrote, "his
good intentions only pave the road to hell."106

In this

essay, as in her later work, political effectiveness is
determined by mindful attention, right action and its
consequences.

These are the minimum requirements for the

just political act.
Imaginatively addressing the problem of
uprootedness, then, as she does in The Need for Roots.

104Ibid. , 151.
105Ibid., 153.
106Ibid.
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requires confronting social and political existence with
an open mind.

In this work Weil finds it useful to

invoke the image of the artist in her discussion of
political action.

Here, political action is very much

like composing; the political actor appears very much the
artist.

"The mode of political action outlined in these

pages," she writes, "requires that every choice made be
preceded by the simultaneous review of several
considerations of a very different nature."107

In

Weil's understanding of political decision-making there
is the necessity of weighing issues and interests from
several levels of existence simultaneously.

Such

decisions require, Weil wrote, "a high degree of
concentration, more or less of the same standard as that
required for creative work in art or science."108
Politics must be conducted with attentiveness and
imagination.

So conducted, politics, like art and

science, can be means to much greater ends, means to
participation in the good.

"Why should politics," Weil

wonders, "which decide the fate of peoples and whose
object is justice, demand any less concentration than art
or science, whose respective objects are beauty and

107Weil, The Need for Roots. 216.
108Ibid.
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truth?"109 To the degree that they represented human
aspirations to contact with the decreated, Weil believed
politics, art and science and their objects justice,
beauty and truth, were interchangeable as equivalences in
the realm of the good.

As such, they should be

undertaken in the same spirit and with the same care.
Weil's introduction of beauty as a political value
is risky because beauty defies precise definition and the
ordered functionality of beauty's disclosure might take a
dangerous form.

Such risk, as some contemporary

political theorists have argued, is an integral part of
political life.110

Weil agreed, believing that the

absence of risk "produces a type of boredom which
paralyzes in a different way from fear, but almost as
much."111

Weil used the image of the artist's work to

address the problem of risk.

A political life in which

chances are not taken lacks the potential for the

109Ibid.
110Of contemporary commentators, the most valuable is
likely Martha Nussbaum. See her The Fragility of
Goodness; Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)
and "Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of
Aristotelian Essentialism," Political Theory 20:2 (May
1992): 202-246.
111Risk is one of Weil's enumerated needs of the soul
in The Need for Roots. 34. She continues, "Risk is a
form of danger which provokes deliberate reaction; that
is to say, it doesn't go beyond the soul's resources to
the point of crushing the soul beneath a load of fear."
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extraordinary.

A risk-free political life succumbs to

the inertial force of necessity.

By contrast, chances

taken in the name of beauty make demands on the human
creative capacity and offer the possibility of another
kind of political existence.
Weil believed that art like craft or trade required
a period of preparation for the artist.

Discerning

beauty requires attentive knowing, but discerning is only
the beginning of knowing.
critical:

Expression is equally

"Simultaneous composition on several planes at

once is the law of artistic creation," Weil writes, "and
wherein, in fact, lies its difficulty."112 As in the
artist's dilemma about what elements to apply where, the
complexity of political decision-making lies in the fact
that these several planes of composition may in fact
represent irreconcilable interests.

Thus, there is a

need for a mediating component derived from the
imagination which Weil calls "inspiration."
Weil defines inspiration as "a tension on the part
of the soul's faculties which renders possible the
indispensable degree of concentration required for
composition on a multiple plane."113

Inspiration

requires an openness to the "supernatural" or the

112Weil, The Need for Roots. 216.
1l3Ibid.
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decreated.114 All who "persevere humbly and patiently"
may develop the capacity for inspiration.115 Weil poses
inspiration as an antidote to the conceit that all or
even most political problems can be unravelled through
the use of human reason narrowly understood.

The broader

faculty of knowing, including imagination and
inspiration, is necessary.

"The method of political

action outlined here," Weil writes, "goes beyond the
possibilities of the human intelligence, at least as far
as those possibilities are known.

But it is precisely

that which lends it its value."116 Moreover, knowing is
not enough.
be expressed.

To have value, the insight into reality must
The chance must be taken.

In art as in

politics, risk cannot be avoided, and mistakes invariably
will be made.

The consequences of risk and mistakes can

be minimized if one is properly prepared.

Thus the need

114Weil's concern with the supernatural is at the
core of her mysticism and so it is little surprising to
find it similarly placed in her political thought. Many
commentators, however, have resisted this idea. The
supernatural has been, for some, a reason to consider
only her speculations on God and the nature of religious
faith. It is just as useful as the centerpiece of her
social and political theory, for while truth cannot be
attained in the world, it must be striven for. My own
understanding of Weil's sense of the supernatural is
heavily influenced by that found in Peter Winch, The Just
Balance, especially, 207.
115Weil, The Need for Roots. 217.
116Ibid.
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for inspiration, a creative faculty developed through
desire and concentration, stored and nourished in the
human soul and exercised each time a decision is made.
Political decisions are made and felt in the realm of
created reality.

As human acts, they can never finally

be perfect in motive or effect.

Weil concludes, however,

that on this model, there is, "perhaps, the chance that
the decisions though imperfect will be good ones."117
The tolerance of imperfection, of mistakes, is
another important, neglected aspect of Weil's political
vision.

It seems anathema to a thinker so proud of her

own intellectual rigor and intent on acting in accordance
with the good.

The imperfections of nature are part of

the beauty of the world.

The flaws in human being make

the human need to discern beauty ennobling.

Weil's

understanding of Christianity and her reading of Plato
allowed her to aspire to the ideal while remaining
unperturbed by the impossibility of attaining it.

The

active, patient search for beauty in the created world
reveals the value of the artist's temperament.

"In order

to write verse that contains some beauty," she writes,
"one must have had the ambition to equal by the
arrangement of words that pure and divine beauty which,

117Ibid.
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according to Plato, lies on the other side of the
skies."118

Similarly in Christianity only "the desire

for perfection has the virtue of being able to destroy in
the soul some part of the evil that defiles it."119
Governing structures, for which she adapted Plato's term
"the Great Beast," for all their imperfections and
dangers, are for Weil necessary to created existence.120
Beauty offers a standard against which political
institutions may be measured.

The beauty to be found in

governing structures reflects the ethical and spiritual
success of a civilization in creating an order grounded
in the good.

The success of a community's political life

can then be measured by the elegance as well as the
efficiency with which it handles its imperfections, and
thereby manages "risk."
In a functional political order, the political
actor's desire for justice must be indistinguishable from

118Ibid.
119Ibid., 218.
120See Weil's essay "The Great Beast: Reflections on
the Origins of Hitlerism" in Selected Essays. 89-140. In
her discussion in Waiting for God translated by Emma
Craufurd (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1951), page 54, Weil
describes the tendency in some social collectivities to
fancy themselves a kind of "ersatz divinity," but
explains that "By social, I do not mean everything
connected with citizenship, but only collective
emotions." An entire section of Weil's Gravity and Grace.
216-22, is devoted to reflections on "The Great Beast."
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the artist's desire for beauty.

This desire may be

evident in the words as well as the deeds of the
political actor.

For Weil, language was an often

unrecognized locus or instrument of the power over others
she called "force.1,121 Weil writes,
To the extent to which human language falls short of
divine beauty, to that extent Man's sentient and
intellectual faculties fall short of truth, and
necessities of social life fall short of justice.
Consequently, politics cannot but be as much in need
of efforts of creative invention as are art and
science. 122
The dangers and inadequacies of human language account
for the multiplicity of opinions which have as little to
do with politics "as has the clash of aesthetic opinion
in the cafes of Montparnasse to do with art."123 To the
political leader or artist such opinions can only serve
as a "certain stimulant" to be taken in very small doses.
Political inspiration feeds upon, but does not rely
solely upon this type of discourse.

What Weil proposes,

and in this Camus follows her, is recasting political
activity with reference to beauty as an endeavor worthy

121Weil, The Iliad, or the Poem of Force. Weil was
fascinated by Machiavelli and her understanding of force
resembles Machiavelli's understanding of fortune.
Understood in this way, force, most often used as a tool
of domination, may also be used as an object of positive
creative energy.
122Weil, The Need for Roots. 218.
123Ibid.
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of mention in the same breath as art or science.
"Politics are practically never looked upon as an art of
so high a category," she writes, because we have "been
accustomed to regard them solely, or at least
principally, as a technique for acquiring and holding on
to power."124

For Weil, the twentieth century by its

tragic example had to mark the end of this way of
thinking about politics.

The destructiveness of modern

politics demanded human beings face that "now, power is
not an end."125
Camus's Creative Politics:

Beauty and Rebellion

The relationship between the vocation of the artist
and an ethical political life was central to Camus's
thought.

The essence of the diversity of human

experience, he believed, could be more fundamentally
captured by art than it could be empirically observed and
conclusively stated by science, especially political
science.
act.

Camus viewed art as participatory, as ethical

"The first choice an artist makes," Camus wrote,

"is precisely to be an artist, and if he chooses to be an
artist it is in what he is himself and because of a

124Ibid.
125Ibid.
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certain idea he has of art.”126

For Camus, art was a

functional, creative response to the absurdity of the
human condition.

This section will demonstrate that his

writings on the nature and function of art, as a form of
creative rebellion, are intelligible as meditations on
the freedom of human action in the modern world.

Camus

valued a self-reflective, creative existence as a
corollary to thoughtful political action.
The creative rebellion Camus envisioned contained
identifiable elements though the rebellion itself lacked
a definitive structure.

The specific modes of rebellion

change as the conditions they meet differ.

Before

proceeding to draw Camus's analogy of artistic creation
and political existence, therefore, the elements of
creative rebellion and the manner in which they function
must be identified.
Creative rebellion required vision or knowing of a
special sort which Camus termed "lucidity."

As the

discussion of knowing demonstrates, the human being's
need to articulate existence is the deepest human desire.
That articulation, however, posits a value.
act inevitably values that which it depicts.

The creative
Artistic

creativity's promise as an ethical model lays precisely

126Albert Camus, Actuelles I . 263 quoted in Bree,
Camus, 244.
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in this capacity to "create" value.

Art as act entails a

myriad of choices and embraces a diversity of values,
from subject, to the form and medium chosen, to size.
Though an expression of the artist's vision, the art
Camus envisions cannot be nihilistic.

The choice to

create is an attempt to communicate, in a symbolic
language commonly-held, the familiar or shared in human
experience.

For Camus, art is an expression of human

knowing ordering the disordered world.

Art's function is

not the representation of some singular aspect of
reality, but the derivation of a unity from reality.

The

articulated unity defies reality and Camus calls this
defiant unity "beauty."

The artist's expression of

beauty reveals an order in that which is without order, a
unity in that which lacks unity.
of beauty defies absurd existence.

The creative depiction
David Sprintzen

argues that the shortcoming of art as an ethical model is
that it only offers this ordering vision to the
partaker.127 But by only offering, the artist resists
the temptation to impose the vision upon others or the
world.

There is much danger, from Camus's perspective,

in a unity that fancies itself a totality.

The artist's

recognition of beauty allows the human creature as
creator to order, if only for a moment, a world which

127Sprintzen, Camus:

A Critical Examination.
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lacks coherence.

This momentary clarity is then also

available to the partaker, though the partaker must
understand the temporary character of the artist's
insight.
Reclaiming beauty in this way was critical for
Camus's ethical thought as he believed contemporary
totalizing conceptions of beauty had become analogous to
the Truth claimed by Inquisitorial clerics in the past
and the totalitarian dictators of his present.

"Beauty,"

he writes, "even today, especially today, cannot serve
any party; it cannot serve, in the long or short run,
anything but men's suffering or their liberty."128
Unlike Weil's conception of beauty as a bridge between
the transcendent and the mundane, Camus held that
beauty's metaphysical content was of only marginal
importance in the political realm.

Camus argued that

defiant beauty now must chiefly serve human experience.
In The Rebel he wrote that "to create beauty" the
creative being "must simultaneously reject reality and
exalt certain of its aspects."129 In this rejecting
capacity, beauty defies the absurd, acknowledging the
world while expressing a preference for another vision, a
vision in which that which human beings all share takes

128Camus, Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 267.
129Camus, The Rebel. 258.
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precedence.

By its valuation of beauty, art articulates

the human potential for the realization of this
experiential sameness among human beings.

For Camus, art

and rebellion each speak from the ground of this common
human "nature."

Rebellion in man, Camus holds in a

Kantian moment, "is the refusal to be treated as an
object" and "the affirmation of a nature common to all
men which eludes the world of power."130

It is in

asserting this common human nature that art and rebellion
defy the finality of absurd existence and the
inevitability of human suffering.

At the same time, art

and rebellion, inasmuch as each requires an engagement of
reality, offer a foundation on which to build social and
political order.

The character of this engagement, the

imaginative reconstruction of this foundation, is
problematic and raises the issue of the relationship
between Camus's conception of rebellion and modern
conceptions of revolution.
The defiant character of beauty, Camus understood,
means that its "procedure" which "is to contest reality
while endowing it with unity is also the procedure of
rebellion."131

The character of the creative act is

130Ibid. This is as close as Camus gets to positing
a formal "human nature."
131Ibid., 276.
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rebellion, but Camus took pains to distinguish this
rebellion from modern conceptions of revolution.

Modern

revolution involves the physical imposition of a
totality, a distortion of reality lacking limits or
boundaries without which modern revolutions come to
define themselves by their destructive capacities.
Revolutions destroy the world in order to remake it and
leave themselves open to being replaced in a similar
fashion.

Rebellion, on the other hand, though like

revolution born of the absurd realization that things are
not as they should be, is a response in quite another
direction.

While each entails a vision imposed,

revolution physically imposes the vision, destroying in
the act of creating.

Rebel creation, by contrast, offers

a vision of a more complete, if never ultimately
complete, existence.
madness for Camus.

Genius without discipline was
Far from a nihilist denial of

discipline, Camus believed creative rebellion was "the
affirmation of a limit, a dignity, and a beauty common to
all men [which] only entails the necessity of extending
this value to embrace everything and everyone and of
advancing toward unity without denying the origins of
rebellion."132 Together, art and rebellion posit a

132Ibid., 251.
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value whose function is to limit history:

that value is

the beauty of the coherence of human experience.
Imagination, thought, and action, Camus argues,
demand a corresponding unity in order to exist.
Therefore, the human conception of a better world could
be no more adequately expressed than in artistic
creation.

But the notion of unity does not entail the

imposition of a totality.

Unity must not lose its

tensional relationship to the diversity of existence.
Any vision of a better world must remain a vision.

No

creative work is final; vision always demands
rearticulation.

Unlike the revolutionary's material

aspiration to absolute unity, the rebel's vision must be
grounded in the goal of a more lucid articulation of
unity rather than the revolutionary consummation of
totality.

Creativity, not tyranny, is the authentic

political manifestation of lucidity.
In The Rebel, art emerges as the final perspective
on the content of rebellion.

But life in fruitful

rebellion requires discipline of the self.

In The Myth

of Sisvphus. Camus wrote that artistic creation is an
activity that "calls for daily effort, self-mastery, a
precise estimate of the limits of truth, measure and
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strength."133 Art, Camus believes, "constitutes an
ascesis." a curious term which adds a religious character
to the idea of aesthetic discipline.134

But Camus

clearly did not intend the artist to be a monk, nor did
he wish to bring to mind Nietzschean ascetic priests, an
interpretation of the role of political and spiritual
leaders for which Camus had great sympathy.135

Instead,

art like political existence is a matter of constant
confrontation with reality:

lucidity, like its

expression, is an ongoing experience.

Art, for Camus, is

a vocation, literally a calling from within, a yearning
to creative expression consonant with the human need to
defy death.

Creation is the human longing for freedom

hurling itself against a terminal existence.

The product

of the creative process, while significant, is not as
critical to Camus's ethical thought as the creative

133Camus, The Mvth of Sisyphus. 115. Philip Thody in
Albert Camus: A Study of His Work (New York, 1957), 104,
finds " [t]he lyricism of The Mvth of Sisyphus is genuine,
that of The Rebel seems forced and is an attempt to
reintroduce feeling into a world from which an excess of
logic has banished it."
134Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus. 115.
135From the prison chaplain in The Stranger to Father
Paneloux in The Placrue. this is a recurring character in
Camus's fiction. These characters deny the world as it
"is" for a world beyond that is "ought," which is
unacceptable to Camus to the degree that it allows these
knowing figures not to dirty their hands in the plagues
of this world.
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process itself. It is the act of creation, the process,
which articulates and mediates the tensions of existence:
unity and diversity, order and disorder, revolution and
rebellion, the "is" and the "ought," thought and action,
the mundane and the divine, reason and revelation.

While

creative rebellion can never claim, as is the temptation,
to resolve these tensions, it nonetheless takes as its
task expressing their tensionality as a unity.

To the

degree that politics is about instituting something,
Camus posits the expression of this tensional wholeness
as that which is to be instituted.136 The difficulty is
that such visions are temporary, while the institutional
arrangements that issue from them tend to be more or less
permanent.

Can we afford to think of our institutions as

incomplete or temporary?

Camus's answer is "yes," if we

understand the temporary as legitimate but incomplete,
that is, if we understand that institutions must be
subject to change when the conditions they were formed to
meet change.

This apparently fluid political order

requires an acuity in managing change that Camus's
conception of creative politics was designed to foster.

136That politics is about instituting something is
the contention of post-modern thinkers like Jean-Francois
Lyotard. See Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thebaud, Just Gaming
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985). For
a critique of the postmodern view of the question, see
Honi Fern Haber, Bevond Postmodern Politics: Lvotard,
Rortv. Foucault (New York: Routledge, 1994).
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At the same time, creative rebellion also requires
respect for limits.

For Camus, creative rebellion is the

"political art." Such expression as the artist employs,
Camus believed, bestows meaning upon the creative act, be
it artistic or political.
Genuine creativity, in art or politics, requires the
recognition of limits.

Beauty limits the creative

process through the impermanent material character of its
articulation.

Creativity is further limited by the

artist-actor's use of elements or what Camus called
"style."

Creation gives expression and form to the

"impossible demand" to impose order on what seems
hopelessly disordered.137 The kind of order the artist
imposes on reality, Camus says, is indicative of the
intensity of the artist's rejection of reality.

At the

same time, the degree of rejection determines the value
of the work.

The rejection may be next to non-existent

as in the case of realist art, which makes a futile, if
exhaustive attempt to depict reality.

The rejection may

also be total, as in the case of excessively abstract or
formalist work.

But realism and formalism, like the

values posited by modern revolution, are manifestations
of the same mistake:

neither sufficiently mediates the

tensions of existence; neither exhibits the balance

137Camus, The Rebel. 271.
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required of true creativity.

From Camus's perspective,

realism and formalism each lack the discipline or
ontological limits of style.
In the act of creation, it is "style" that limits
the artistic reconstruction of the world.

"The unity in

art," Camus writes in The Rebel. "appears at the limit of
the transformation that the artist imposes on
reality."138

Style is the limit imposed by the artist

"by his language and by a redistribution of elements
derived from reality."139 Whereas beauty is a more
general aesthetic quality, that which is to be expressed,
style is as much act as quality, the manner of the
artist's expression.

Style is the means through which

the artist gives form to reality.

"In this domain,"

Camus argues in The Rebel, "as in others, any unity that
is not a unity of style is a mutilation.

Whatever may be

the chosen point of view of an artist, one principle
remains common to all creators:

stylization, which

supposes the simultaneous existence of reality and of
mind which gives reality its form."uo

Style is the

consistent application of the creative sensibility to the
problem of disordered reality.

Style itself is limited

138Ibid., 268.
139Ibid. , 271.
U0Ibid.
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by the autonomy of reality, while the faculty of knowing
confronts reality to derive a creative interpretation.
The essential element of the act of creation is
maintaining the interaction of form and content.

No

convincing unity is expressed in a work in which "the
content overflows the form, or in which the form drowns
the content."141

The two chief defects of modern art,

Camus believed, the tendencies to realism and formalism
had their analogs, their parallels, in the conduct of
modern politics.
It is the style of the artist as well as the style
of the political community that determines the
potentiality for the existence of beauty or justice in
that community.

In the social and political realm, style

gives form to the community's and the individual's
existence.

It is a discipline of self and society which

finds its expression in institutions, rituals or
myth.142

Camus's idea of style functions as a locus for

his concern for maintaining the discipline required of
true creativity and the nearly ascetic commitment
required of the artist.

The artistic genius creates and

respects his or her own limits.

In the ethical realm,

141Ibid.
142See Camus's concern with the funeral ritual in
both The Stranger and The Plaque discussed in Chapter Two
above.
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those limits begin at the point of contact with the
another human being.

The creative political actor must

act in the context of others and remain mindful of this
limitation.

Like Weil, Camus believed the presence of

the other is decisive.

For Camus it means that political

life too must remain conscious of style.
offered to, not imposed upon the other.

The vision is
Likewise, in

creative political existence, the actor must find a way
of expression that remains conscious and respectful of
the limits that existence in a community of human beings
requires.

All is not permitted.

As an ascetic activity, then, creation requires the
conscious discipline of the artist.

In art, some measure

of artistic genius may be found in any of the several
aesthetic activities.

Sculpture, Camus argued, is "bent

on capturing, in three dimensions, the fugitive figure of
man, and on restoring the unity of great style to the
general disorder of gestures."143 Likewise, the
painter's choice of frame and subject is about imposing
stability on incessant change.

Each of these forms

impose its own order and assert its own unity.

But

political existence requires engagement with reality and
neither of these art forms interacts with its world to a
degree satisfactory to Camus.

Style entails interaction,

143Camus, The Rebel. 256.
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and Camus's insistence on interaction defines his notion
of creative human existence.
Camus's idea of the novel illuminates his notion of
interaction as art's function in the modern world.

The

novel, Camus believed, was the product of the time of the
spirit of rebellion, allowing the artist to embrace the
world as the home of human beings while denying it as the
place of their torment.144 The novel draws upon
humanity's need to control its destiny, depicting that
control (if not imposing it, as in modern revolution)
while remaining conscious that the very notion of the
human control of destiny is an impossibility.

This

concern with destiny is reflected in human desires for
perpetuation and possession.

For instance, Camus

144Compare Camus's view of the function of the novel
with that of M. M. Bakhtin in his work on the categories
of literature and their subcategories. His concern is
the novel as the only developing form of literature.
Literature, Bakhtin believes, assimilates real historical
time and space. At various stages of literary
development, this process of assimilation produces a
novelistic narrative which yields associated images of
human beings. See Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination:
Four Essays, translated by Michael Holquist (Austin,
1981).
Germaine Bree writes in Bree, Camus. 242:
"Literature was for Camus an essential human activity,
one of the most fundamental. It expresses and safeguards
the aspiration toward freedom, coherence, and beauty,
those components of man's relative happiness, an
aspiration which alone makes life valuable for each
separate transient human being. It defines that part of
existence in which each individual is more than a social
unity or an insignificant cog in the evolution of
history.11
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believed that a sense of its permanence makes suffering
endurable. " [I]n this insatiable need for perpetuation,11
Camus wrote, "we should better understand human suffering
if we knew that it was eternal."145

Perpetuation allows

the theoretical presence of eternity, Camus's reasoning
goes, which in turn gives human beings a sense of
destiny.

Millennialist faith in the return of Christ,

the Enlightenment's faith in the human conquest of
nature, and the history-driven totalitarian regimes of
the twentieth century had all been symptomatic of this
tendency.
Western liberal democracies were not immune from a
similar, if less openly monstrous, flaw.

Liberal

commercial democracies, where human rights were bound up
with the possession of property, freely bought into the
fetish for destiny.

Camus argues that it is for the sake

of destiny that human beings desire possessions:

the

human need to possess, on which commercial societies are
founded, leads to the need to possess others in the way
that objects are possessed, all belying a deeper need to
control some part of human destiny.

In the novel, for

Camus an artistic form born of the modern era, this very
human need is satiated.

In the novel, Camus wrote in The

Rebel, the reader "is finally able to give himself the

145Camus, The Rebel. 261.
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alleviating form and limits which he pursues in vain in
his own life."146

The novel's significance is that it

engages the reader in the reader's present, it "creates
destiny to suit any eventuality and is, therefore, part
of absurd existence, while denying it by positing a
destiny."147 It is the novel's handling of destiny,
Camus thinks, which is its chief aesthetic value.

The

novel defies the absurd, offering a means to discern the
permanent value of human existence, that is, it squarely
rejects reality "without accepting the necessity of
escaping it."148
The style of Camus's rebel creation, then, be it in
art or politics, is a creativity somewhere between
realism and formalism.
perfect:

Human creation can never be

by definition it bears the distortion "that is

the mark of both art and protest."149 Style must retain
the delicate equilibrium that is the mark of both
creation and civilization.

"It is the same thing with

creation as with civilization:

it presumes uninterrupted

tension between form and matter, between evolution and
the mind, and between history and values," Camus wrote in

146Ibid., 264.
147Ibid., 264.
148Ibid., 260.
149Ibid., 271.
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The Rebel.

"If the equilibrium is destroyed, the result

is dictatorship or anarchy, propaganda or formal
insanity.

In either case creation, which always

coincides with rational freedom, is impossible."150

The

twin lessons of modernity, which Camus gleans from his
experience, are that reforms require the reinterpretation
of human existence and that all interpretations of human
existence are in need of the limits of style.

Modern art

and contemporary European politics each chose either
realism or formalism.

Each choice is a counterproductive

fundamentalism detrimental to human existence.

By

contrast, the style of the rebel acknowledges and
embraces the boundaries and limits of the "created
universe."
For Camus, the purposes of artistic creation and
political participation are the same:

the imaginative

participation in the reconstruction (rebellion) as
opposed to the material destruction (revolution) of the
human being's universe. Camus offers Proust as an example
of an artist who accomplished the artist's task.

Proust,

demonstrated that the art of the novel can
reconstruct creation itself, in the form that it is
imposed on us and in the form in which we reject it.
In one of its aspects, at least, this art consists
in choosing the creature in preference to his
creator. But still more profoundly, it is allied to
the beauty of the world or of its inhabitants

150Ibid.
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against the powers of death and oblivion. It is in
this way that his rebellion is creative.151
Art describes reality without conceding to it, embraces
life without denying death.

Similarly, political

existence involves engaging reality without conceding to
the finality of the absurd.

Camus's fundamental

requirement of both artistic creation and political
participation is that they assert the value of unity in
the face of absurd diversity.

The assertion and the

unity, creation and the value it posits, are
dialectically related.
other.

Neither can exist without the

As the value that drives human creativity, unity

in the midst of diversity nurtures and exalts the human;
it does not beat human beings into an unnatural
homogeneous conformity.
wrote that

Illustrating the point, Camus

"[r]eligion or crime, every human endeavor in

fact, finally obeys this unreasonable desire and claims
to give life a form it does not have. The same impulse,
which can lead to the adoration of the heavens or the
destruction of man, also leads to creative literature,
which derives its content from this source."152

For

Camus, the need or quest for unity is always the passion
that lifts human beings above "the commonplaces of the

151Ibid., 267-268 (my emphasis) .
152Ibid., 262.
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dispersed world" and is thus the fount for all
extraordinary human endeavors, artistic and political.
Camus could not distinguish the task of the artist
from the obligations of human beings living in community.
In a lecture on Algeria entitled "Appeal for a Civilian
Truce" Camus conceded:
I am not a political man, and my passions and
inclinations do not lead me to public platforms. I
step onto the podium only when forced to by the
pressure of circumstances and by my conception of my
function as a writer. As to the basis of the
■Algerian problem, I shall probably have, as events
multiply and suspicions increase on both sides, more
doubts than certainties to express.153
The writer's obligation is to express with passion in a
way not hostile to reason the complexities of a given
situation (in this case, the civil war in Algeria,
Camus's home, a conflict of the most personal kind). For
Camus, the essential element in the relationship between
art and politics may be found, then, in the motivation of
the artist:

the assertion of what human beings hold in

common through the articulation of the lucid encounter
with reality.

Camus would have us understand him (Camus

as artist) as neither a reporter describing (as in
realist art) nor a prophet prescribing (as in formalist
art) .

The artists' vocation is not judge, but justifier:

"judging contemporary man," he wrote, "in the name of a

153Camus, Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 132 (my
emphasis).
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man who does not yet exist is the function of
prophecy."154 The prophet judges absolutely.
artist cannot.

The

Camus elaborated in a lecture on the role

of the artist:
If he judged absolutely, he would arbitrarily divide
reality into good and evil, and thus indulge in
melodrama. The aim of art, on the contrary, is not
to legislate or to reign supreme, but rather to
understand first of all. Sometimes it does reign
supreme, as a result of understanding. But no work
of genius has ever been based on hatred or contempt.
This is why the artist, at the end of his slow
advance, absolves instead of condemning.155
Camus deals with this guestion of the artist as prophet
in the short story "The Artist at Work" in Exile and the
Kingdom.

The story's principal, the painter Jonas, is

named for the Biblical Jonah, the reluctant prophet.156
Jonas becomes so consumed by being the celebrated person
called artist that he must undertake a period of

154Ibid., 266. "Judging" is one of the central
problems in Camus' work, as this characterization of the
prophet and that of the judge-penitent in The Fall (New
York, 1956) indicates, Camus did not want to judge, yet
knew that to live is to judge. Also if we accept Camus'
understanding of the work of the prophet, it is difficult
to characterize him as such though Jean Kellogg does so
in Dark Prophets of Hope: Dostoevsky. Sartre. Camus.
Faulkner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
More useful, perhaps, is the approach of Felix S. A.
Rysten who studied the figure of the false prophet in the
work itself. See Rysten, False Prophets in the Fiction
of Camus. Dostoevsky. Melville, and Others (Coral Gables:
University of Miami Press, 1972).
155Camus, Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 266.
156Albert Camus, "The Artist at Work," in Exile and
the Kingdom. 110-158.
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spiritual and physical exile to restore his creativity.
Jonas rediscovers his creative self only by putting down
his brushes.

Jonas realized that the work of the artist

is understanding, not explanation.

The artist as cause

celebre spends far too much time explaining or listening
to explanations of the work.

Though the artist's is an

incomplete understanding, his task is expressing,
creating it.

To view the work of the artist as either

comprehensively descriptive or prescriptive is to
bastardize the tension that the artist seeks to
articulate.

Here Camus's notion of the artist's ascesis

is essential.

Ascetic discipline compels the artist

constantly to rearticulate his lucid experience with
reality.

Lucidity demands the artist justify human

existence, even if it means condemning the present order
as inhuman.

This is the artist's spiritual and political

obligation, for the need to rearticulate his existential
experience is ontological as well.

A just political

order demands an ascetic engagement of reality by the
political actor.
At the poles of absurd existence, then, are
absolutes.

Modern revolution embraces absolutes in the

name of a given set of values.
knowledge of human nature:

It posits an absolute

either in the form of abject

sinfulness or in a superhuman form capable of all
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knowledge.

By contrast, rebellion is existence in

resistance to the assertion of absolutes.

It

simultaneously acknowledges human limitations, and denies
the moral and ethical tyranny implicit in those
limitations.

The unity or wholeness posited by the

artist is of the commonality of human experience.

This

commonality of human being is the only value explicit in
Camus's aesthetics, and it is the foundation of his
understanding of political participation.

In The Rebel.

Camus writes,
One can reject all history and yet accept the world
of the sea and the stars. The rebels who wish to
ignore nature and beauty are condemned to banish
from history everything with which they want to
construct the dignity of existence. Every great
reformer tries to create in history what
Shakespeare, Cervantes, Moliere, and Tolstoy knew
how to create: a world always ready to satisfy the
hunger for freedom and dignity which everyman
carries in his heart. Beauty, no doubt, does not
make revolutions. But a day will come when
revolutions will have need of beauty.157
An articulate longing for unity must not degenerate into
a futile attempt at definition.

Camus understood that

attempts to define human nature inevitably fall into the
trap of enumerating a set of contingent values.

The

capacity to participate creatively in community, or
philosophically, to participate creatively in a community
of being, is the only value that Camus derives from his

157Camus, The Rebel. 276.
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sense of a common human nature.

Camus, in choosing

rebellion, revealed his belief that expressing a
commonality in human experience need not mean the precise
definition of human nature.
Camus's aesthetic considerations, examined for what
they tell of his at times obscure political position,
reveal a man preoccupied with preserving human existence
in community, while embracing a politics profoundly
individual and ethical, rather than collective and
institutional.

Camus's was a politics of individual

participation in human community, an ethic of selfconscious political participation.158 The danger in
such thinking, of course, is that each might mistake
personal will for universal law.

But this is the precise

tendency Camus thought the ascetic requirement of his
ethic, derived from his notions of human creativity,
would derail.

The self-conscious effort on behalf of the

individual would lead to an awareness of some "common
human nature" which could act as a basis for the

158Camus found his own ethical standard difficult to
live up to. He has been roundly criticized by Sprintzen,
Camus: A Critical Examination: Patrick McCarthy, Camus
(New York: Random House, 1982); and Conor Cruise
O'Brien, Albert Camus of Europe and Africa (New York:
Viking Press, 1970) for his ethical paralysis over the
matter of the Algerian Civil War. Camus was nonetheless
honest about the personal nature of the conflict. See
Camus, "Algeria" in Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 109154.
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formation and undergirding of human community.

Camus had

no utopian vision that a day would come when such a
civilization would emerge.

Camus the artist recognized

that such a mode of being was at best a potentiality
within human beings.

Nonetheless, chief among a

citizen's political duties is the constant questioning of
existence, not in existential despair, but rather, as a
challenge to human potentiality.
IV.

Conclusion:

Creative Politics

The paired images of the artisan-worker and the
artist in the thought of both Weil and Camus are
instructive as to the nature of creativity and its
application to a political world characterized by force.
Creativity involves bringing the faculties of the
individual to bear on politics without sacrificing human
dignity, in person or soul, to force.

The creative form

of knowing the world entails the daring to see what is
not self-evident (taking chances) and the wisdom to
embrace that which is self-evident (protecting vital
media).

In the political thought of Weil and Camus, work

and art are conceived as complementary activities
oriented toward revealing the ordered, functional beauty
of the world.

As images of human activity (especially

political activity) in the world, each demands the
individual know the world self-consciously and bring that
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knowledge to bear on the world in a form either useful or
insightful or both.

The ethic proposed is a difficult

one; the responsibilities of the individual are manifold.
But this difficulty is what makes creativity appealing as
an ethical model, for Weil and Camus separately
envisioned the difficult creative life as an ethical
antidote to the comparatively "simple" ethic of obedience
required by collective political movements.
Neither Weil nor Camus confused creativity with the
absolute power to impose individual will.

This is the

precise use of force they were trying to counter.

The

primacy of knowing to a creative existence required
preparation, the most useful image of which is
apprenticeship.

In the political realm, preparation

meant an openness to the reality which is the context of
all politics.

Absurd necessity determined the ultimate

limits of all human activity, and, often, determined the
character of that activity.

Power and force, the

institutional and personal forms of human-made necessity,
were human responses that often mirrored the
arbitrariness of necessity without the benefit of
necessity's indifference.

Creative political action is

thus limited by the exigencies of necessity.

The

responsible political actor's task was to address
creatively the shortcomings of the social and political
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world without denying that context to the point of
nihilism or totalitarianism.

Authentic creativity, be it

work, art, science or politics, occurs in the context of
lived reality.

In the political thought of Weil and

Camus, creativity is the faculty of making use of
available materials to create something better, that is,
to humanize the social and political context.
Respect for this prevailing social and political
context is decisive.

It reveals the influence of the

French Resistance experience Weil and Camus shared.

The

goal of creative political existence is profoundly subtle
transformation not reactionary revolution.

Even in the

worst of tyrannies, reactionary revolution is likely to
result in tyranny under another guise, as Camus
discovered in the post-liberation purges in France.

In

the creative politics Weil and Camus seek, membership and
identity are crucial to grounding ethical action.

Their

affinity for trade-unionism belies this tendency in
reference to worker-artisans.

Sharing a vocation appears

as grounds for recognizing identity with others via
commonly-held interests.

As useful as the image is,

however, the trade-union is a specific and rather narrow
association prone to the difficulites of prejudice.

The

value of the image of the artist is in complementing the
trade union's specificity with a broader conception of
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membership.

In choosing to share the product of his or

her work, the artist makes an offer of a very personal
nature and professes a faith that the work of art will
speak to others from the ground of a common human
experience.

The narrow conception of membership

represented by trade unions is thus limited and
supplemented by the artist's profession of faith in the
commonness of human being.
Artisanship and art thus form two significant
portions of a conception of citizenship.

As a bridge

between the old and the new, Weil and Camus valued the
creativity they found in artisanship and art as a model
for ethical political action.

The two activities seem to

encourage innovation while remaining respectful of
tradition.

Chapter Four will establish the applicability

of creativity to the political circumstances identified
by Weil and Camus.

How to establish a new way of being

in an already established context of social and political
mores without destroying that in the flawed community
which has value?

The next chapter will explore how Weil

used creativity to address the problem of uprootedness in
her final work and how Camus sought the creation of a
style to address the shortcomings of rebellion.
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CHAPTER 4

RECONCILING FREEDOM AND JUSTICE:
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WEIL AND CAMUS
I.

Introduction

No political actor creates ex nihilo.

All political

activity occurs in a context with predefined limitations.
The political actor is limited not only by imagination
and personal physical constraints, but by law, custom,
locally accepted modes of behavior, local desire for the
action and available physical and mental resources.
Knowing that creation occurs in a context, that is,
acknowledging and respecting these limits, is the
difference between the creative political actor found in
the thought of Weil and Camus and the modern
revolutionary they found at work in their world.

Camus

remarked that true genius does not first destroy in order
to create.

The modern revolutionary, impatient for

change, found it more useful to destroy that which
existed in order to begin anew in materially constructing
the revolutionary vision.

To counter this tendency, more

conservative elements became rigidly reactionary.

The

resulting dialectic of revolution and reaction created a
235
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decentered politics in which neither side could
strategically afford to respect limits.

The appeal of

creative political action to Weil and Camus was as a
response to this dialectic, and it entailed recovering
respect for the limits of human action in the world.
The Resistance experience was critical to the
development of their political thought.

Weil and Camus

each learned that resisting evil was not the same as
creating a workable order grounded in the good.

Secret

meetings, sabotage, subversion and feigned loyalty were
not the stuff of citizenship.

Building the postwar world

would require positive political action.

To this end,

they created different but not entirely divergent
political theories based on their visions of the postwar
world.

The necessary objective for both was the

reconciliation of a collective form of justice with an
individual freedom in harmony with human dignity.

The

reconciliation required a conceptual reorientation to
justice and freedom each thinker believed must be
undertaken if Europe was to be fruitfully reconstructed
after the war.
Their political visions, geared toward this
conceptual reconciliation, present and address a coherent
set of problems attending political and social order in
the aftermath of total war:

How could the integrity of
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the individual be preserved without succumbing to
solipsism?

How could a safe context called "home" be

created without generating the monstrous collectivities
wrought by twentieth century revolutionaries?

How to

create justice in a community without compromising the
freedom of the individual?

What are the reciprocal

responsibilities of the community and the individual and
the reciprocal obligations of the individual and other
individuals?

These problems persist in one form or other

into the post-Cold War world.

This chapter will show how

Weil and Camus each presented and addressed these issues.
What emerges in their thought is that ethical political
action must be undertaken by a whole human self, firmly
grounded in its specific origins, but committed to the
general survival and enrichment of human beings.
II.

The Integrity of the Individual

Weil and Camus each asserted a common human dignity
to counter the anonymity of collective political
existence.

Giving voice to that common humanity absorbed

both thinkers from their earliest writings.

For Weil, it

began in her consideration of Marxism.1 Weil believed
the precise value of Marx's thought to be his early

1See the discussions of Weil and Marxism above. See
also Blum and Seidler, A Truer Liberty; McLellan, Utopian
Pessimist; and Mary Dietz, Between the Human and the
Divine.
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valuation of the human being.

Long after she abandoned

revolutionary Marxist methods, Weil clarified her idea of
the individual in her essay "Human Personality."2

In

this 1937 essay, she asserted the importance of fragile
human potentialities over the more material aspirations
of modern society.

She chose to ground human action in

respect for the divine in every other human being.

Camus

analyzed the human condition from the perspective of the
solitary human being's confrontation with the absurd.
Recognizing despair as a common but futile response to
this encounter, Camus sought a way to live with its
inevitable consequences.

Camus's rebellion consisted in

saying "no" to the inevitability of the absurd and "yes"
to that which human beings share.

While neither thinker

could abandon the human need for community, both agreed
that the needs of the human beings should be the occasion
for the community, rather than the reverse.
Weil:

The Impersonal and Ethics
In the possibilities inherent in individual human

beings, in their will to know the good, in their creative
energy and in their intelligence, Weil found the only
possible effective counter to the power of

2Weil, "Human Personality" in Selected Essays. 9-34.
The essay is a response to the "Personalism" of Emmanuel
Mounier.
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collectivities.

In an early essay on the efficacy of

Marxism called "Prospects" she wrote:
Let us not forget that we want to make the
individual and not the collectivity, the supreme
value. We want to form whole men by doing away with
that specialization which cripples us all. . . .
We
want to give back to man, that is to say the
individual, the power which it is his proper
function to exercise over nature, over tools, over
society itself.3
The essay on "Human Personality" is a definitive
statement of Weil's conception of the individual human
being.

A just political order grounded in the good

requires an inversion of the relationship between the
collectivity and the individual.

Though the character of

the human presence is determinant for Weil, the presence
of the collective must still be accepted before it can be
transformed:
The human being can only escape from the collective
by raising himself above the personal and entering
into the impersonal. The moment he does this, there
is something in him, a small portion of his soul,
upon which nothing of the collective can get a
hold.4
The personal/impersonal distinction is decisive.

For

Weil everything that is personal is error and sin.
Saying "I" or taking the collective signification "We" as
the sole source of personal identity unduly distinguishes
the individual from the rest of humanity.

Weil's

^eil, Oppression and Liberty. 19.
4Weil, "Human Personality," in Selected Essays. 15.
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conception of ethics begins with the recognition that
everything that is impersonal in human beings is sacred.
The impersonal is a reflective distance allowing love for
others in themselves rather than through some imposed
conception of them.

Seeing others from this reflective

distance, paying ••attention” to others, allows the
individual to see the intrinsic value of the human being.
The distance required by the impersonal is not a distance
on the other, then, it is a distance on the self.

It is

the requirement of a selflessness in reference to the
other simply because the other is a human being.
Ethically, seeing the other from the perspective of the
impersonal creates a responsibility to all other human
beings "to safeguard, not their persons, but whatever
frail potentialities are hidden within them for passing
over to the impersonal."5 Primary obligation thus flows
from individual to individual.
Identifying the potentialities within human beings
and then providing for their protection was part of
Weil's conception of human being as sacred.

The sacred

is that in the human being which expects to be treated,
against all experience, according to the good rather than
evil.6

For Weil, this expectation was a verifiable part

5Ibid., 16.
6Ibid., 10.
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of human experience and evidence of the residual presence
of the divine in human beings.

The inevitable

confrontation with evil always surprises, producing a cry
of outrage.

Redressing this outrage takes the form of

protective devices like governing institutions and their
manifold theoretical justifications.

Concepts like the

notion of "rights" and the collectivity-derived authority
of institutions may be read both as articulations of that
outrage and as measures of how much the causes of the
outrage are actually (mis)understood.

While these

structures may provide comfort, they often create their
own necessity and their own injustices.

The amount of

comfort these structures provided were no measure of
their success.

Comfort was a function of the personal.

The protective artifices valued in the twentieth century
were ill-conceived because they privileged comfort, that
is, the personal, over the impersonal as that which was
to be valued.
The success of collectivities in the twentieth
century derived from their ability to pander to the needs
of the personal while serving only their own prestige and
power.
discern:

The psychological mechanism was not difficult to
there was comfort, that is, protection from the

exigencies of necessity, Weil knew, in losing one's self
in a collectivity, in taking membership in a collectivity
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as the fount of individual identity.

The discipline of

the impersonal was Weil's ethical counter to this
temptation to comfort.

Valuing disinterested action

required removing from social and political institutions
whatever was detrimental to the growth of the impersonal
in its members.

In the resulting order,

for every person there should be enough room, enough
freedom to plan the use of one's time, the
opportunity to reach ever higher levels of
attention, some solitude, some silence. At the same
time, the person needs warmth, lest it be driven by
distress to submerge itself in the collective.7
Weil's earlier emphasis on creatively refashioning labor
and free time takes a renewed importance in this social
order.

Creative ethical action requires an impersonal

orientation to others and the necessity of the world.
Each has the potential for impersonal action provided the
human being "can root himself in the impersonal good so
as to be able to draw energy from it," Weil wrote, "then
he is in a condition, whenever he feels the obligation to
do so, to bring to bear without any outside help, against
any collectivity, a small but real force."8 This "small
but real force" is the significant potential
manifestation of the creative that the individual can and
must freely exercise in social and political life.

7Ibid., 17.
8Ibid., 15.
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The good, known through the decreated part of the
human soul, is the source of acting with impersonal
force, but drawing on the good requires a stillness which
modern civilization has not allowed.

To know the good,

Weil believed, human beings needed silence and warmth.
What they got in the modern world was "icy
pandemonium."9 The structures which order human
existence are cold and indifferent.

To overcome this

indifference human beings respond with an ever-increasing
volume of activity.

The modern human environment was

characterized by a seemingly endless competition among
noises, mechanical and human.

In her critique of modern

working conditions, Weil documented the mechanical noise
drowning out human life.

In the political realm, the

noise of empty rhetoric had obscured the cry of outrage
against injustice.
example.

Weil used the notion of rights as an

Like the Romans, Weil believed, modern

civilization had preoccupied itself with the language of
rights:
The notion of rights is linked with the notion of
sharing out, of exchange, of measured quantity. It
has a commercial flavour, essentially evocative of
legal claims and arguments. Rights are always
asserted in a tone of contention; and when this tone
is adopted, it must rely upon force in the
background, or else it will be laughed at.10

9Ibid., 17.
10Ibid., 18.
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In this notion of rights, the appeal against evil comes
from the level of the personal, the selfish.

A political

community based on this idea of personal rights devolves
into a kind of tyranny of individuals offering no defense
against dictatorship.

"Thanks to this word,” Weil

thought, "what should have been a cry of protest from the
depth of the heart has been turned into a shrill nagging
of claims and counter-claims which is both impure and
unpractical.1,11 Shrill nagging about rights is just
noise hindering the more important search for justice by
obscuring the fact that while everyone should be
respected equally, everyone is not equally privileged.12
The shared element in human existence is life in a
state of affliction, not some set of universal rights.
The pervasiveness of noise only deepens the plight of
those who do not recognize the suffering they share with
the rest of humanity.

For Weil, affliction is the true

state of human being, a device for pulverizing the soul
and the pride.

Engaging affliction is the first

requirement of action in accordance with the good or

11Ibid., 21.
12Richard H. Bell, "Reading Simone Weil on Rights,
Justice and Love," in Bell, ed., Simone Weil's Philosophy
of Culture. 214. See also McLellan, Utopian Pessimist.
Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine, and Winch's
Wittgensteinian encounter with Weil called simone_ Weil:
The Just Balance.
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truth.

Weil's description of the state of affliction

echoes Camus's later description of the absurd:
I may lose, at any moment, through the play of
circumstances over which I have no control, anything
whatsoever I possess, including those things which
are so intimately mine that I consider them as being
myself. There is nothing that I might not lose. It
could happen at any moment that what I am might be
abolished and replaced by anything whatsoever of the
filthiest and most contemptible sort.13
The business of living, its noise and indifference,
shield human beings from affliction.

Only those who are

materially afflicted or those who seek the good know
their own affliction.

Most people avoid confronting

their own affliction by ignoring the affliction of
others.

Yet, acting on the impersonal requires an

annihilation of this selfish self, that is, putting
oneself in the place of the afflicted.

Only "the

supernatural working of grace" can so orient a soul as to
make it capable of attending to affliction and thus
knowing truth.14 Ethical action in the world must be
based on this "intense, pure, disinterested, gratuitous,
generous attention" Weil called "love."15
Action grounded in love means attending to the
affliction of self and other, attending to the sacred in

13Weil, "Human Personality," in Selected Essavs. 27.
14Ibid., 28.
15Ibid.
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human being.

"Attention" thus is the core of ethical

action in the world.

Weil's concise idea of justice

derives from this beginning:

"Justice consists in seeing

that no harm is done to men."16

God will deliver the

eternal part of the soul from evil.

"Therefore," Weil

concludes, "it is for men to see that men are preserved
from harm."17 While people can act pursuant to this
goal, no single human being can protect all others from
harm.

Nor can human beings be trusted always to act with

the goal of preserving others in mind.

Weil is forced to

recognize the inevitable need for protective structures.
At the end of "Human Personality" she insisted that these
structures would have to be rethought and recreated with
the protection of the sacred in human beings as their
charge.

By so reconceiving the political order, Weil

hoped to strip contemporary political discourse of its
noisy vernacular by valuing the impersonal perspective in
political life.
Camus:

The Indomitable Men

Camus, in the middle of editing her works for
posthumous publication, agreed with the spirit of Weil's
thought on the integrity of the individual.

"S[imone].

Weil is right," he wrote in a notebook entry of September

16Ibid., 30.
17Ibid.
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1950, "it's not the human being that must be protected,
but the possibilities within him."18 The individual's
heroic defiance of the absurd (Sisyphus, those who
battled The Placrue. The Rebel) was a central theme in all
of Camus's work.

The subjects of his two philosophical

essays, suicide in The Mvth of Sisyphus and murder in The
Rebel, reveal his belief that the greatest human crime
was snuffing out those possibilities either in oneself or
another.19 To inflict death, on self or others, was to
destroy potential, to exercise a power it should not be
in the human province to wield.

Camus realized, however,

that protecting the possibilities in human beings was
only the beginning.

Convincing human beings to act

creatively from that potential, mindful of their
limitations as human beings, must be the larger objective
of ethical thought.
In the aftermath of the Liberation, Camus believed
that participation of the kind he saw in the Resistance
had been a successful first step in the direction of a
politics grounded in a creative ethics.

The activities

18Albert Camus, Notebooks 1942-1951. translated by
Justin O'Brien (New York: Paragon House, 1991), 265.
19Even his brief, regrettable support for the postLiberation purges in France was ultimately countered by
the extended anti-capital punishment essay "Reflections
on the Guillotine." For Camus and the purges, see the
discussion below and Footnote 34.
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of the Resistance convinced Camus that action like that
derived from the violent passions of war could be
transformed into acting within a more peaceable
understanding of politics:
Of course the Resistance did not begin as a
political struggle. The fight against the Vichy
government was only a consequence of the fight
against the occupier. But under the conditions of
clandestine action, war took on a new form. Our
military machine had to be constructed out of many
different pieces. Such an undertaking is of a
political nature. Committing sabotage is an act of
war. But bringing together saboteurs, co-ordinating
throughout the country activities carried out by
people and groups with different social
backgrounds— this is an act of politics.20
The successful cooperative interaction of individuals in
resisting the Nazis convinced Camus that a new order, an
order in which politics was to be reclaimed by
individuals, free of the authority of ideologies or
Weil's divine, was possible.

This order would be one

in which the face of man is seen in bright light.
Politics is no longer dissociated from individuals.
It is addressed directly by man to other men. It is
a way of speaking. If the Resistance is remembered
as more than just a moment in our history, it will
be remembered for having placed our citizens face to
face.21

20Albert Camus, "Resistance and Politics," Combat. 1
September 1944 quoted in Between Hell and Reason. 47.
21Ibid., 48.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Camus hoped to secure this order in a politically
democratic and economically socialist postwar France.22
This hybrid social order would protect human
potentialities by keeping the individual engaged in
democratic political processes while protected from the
tortuous currents of an "open" capital-driven market.
The postwar coalition of elements of the Resistance
that would bring this vision to fruition broke down
before the war ended in 1945.23

Camus abandoned the

editorship of Combat in 1946, but continued his ethical
explorations in The Rebel.24

The work consisted of

stinging critiques of most of the major intellectual
movements of modernity.

Camus sought to free the modern

human being to act by critiquing these inherited
presuppositions, clearing the way for genuinely creative
action.

The result was an idea of rebellion as a

22See below the discussion of Camus, editorial,
Combat, 1 October 1944, in Between Hell and Reason. 5758.
^Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals,
1944-1956 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1994) offers a brilliant discussion of the prewar and
wartime trends in French intellectual culture which led
to the splintering of the Resistance movement once the
Nazis were defeated. Judt's larger objective is to show
how French intellectuals' affinity for Socialist thought
made it difficult to overcome the consequences of
Communist realpolitik while remaining true to their
Marxist roots.
24Camus, The Rebel.
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singular act undertaken by an individual not in the name
of one intellectual system or other, but rather in the
name of a common human experience.

The Rebel was the

beginning of Camus's attempt to harness the frustration
of modern humanity and to refocus it into a positive,
constructive way of being in the world.
Camus took pains to limit the rebellion he advocated
in The Rebel.

Rebellion for its own sake, like that of

the modern revolutionary, preserved nothing; it justified
destruction by its intention to build another image.
Camus sought to limit the revolutionary by appealing to
the fact of our common human being:
In assigning a limit within which begins the dignity
common to all men, rebellion defined a primary
value. It put in the first rank of its frame of
reference an obvious complicity among men, a common
texture, the solidarity of chains, a communication
between human being and human being which makes men
both similar and united.25
In every other human being's power to rebel lies the
precise limit beyond which the action of any individual
or group cannot go.

This is the rebel's "no.11 Political

activity founded on "no" can only result in a livable
order if the rebel knows when and why to say "yes."
members of the Resistance had said "no" to the Nazis.

25Ibid., 281.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The

251

When the time came to cay "yes” they could not agree on
what to affirm.26
The capacity to say "yes" was central to Camus's
conception of creative rebellion.

Europeans had just

lived through a thirty year historical crisis accompanied
by the unprecedented destruction of human life and human
possibilities.

As Europe picked up the pieces, Camus

thought about the reconstruction in terms of what was yet
to be created.

He knew that every historical crisis

terminates in institutions. If we have no control
over the crisis itself, which is pure hazard, we do
have control over the institutions, since we can
define them, choose the ones for which we will
fight, and thus bend our efforts toward their
establishment. Authentic arts of rebellion will
only consent to take up arms for institutions that
limit violence, not for those which codify it.27
Camus urgently believed that the reconstruction should
not be blind to its own power to define the terms of the
postwar world.

The individuals who undertook the

rebuilding would have to remember their humanity and in
their work and say "yes” to preserving human dignity.
The work would need to be done with moderation and a

26See Judt, Past Imperfect, especially Chapter 3
"Resistance and Revenge" and Chapter 4 "What is Political
Justice?" 45-74 and 75-98.
27Camus, The Rebel. 292.
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respect for human limits.

"Approximative thought," Camus

wrote, "is the only creator of reality."28
Rebellion in the name of human dignity required a
face-to-face postwar politics.

Dignity could be served

by concentrating on the "concrete realities" of human
existence:

"on occupation, on the village, where the

living human heart of things and of men is to be
found."29 A commitment to human dignity meant a
political context responsive to the needs of work, home
and family— in short, the recasting of the political
context as a human context.

In this human context may be

found what transcendence there is in Camus's thought.30
Camus's is a decidedly horizontal conception of
transcendence.

For Camus, the "the living human heart of

things and men" made up the eternal in human existence.
"Politics," Camus wrote, "to satisfy the demands of
rebellion, must submit to the[se] eternal verities."31

28Ibid., 295.
29Ibid. , 298.
30Camus's resistance to a traditional notion of
transcendence is well-noted. See Rosen, "Marxism,
Mysticism and Liberty; Hanna, The Thought and Art of
Albert Camus: Fred Wilhoite, Bevond Nihilism; Isaac,
Arendt. Camus and Modern Rebellion; and Sprintzen, Camus:
A Critical Examination. Weil and Camus have been
compared on this issue in Dunaway, "Estrangement and the
Need for Roots: Prophetic Visions of the Human Condition
in Albert Camus and Simone Weil."
31Camus, The Rebel. 298.
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Camus prescribed a mode of action in which the human
being "indefatigably confronts evil."32

He had no faith

that institutions alone could teach human beings how to
behave toward each other.

If Camus had no doubt where

and with whom the preservation of human dignity must
begin, he had no illusions where it would end:
Man can master in himself everything that should be
mastered. He should rectify in creation everything
that can be rectified. And after he has done so,
children will still die unjustly even in a perfect
society. Even by his greatest effort man can only
propose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of
the world. But the injustice and the suffering will
remain and, no matter how limited they are, they
will not cease to be an outrage.33
In rebellion Camus found a mode of existence that he
believed charged human beings to confront the absurd in
the name of a positive value rather than in existential
despair.

His faith in this value, in that in the human

being which should be preserved, is what Camus might
earlier have called a "leap."

Like other acts of

eluding, Camus's leap gave him a standard of reference:
Camus's faith in humanity's ability to save itself was
the standard to which he held the postwar world.

More

often than not the world did not measure up.
A war conducted with no regard for human dignity
bred a postwar world fundamentally hostile to human

32Ibid., 303.
33Ibid.
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dignity.

Worse, Camus found, this hostility was harder

for the individual to redress alone.

The answers "yes"

or "no" were increasingly inadequate to meet the
complexity of the questions of the postwar world.

Camus

was disillusioned by the direction taken by the postwar
purges which he defended for six months in late 1944 and
early 1945.34

He keenly felt the inadequacy of

individual human action the day after the atomic bomb was
dropped on Hiroshima, writing, "The world is what it is,
which is to say, nothing much."35

In the 1950s, he felt

his own impotence as his homeland Algeria was torn apart
by brutal civil war.

He could only call for a cessation

of the killing:
I am interested only in the actions that here and
now can spare useless bloodshed and in the solutions
that guarantee the future of a land whose suffering
I share too much to be able to indulge in
speechmaking about it.36

^See Camus's responses to Mauriac in defense of the
purge in editorials of 20 October 1945 and 25 October
1945 in Combat and his acknowledgement that the purge had
gone awry in an editorial in Combat of 5 January 1945 in
Camus, Between Hell and Reason. 66, 71, 100. See also
the biographical accounts of this period of Camus's life:
Lottman, Albert Camus: A Biography; McCarthy, Camus; and
Brian Masters, Camus: A Study (Totowa, New Jersey:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1974). See also the Judt's
discussion of the purges in Past Imperfect.
35Camus, editorial, 8 August 1945, Combat. in
Between Hell and Reason. 110.
^Albert Camus, "Preface to Algerian Reports," in
Camus, Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 112.
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But there were moments and there were people.

Camus

supported the Algerian Socialist Aziz Kessous in his
attempt to encourage a dialogue between the two sides in
the civil war.37

In a 1955 speech, Camus lauded deposed

Columbian President Eduoardo Santos as one of those men
"whose sacrifice and example every day help us to
live."38 He found in Santos a spirit he had hoped would
characterize the postwar world, but instead found that it
remained the exception.

Camus took the occasion of

praising Santos as an opportunity to illustrate and call
for social and political action in the name of human
dignity.

In the speech Camus spoke forcefully:

What is beginning is the period of the indomitable
men devoted to the unconditional defense of liberty.
This is why your [Santos's] attitude serves as an
example and a comfort to all those who, like me,
have now broken with many of their traditional
friends by rejecting any complicity, even temporary,
even and above all tactical, with regimes or parties
whether of the Right or of the Left that justify,
however little, the suppression of a single one of
our liberties I39
The "indomitable" political actor had only his or her
humanity, and the freedom that conception entailed, to
call on in choosing modes of political action.

Failure

37Camus, "Letter to an Algerian Militant," in
Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 127.
38Camus "Homage to an Exile," in Resistance.
Rebellion and Death. 100.
39Ibid., 105.
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was inevitable, significant successes were rare, and
blind partisanship was dangerous.

The rebel's effort,

self-consciously aware of its own limits, was nonetheless
of inestimable value.
Weil and Camus thus each held to the idea of a
transcendent ethical principle, though their conceptions
of that principle were markedly different.

Weil's was a

more traditional understanding of transcendence in
ethics.

It took the form of an obedience to the divine

residual in human nature.

Each created person, possessed

of a fragment of divine being, was precious.

Love of the

divine mandated that it was the obligation of each human
being to see to the preservation of every other human
being.

Camus conceded the need for a transcendent

principle, but could not find it in religion or ideology.
He looked instead to engender an awareness of what human
beings share:

the experience of suffering, the awareness

of death along with the joys of life and love.

Like

Weil, Camus believed that the potentialities in human
beings must be watched over and guarded jealously by
every human being.
both Weil and Camus:

There is a paradox in the position of
each seeks an external limiting

mechanism inside of each human being.
source of his or her own preservation.

Each person is the
Dangerously close

to solipsism, this is only half of the equation.

Each
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person is also the source of the preservation of all
others and bound by his or her humanity to act so.
Neither thinker believed it was enough to protect
the possibilities within human beings.

These human

beings must also be encouraged to act upon those
possibilities.

The emergent conception of freedom

entailed acceptance of the limits of all human acts as
well as a responsibility to other human beings as subject
to the consequences of those acts.

It also meant

sometimes acting for cause with little or no hope for
success or recognition.

Such recognition could not be a

consideration when acting on the impersonal.

In the

anonymity of the act, Camus's indomitable actor must face
the apparent (absurd) futility of the struggle.

Both

Weil and Camus knew that facing this futility would be
less difficult in a world where others were sharing that
burden, that is, making their own creative responses to
the conditions of injustice.

Acting in the name of human

dignity would require recognizing this shared component
of the struggle.

This meant avoiding the trap of the

personal and acting from the perspective of the
impersonal.

The personal sense of futility could not be

allowed to color the decision to act freely.
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III:

Counter-Collectivity:

Rootedness and Home

Preserving the integrity of the individual was the
primary goal political order should set for itself.
There still must be a political order.
character of that order?

What of the

Weil and Camus agreed that it

should provide what the French Third Republic in
particular and European civilization in general had not
provided:

a place of safety that could be loved and

defended against tyranny.

Weil and Camus each attributed

the fall of the Third Republic to the indifference of the
French population to its fate.

The Occupation meant not

only the end of the structures of the Republic itself,
but called into question the idea that a France existed
worthy of love.

By their actions, members of the

Resistance defied the disappearance of France, but knew
that they would have to recover the meaning of France
once the occupier was repulsed.40
Preserving human dignity required a context of
safety and support; it required creating a home.
Scholars of both thinkers have approached the issue of
community from the perspective of the critique of

40See Judt, Past Imperfect. This "meaning of
France" was the point on which the hoped-for cooperation
broke down.
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totalitarianism.41

The critique of totalitarianism is

primarily negative and throws the analysis back upon
outmoded forms of the polity.

By approaching the problem

from the perspective of homelessness, the critique or
diagnosis is only a starting point.

Once totalitarian

structures are dismantled, home must still be conceived
and built.

The critique of totalitarianism is a

necessary beginning, but creating home is a more positive
political act.
Homelessness is a neglected aspect of the political
thought of both Weil and Camus.

For Weil, homelessness

was the state of having been torn from one's roots, from
all that sustains the human being.

She thus isolated the

phenomenon of uprootedness as the central problem of
human existence.

For Camus, a native of French Algeria,

the problem of homelessness was an intensely personal
one.

Home, for Camus, consisted of the land and people

of his native Algeria as well as the French intellectual
tradition in which he had been educated.

During the

Second World War, his function as editor of the
Resistance newspaper Combat forced him to define "French"
and in so doing identify himself as a Frenchman, albeit

41Tw o excellent examples are Mary Dietz's discussion
of the collectivity in Between the Human and the Divine.
50-59 and Jeffrey Isaac's discussion of "Totalitarianism
and the Intoxication of Power" in Arendt. Camus and
Modern Rebellion. 37-67.
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one of Algerian origin.

In the 1950s, the war for Arab-

Algerian independence from France demanded that he choose
either France or Algeria magnifying the complexities of
home for Camus.

Home, as an issue for both thinkers, was

not just the recovery of the roots of a particular
milieu, but also the creation of a community which could
nourish human beings without the tyranny of
totalitarianism.

Weil and Camus tried to conceive a

milieu in which human beings could feel safe in the
exercise of their freedom.

For both, justice was an

environment to be conceived and built, not an abstract
principle.
Weil:

Rootedness and Patriotism
The Need for Roots is Weil's meditation on

deracinement or uprootedness.42 The willingness of
uprooted Europeans to destroy their environment confirmed
the inadequacy of that environment as home.

For Weil,

roots, as one of her more astute critics has shown, meant
that cultural values not only have weight (gravity), but

42The French title of the book is L'Enracinement.
Prelude a une declaration des devoirs envers l'etre
humain (Paris: Gallimard, 1951). Enracine connotes
"deep rooted. The societal problem of uprootedness
identified by the work, deracinement. is thus grave and
unambiguous: an uprooting suggesting eradication.
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also meaning and coherence (grace) .43 Reestablishing
roots, Weil believed, should be the first priority of
postwar reconstruction.

Weil described rootedness:

A human being has roots by virtue of his real,
active, and natural participation in the life of a
community, which preserves in living shape certain
particular treasures of the past and certain
particular expectations for the future. This
participation is a natural one, in the sense that it
is automatically brought about by place, conditions
of birth, profession, and social surroundings.
Every human being needs to have multiple roots.44
Rootedness indicates a sense of naturally mutual
belonging, an identity of interest, between an individual
and his or her milieu.45

As Eric Springsted correctly

argues, rootedness means that "communities are not
imperious creators of our persons, but creators because
they allow us our ability for self-creation— or
decreation. "46
Weil first encountered uprootedness in her study of
the effects of modern working conditions.

Modern workers

lacked roots in urban areas where forms of industrial

43Eric Springsted, "Rootedness: Culture and Value,"
in Bell, editor, Simone Weil's Philosophy of Culture.
161-188.
^Weil, The Need for Roots. 43.
45In the conclusion of her Between the Human and the
Divine. Dietz argues that the organic metaphor of "roots"
diminishes the sense of belonging to a place in Weil's
work.
46Springsted, "Rootedness:

Culture and Value," 182-

183.
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production kept them alienated from themselves, their
work and each other, while barely providing for their
sustenance.47

Roots were also missing in the

countryside where technology and the demand for higher
levels of productivity meant that labor was no longer
attuned to the cycles of nature.

Moreover, Weil

believed, rural laborers thought that reformers had
ignored their very real concerns in order to concentrate
on those of urban laborers.48 These issues, coupled
with those of collaboration and resistance, convinced
Weil that the architects of postwar France would confront
a population more divided and displaced than it had been
before the war.

For Weil, the explanation and the

solution were of a piece:
himself uproots others.

"Whoever is uprooted in
Whoever is rooted in himself

doesn't uproot others."49
Weil had to be careful not to recreate the
totalitarian collectivity she saw at work in the world.
In the modern state, Weil discerned an accomplice in the
uprooting of generations of Europeans.

The nation-state,

Weil believed, had become the single most significant
collectivity in human existence.

The nation, simply "a

47Weil, The Need for Roots. 72.
^Ibid., 91.
49Ibid., 48.
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territorial aggregate whose various parts recognize the
authority of the same state," had become the source and
fount of all human identity, the sole object of the
otherwise ennobling human attributes of loyalty and
sacrifice.50 As such, it had become the repository for
the human being's "most valuable possession in the world
of temporal affairs, namely, his continuity in time."51
Yet, at the apex of its influence, the nation-state had
undergone a "sudden and extraordinarily rapid
decomposition," uprooting humanity, leaving it "stunned"
and confused as to how to respond.52
The decomposition of the nation-state was masked by
an entirely modern conception of patriotism.

As a

passion directed at an external collectivity called the
nation, Weil believed, modern patriotism had supplanted
an elder system of obligations:
neighbor, and family.

to lord, king, city,

The elements of the elder system

were distinct but interrelated, "[t]he whole formed
something very complicated, but also very human."53

To

the modern state, distant and powerful, the human being
represented a resource to be conserved or spent as its

50Ibid., 98.
51Ibid., 100.
52Ibid.
53Ibid., 104.
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needs demanded.

The human being so objectified is

uprooted with deeply disturbing ethical consequences:
Everything points to the fact that, unless
supernatural grace intervenes, there is no form of
cruelty or depravity of which ordinary, decent
people are not capable, once the corresponding
psychological mechanisms have been set in motion.54
Patriotism had become just such a psychological
mechanism.

It motivated human beings to conquer in the

name of liberation and for the prestige of the nation.
"Conquering the world and liberating the world," Weil
wrote, "are two incompatible forms of glory, but which
can be easily reconciled with one another in reverie."55
Weil had seen the phenomenon at work in Germany in 193 3
and its consequences at work in the rest of Europe
thereafter.56 War, conquest and martial glory were
incompatible with Weil's conception of home.
The modern state thrives on its own glory and not on
the real love of its members.

The modern state,

Weil

believed, "is a cold concern, which cannot inspire love,
but itself kills, suppresses everything that might be

54Ibid., 112.
55Ibid., 113.
56See Weil's exposition of the failure of the
Communist Party to confront the totalizing tendencies of
Nazism in the series of ten articles she wrote while
visiting Germany between 4 December 1932 and 5 March
1933: Simone Weil, "The Situation in Germany," in
Formative Writings. 97-147.
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love; so one is forced to love it, because there is
nothing else."57 The French model of the modern nation
state came from Richelieu whose "devotion to the state
uprooted France."58

Interposing the state between the

individual and justice, Richelieu killed off "all
spontaneous life in the country" to insulate the state
from opposition.59 The spontaneity of life is a
manifestation of rootedness and the source of a
community's strength.

Proper governance encourages the

creative expression which gives voice to a community's
sense of itself.

In the spontaneous expression of its

inhabitants, what Weil calls the vital medium finds its
life.

The modern nation-state, concerned only with its

own power and prestige, cannot serve as a vital medium.
The task of those who would set up postwar France
was easily stated, if difficult to execute:
French people something to love."60

"To give the

France would have

to be reconceived as a particular vital medium, distinct
from but no better than other vital media.

"In defining

one's native country as a certain particular vital
medium," Weil believed, "one avoids the contradictions

57Weil, The Need for Roots. 114.
58Ibid., 116.
59Ibid., 134, 116.
60Ibid., 157.
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and lies that corrode the idea of patriotism.1,61 The
particular vital medium, the country, "has been produced
by a network of causes in which good and evil, justice
and injustice have been mixed up together, and so it
cannot be the best possible one."

It nonetheless

"deserves to be guarded like a treasure for the good it
contains."62

The State's duty is to foment and protect

the creation of the country.

It must preserve the

conditions wherein the country can become "a life-giving
agent, really turned into good, root-fixing ground" and
"be made a favorable setting for participation in and
loyal attachment to all other sorts of environmental
expression. "63
Love is owed a country, not a nation-state.

Because

the country exists in a context of other countries,
however, there are always outside pressures.

When the

time comes, human beings are obligated to protect the
source of their own lives, their vital medium.

But the

inhabitants of a vital medium only fight in self-defense,
not in aggression.

The idealized form of patriotism Weil

conceives is grounded in compassion and love, not concern
for national grandeur and prestige.

True patriotism

61Ibid., 161.
62Ibid.
“ ibid., 165.
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derives from a compassion for one's country as something
beautiful, precious, fragile and perishable.64

Weil

rather optimistically believed that such a patriotism
would appeal to even the disenfranchised:
Were such a relationship to be established between
the people and the country, the former would no
longer regard their own personal sufferings as
crimes committed by the country against themselves,
but as ills suffered by the country in and through
themselves. The difference is immense.65
Love born of rootedness must be the eternal source of the
new French constitution.

The fall of the Third Republic

represented a break in historical continuity that meant
"constitutional legality can no longer be regarded as
having an historical basis; it must be made to derive
from the eternal source of all legality."66 Weil
naively took for granted that a political order that
could show its debt to this eternal source would engender
the love and obedience of its members.

Moreover, she

believed, it would create a reciprocal obligation between
rulers and ruled.

"Since the people's obedience toward

public authorities is a necessity for the country," Weil
concluded, "this obedience becomes a sacred obligation,
and one that confers on the public authorities

“ ibid., 170.
65Ibid., 176.
“ ibid., 181.
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themselves, seeing that they form the object of it, the
same sacred character."67
Weil's rather utopian attempt to recast patriotism
derived from her deeply held conviction that prevailing
forms of collective identity were evil, but that some
form of collective identity was nonetheless necessary to
the human spirit.

A spiritual component, a stillness

necessary to access the decreated, suffuses Weil's work.
She argued that the "idolatrous course" of
totalitarianism "can only be arrested by coming up
against a genuinely spiritual way of life.”68 The
immediate form this took was the restoration of beauty to
human labor.
theme.

In The Need for Roots Weil expanded on this

The beautiful, commonly shared and recognized as

home, is that in the vital medium which is to be loved,
preserved and protected.

The beautiful in French

civilization must be the inspiration for a new French
order as the beautiful in European civilization must be
the inspiration for a new European order.

For Weil, the

only counter to the tyranny of totalitarian forms of the
collective was a spiritual dedication to the beauty of
home which must inform any reconception of citizenship or
patriotism.

67Ibid., 182.
“ ibid., 91.
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Camus:

The Complexities of Home

A native of Algeria raised in the French colonial
school system there, Camus's circumstances forced him to
conceive of home as something transcending national
identification.

In his political essays, Camus grappled

with questions of home most pointedly on two occasions:
in his "Letters to a German Friend" during the Second
World War and in his work on the Algerian Civil War in
the 1950s.

In the first instance, Camus tried to come to

terms with his conception of home by comparing it to that
of his "German friend."

The result is an effective, if

idealized, reflection on the meaning and ethical
obligations of membership.

His task is even more

difficult in his work on Algeria.

Like a child

confronted with a physically violent relationship between
parents, Camus refuses to choose.

Instead, he futilely

calls for a cessation of the violence of civil war by
appealing to the home, the love of the place, which the
French and Arab communities ostensibly shared.

In both

cases, Camus groped for a conception of home by
confronting unacceptable definitions and defenses of
home.
Composed during the war, Camus's "Letters to a
German Friend" attack the arrogance of German selfidentity and the cruelty with which that identity was
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being imposed on the rest of Europe.69

By addressing

the letters to a mythical "friend," Camus acknowledged
the shared European responsibility for the calamity of
1939-1945.70 He explained that when he says "you" he
means "you Nazis" and not "you Germans."

Similarly, when

he says "we" he means "we Frenchmen" and sometimes "we
Free Europeans."

He claims to be "contrasting two

attitudes, not two nations, even if, at a certain moment
in history, these two nations personified two enemy
attitudes."71

The enemy attitudes have to do with how

the interlocutors define themselves in relation to their
nations and each other.

In the letters Camus begins

articulating the hard lessons learned about home and
country during two world wars.
In the first letter Camus contrasts the love of
country espoused by his German counterpart to his own.

69Albert Camus, "Letters to a German Friend," in
Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 1-32. "The Letters" were
not published together until after the Liberation. Camus
was uncomfortable with their publication because he felt
they were written in a certain spirit at a certain time.
They are no less critical to his political thought and
may be read as Camus's definitive critique of nihilism.
See Isaac, Arendt. Camus and Modern Rebellion. 93.
^ilhoite in Beyond Nihilism. 51, found that, in
the "Letters" Camus rejected "the nihilistic conclusions
which, to many, had seemed latent in his earlier works."
Camus recognized in his "friend" a mirrored reflection of
himself.
71Albert Camus, "Preface" to "Letters to a German
Friend" in Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 4.
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The German, who equates love of country with blind
obedience, has charged Camus with not loving his country.
Camus is stung by the charge, but deflects it by arguing
that his idea of membership is the more authentic:
No, I didn't love my country, if pointing out what
is unjust in what we love amounts to not loving, if
insisting that what we love should measure up to the
finest image we have of her amounts to not
loving.72
The rapid fall of the Third Republic issued from a lack
of confidence in its character, not a lack of love for
the ideal of France.

"I belong to an admirable and

persevering nation," Camus wrote, "which, admitting her
errors and weaknesses, has not lost the idea that
constitutes her whole greatness."73

Camus's France was

rummaging through its own past preparing to recreate
itself in conformity with the idea her people (namely,
the Resistants) had of her.

A country that would

undertake the task of recreating itself after such a
calamity, Camus believed, had proven her worthiness.
"This country is worthy of the difficult and demanding
love that is mine," Camus wrote, "[a]nd I believe she is
decidedly worth fighting for since she is worthy of a

^Camus, "Letters to a German Friend," in
Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 5.
^Ibid., 10.
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higher love."74

By contrast, the German's nation got

the only love it deserved:

a blind love in which it

could not possibly find self-justification.

That

inability to justify itself, Camus concluded, would be
its undoing.75
In Camus's emergent conception of citizenship, love
of country enjoins the individual to hold it to a
standard of integrity.

He defends the France that serves

as a home for his compatriots in the Resistance.

The

citizenship in the name of which the resistants fought
was a critically discerning one.

The willingness to make

demands of France while defending her, Camus explains to
his "friend," is love, that which separates "us" from
"you."

Camus writes:

You were satisfied to serve the power of your nation
and we dreamed of giving ours her truth.
It was
enough for you to serve the politics of reality
whereas, in our wildest aberrations, we still had a
vague conception of the politics of honor, which we
recognize today.76
A just political order draws its strength from the love
of people who make up that order, not, as under the Nazi
regime, from fear or pride and military strength.

74Ibid.
^Ibid.
76Ibid., 13.
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certain sort of human being is capable of a just order.
Who is this human being?
There I stop, for we know. Man is that force which
ultimately cancels all tyrants and gods. He is the
force of evidence. Human evidence is what we must
preserve, and our certainty at present comes from
the fact that its fate and our country's fate are
linked together. If nothing had any meaning, you
would be right. But there is still something that
has a meaning.77
France as home was the something that still had a
meaning.

In the period after the Occupation, that

meaning had taken form in the minds of those who
resisted:

"We had formed an idea of our country that put

her in her proper place amid other great concepts—
friendship, mankind, happiness, our desire for
justice."78 The country the Resistants defended should
know its place in the midst of, not above, concepts like
friendship and justice.

It was incumbent upon the

citizen to remind those who governed that their authority
rested on their ability to preserve a space in which the
human needs for belonging, friendship, and justice could
be met.
Camus contrasted this sense of France as protector
of the human with the German's conflicting sense of
national glory.

"You," Camus wrote, "are fighting

^Ibid., 14.
^Ibid.
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against everything in man that does not belong to the
mother country."79

The German's disregard for the

intelligence and the heart made him capable not only of
the destruction of France, but of the bastardization of
the name of France in the form of Vichy.

In the third of

the "Letters" Camus recognized that the Resistance fought
from an
awareness of having been not only mutilated in our
country, wounded in our very flesh, but also
divested of our most beautiful images, for you gave
the world a hateful and ridiculous version of them.
The most painful thing to bear is seeing a mockery
made of what one loves And that idea of Europe that
you took from the best among us and distorted has
consequently become hard for us to keep alive in all
its original force.80
The Germans had done far worse than simply overrun
France.

They had made a mockery of home and thus

revealed their own failure to grasp its importance.
France, Germany and the rest of Europe, that is, home,
would have to be reestablished after the war.
not new:

This was

home "always has to be established.1,81

Those

who resisted should have a clearer idea of what needed to
be established simply because they so keenly felt its
loss.

That they could not agree does not obscure the

value of the insight.

^Ibid.
“ ibid., 21.
81Ibid., 25.
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Camus was hesitant about applying the contents of
the "Letters" beyond the circumstances of Occupied France
because they are so clearly propaganda pieces.
Otherwise, to suggest, as he does, that even a segment of
the French population had self-consciously paused before
the invader to find its moral bearings while its people
were being killed and its property confiscated is selfjustifying and disingenuous.

The "Letters" are much more

valuable as reflections on the trauma of discovering that
one's home is so inadequate as to not be worth defending.
This problem confronted all of Europe after the war.

The

former Resistants worked for the possibility of
recreating home after the war.

In the "Letters," Camus

began articulating what that home should look like:

a

place where terms like country, friendship, mankind, and
justice were equivalencies.

Whatever their shortcomings

as propaganda, the "Letters" were a cautionary tale of
the dangers of excessive allegiance to the modern state
and the importance of a self-critical love of home.
The clarity of Camus's conception of home in the
"Letters" was undermined in the colonial circumstances of
Algeria.

Civil war in Camus's homeland was an attempt by

Arab elements to shed the authority of the French who
made up about a tenth of the population.

Camus was of

humble beginnings, so though a colon, that is, descended
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of French immigrants to Algeria, he was not part of the
small number of colons who owned much of the property and
held much of the political power in Algeria.

Still, he

had been fortunate enough to be educated in the French
colonial school system and considered himself FrenchAlgerian.

He told an interviewer in 1957:

No one is more closely attached to his Algerian
province than I, and yet I have no trouble feeling a
part of the French tradition. Consequently, I
learned, as naturally as we learn to breathe, that
love of one's native land can broaden without
dying.82
The conflicts in Algeria tested the sources of Camus's
identity and his understanding of "home.”

The violence

of the war demanded that Camus choose between his French
ancestry or the Algeria to whose people and physical
beauty he was so attached.

But for Camus, the violence

meant that neither side represented home and it became
imperative not to choose.
Camus defended the French presence in Algeria.

He

thought that the "dream" of the sudden disappearance of
the French was "childish."

At the same time, their right

to be a presence gave the French "no right, in my
opinion, to destroy the roots of an Arab culture and

“ Camus, "The Wager of Our Generation," in
Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 243.
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life."83

It was Camus's position that the Algeria he

called home was home to both Arab and colon alike.

He

would not recognize an Algeria in which one or the other
community was missing.

As both sides had legitimate

claims to the place as home, each was responsible for
advancing a dialogue in which the significant ineguities
of the situation were addressed.

Camus tried

unsuccessfully to promote dialogue and quell the
violence:
We Frenchmen must struggle to keep repression from
becoming general so that French law will continue to
have a generous and obvious meaning in our country;
we must struggle to remind our people of their
mistakes and of the obligations of a great nation,
which cannot, without losing its prestige, answer a
racial massacre with a similar outburst.84
Concessions would have to be made by the Arab militants
as well.

Camus's frustration showed in one of his less

sanguine moments:
You Arabs must spare no effort to show your people
that, when they kill civilian populations, terrorism
not only raises justifiable doubts as to the
political maturity of men capable of such acts, but
also strengthens anti-Arab elements, reinforces
their arguments, and silences French liberal opinion
which might find and put through some solution
leading to reconciliation.85

“ Camus, "Letter to an Algerian Militant," in
Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 127.

120Ibid., 21.
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It is doubtful that anyone would take seriously the
judgment of a "European" about someone else's "political
maturity" in the aftermath of two world wars.

But

Camus's purpose was to establish a dialogue in which
negotiation would replace bloodshed, cooperation would
replace the brutal dialectic of reprisal and get the
warring sides to see what they held in common, the love
of a place.
Camus's qualifications to speak out on the Algerian
crisis were that "I have lived through the Algerian
calamity as a personal tragedy and that I am incapable of
rejoicing over any death whatever."86 He hoped to be a
voice of reason calling the two sides, united by "our
love of common soil and our anguish," to dialogue.87
Both sides were accountable for the reconciliation.

The

one million Frenchmen who had called Algeria home for a
century and the millions of Arabs and Berbers who had
called Algeria home for many centuries "must live
together at the crossroads where history put them."88
Home, for Camus, must be strengthened by the different
interests within it.

In a world of conflict, difference

“ Camus, "Appeal for a Civilian Truce in Algeria,"
in Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 132.
87Ibid., 133.
“ ibid., 136.
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must be the starting point of dialogue, of living
together.

Camus called for a cessation of the bloodshed,

a recognition of kinship and negotiation from the shared
love of Algeria.

As home, Algeria must be able to house

the needs and interests of diverse populations without
violence.

Such diversity is essential to human

existence, Camus wrote,
because differences are the roots without which the
tree of liberty, the sap of creation and of
civilization dries up. Nevertheless, we stand
facing each other as if frozen, as if struck with a
paralysis that can be cured only by brutal and brief
outbursts of violence.89
A dialogue was never established.

Algeria was granted

its independence from France by President deGaulle in
1962.

A mass exodus of colons began and only 100,000 of

the original 1.2 million remained by 1964.90
Camus is persistently criticized for not choosing
sides in the conflict, particularly from the left with
its expectation of support for the oppressed.91

His

89Ibid.
^See Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace:
Algeria. 1954-62 (New York:
Penguin Books, 1987).
See
also the biographical account of Camus's life during this
period in Lottman, Camus; A Biography.
91Most vocal among Camus's critics are Conor Cruise
O'Brien, Edward Said, Patrick McCarthy and Anthony
Rizzuto. See O'Brien, Albert Camus of Eurooe and North
Africa (New York; Viking Press, 1970); McCarthy, Camus,
Rizzuto, Albert Camus's Imperial Vision (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1981) and more
recently Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York:
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silence, it is argued, is tacit approval of the
oppressive colonial system.

But Camus was not silent.

Here as on other occasions he sided with an idea he had
of human beings and home against a realpolitik of
violence.

Unlike most of his critics, at stake for Camus

in Algeria was home.

If he could not intellectualize

brutality and theoretically bring about a resolution to
the civil war, it was not from want of effort.

Camus

made no attempt to reconcile the France-to-be of the
"Letters" with the France that conducted a war of
decolonization in Algeria.

At home in the Resistance,

Camus could not find home in either camp in Algeria.
The intractable positions of the two sides in the
civil war were symptomatic of the totalizing tendencies
of modern politics.

Each side claimed freedom as its

birthright and justice as its goal.

Yet, neither was

willing to engage the other's understanding of these
terms.

While Camus shared with Weil a suspicion of the

modern state and its totalizing forms, he also shared her
sense of the importance of home to human existence.

For

Weil, home was a place vivid in the imagination, a vital

Vintage, 1993). Alec Hargreaves appreciates the
complexities of Camus's position. See Hargreaves, "Camus
and the Colonial Question in Algeria," Muslim World 77
(July/October 1987): 164-74 and Hargreaves "Caught in the
Middle: The Liberal Dilemma in the Algerian War,"
Nottingham French Studies 25:2 (October 1986): 73-82.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

281

medium where roots could be established.

For Camus home

was a longed-for peace that he was helpless to bring
about.

In the "Letters” he lauded a France that would be

based on the self-critical values of the Resistance but
never came to be.92

In colonial circumstances, the

ideal of home clashed with the harsh reality of
colonization where the homes of others had been corrupted
if not destroyed, so his appeals on the Algerian question
could only identify the elements of home in the broadest
possible terms.93

Perhaps Camus's dual status as a

colon, that is, his self-identification as both Algerian
and French, explains his failure.

Perhaps a larger

civilizational failure to recognize the need to recreate
the nation-state as home is to blame.

What is certain is

that the two thinkers shared a belief in the
establishment of a place of safety for the individual, a
place from which at least part of the individual's
identity could be drawn, a place where freedom could be
reconciled to justice.

92See Judt, Past Imperfect.
93See Simone Weil, "East and West: Thoughts on the
Colonial Problem," in Selected Essays. 195-210 and Albert
Camus, "Algeria," in Resistance. Rebellion and Death.
111-153.
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IV.

Reconciling Freedom and Justice

For Weil and Camus, the goal of a political order as
home would reflect the reconciliation of individual
freedom and a collective form of justice.

Fred Rosen

recognized this need and suggested that the
reconciliation was necessary because in modern
totalitarian politics justice had been "invoked in such a
way that the pursuit of justice often involves the
sacrifice of liberty."94

Camus recognized this tendency

and suggested that a more limited form of justice
"actually depended upon freedom and also served to
restore and preserve it."95

Weil's rationalist approach

to liberty, finding the source of freedom in the
individual's capacity to overcome servitude to necessity
by directing "his action intelligently," later conceived
liberty as intelligible choice in the political realm.
Rosen associates her conception of justice "with love,
attention, the refusal to harm others, duty and
obligation.1,96 While Camus sought reconciliation in the
relationship of freedom and justice, Weil found the nexus
of freedom and justice in their shared transcendent
source.

While they both valued the effort, neither

94Rosen, 312-313.
^Ibid., 314.
96Rosen, 315-316.
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thinker, Rosen argues, successfully accomplished the
difficult reconciliation.
Rosen correctly identifies the impulse behind the
attempted reconciliation.

The totalitarian

bastardization of the language of freedom and justice
meant that their reconciliation would require breathing
new life into the tired abstractions the terms had come
to signify.

The interest of Weil and Camus in this

project may be found in their shared concerns with
preserving individual integrity and reshaping the modern
nation-state into a community more recognizable as home.
For both, sustaining the integrity of the human being
meant encouraging the free individual to creative
expression through word and deed.

It was not sufficient

merely to be possessed of freedom, but it was incumbent
on the ethical political actor to exercise that freedom.
Exploring the freedom Weil and Camus separately
envisioned required a context, thus their shared need to
recreate community.

As this section will demonstrate,

Weil and Camus each give voice to an emerging conception
of justice as a context required for the exercise of
freedom.

Home could not be just a physical place.

Freedom could no longer be thought of as equivalent to
the unchecked will of the individual and justice could no
longer be thought of as something dispensed.

Justice, as
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a dimension of home, must form the lived context of all
legitimate postwar politics.
Veil:

Justice and Consent
In an essay written in the same period as The Need

for Roots. Simone Weil examined the relationship between
justice and freedom by considering their nexus,
consent.97 Free consent entailed obedience to necessity
short of collaboration with evil.

Acting in obedience to

necessity meant opening the self to the divine without
using that openness disingenuously to justify all manner
of acts.

Consent to obedience must be understood as

aspiring to the good.

Weil thought that human beings

found their only true freedom in this obedience.

"Where

obedience is consented to," she held, "there is freedom;
there and nowhere else."98
As part of created reality, however, human beings
had latitude when it came to acting in conformity with
this obedience.

A real choice must be made.

Human

beings could, and most did, choose not to act in
accordance with obedience to necessity and in so doing
valued ends other than the good.

They might also draw on

the decreated part of the human soul and agree to consent
in a manner conforming to obedience to necessity.

True

97Weil, "Are We Struggling for Justice?".
98Ibid., 8.
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consent entailed making the latter choice:

choosing to

obey the order of necessity to the degree circumstances
allowed.

This idea of consent formed the core of Weil's

conception of justice.
Human beings, caught in the web of necessity, lack
the will to treat themselves justly.

Justice requires a

community of people mutually consenting to value the
good, to obey necessity by minimizing the harm human
beings do one another.
as a political value.

Justice was a spiritual as well
Weil wrote:

Justice has as its object the exercise of the
faculty of consent on earth. To preserve it
religiously wherever it exists, to try to create
conditions for it where it is absent, that is to
love justice.99
The just community preserves the implied equality of
human beings as human beings.

For justice to exist,

human beings must be treated with the same respect.

Her

idea of consent made Weil quick to disavow the apparently
democratic implications of her argument.

"Democratic

thought contains a serious error," Weil argued, "it
confuses consent with a certain form of consent, which is
not the only one and which can easily, like any form, be
mere form."100 There could only be justice among
persons equally regarded.

In the just encounter, this

"ibid., 5.
100Ibid., 6.
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equality derived not from similar material or
intellectual resources, but rather from mutual agreement
to consent to the obedience of necessity.

A just

environment valued and preserved freedom, that is,
encouraged this obedience.

Once freedom was understood

as obedience to necessity, the love of justice could be
preserved in the exercise of that freedom.
Weil was convinced that wherever lives were lived in
consent to true obedience there was a blossoming of
beauty, poetry, and happiness.

The dearth of such places

in the midst of manifold claims of just (often,
democratic) government based on consent meant that
bastardized forms of consent were the rule rather than
the exception.

These unacceptable forms of consent

tended to be grounded in the economic order:
Consent is neither to be bought nor sold.
Consequently, whatever the political institutions,
in a society where monetary transactions dominate
most of social life, where almost all obedience is
bought and sold, there can be no freedom.101
Weil associates these economic circumstances with the
degradation of humanity she had seen in the factories.
Driven by profit, this lack of freedom or uprootedness
had come to characterize Western civilization.

To

establish roots, to ground human existence in the good,

101Ibid.
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freedom and its political and economic context would have
to be re-created.
Weil began her creative reconstruction of freedom
and its context in The Need for Roots.

She struck first

at political orders that had convinced themselves they
were based on consent.

She found their weakness in the

rights-claims they encouraged.

Her critique of rights

was not intended to refute the need for rights, but
rather to recast the way rights were thought about.

To

the degree that rights spoke from a sense of the
integrity of the individual, they were critical and
should be preserved.

To the degree that all political

discourse had devolved into irresolvable conflict among
rights-claims, rights had assumed too primary a role in
modern politics.102

Weil's answer to the problem was to

value the obligations owed human beings over rightsclaims, relegating the latter to a "subordinate and
relative" role.
Subordinating rights to obligations was a creative
leap bordering on the revolutionary in that it forced

102See Edward Andrew, "Simone Weil on the Injustice
of Rights-Based Doctrines," Review of Politics 48 (Winter
1986): 60-91; Bell, "Reading Simone Weil on Rights,
Justice and Love," in Bell, editor, Simone Weil's
Philosophy of Culture. 214-234; as well as the
discussions in Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine,
134-140 and McLellan, Utopian Pessimist. 244 and Blum and
Seidler, A Truer Liberty. 53-54, 260-261.
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Weil to reconceive law in nearly natural law terms.

In

her conception, as Collins and Nielsen have shown, nature
(or obligation) compels, while law (the statutory
protector of rights) counsels.103 Rights-claims, then,
are almost always legal claims while obligations, Weil
believed, always derive their authority from a natural
order existent above the legal.

Rights, redefined as

specific manifestations of obligations to be met, would
have to be enshrined in statute because they could be
binding only when recognized by the community:
A right is not ineffectual by itself, but only in
relation to the obligation to which it corresponds,
the effective exercise of a right springing not from
the individual who possesses it, but from other men
who consider themselves as being under a certain
obligation toward him.104
Rights are only protected in the sense that they are
grounded in a recognized obligation.

Human beings are

obligated to protect the sacred in each other by the mere
certainty that they are human beings.

Obligation

therefore derives from the decreated, the residue of the
eternal in created reality.

Defiling the sacred by

causing or failing to relieve the affliction of another

103Ronald K. L. Collins and Finn E. Nielsen, "The
Spirit of Simone Weil's Law," in Bell, editor, Simone
Weil's Philosophy of Culture. 235-259.
104Weil, The Need for Roots. 3.
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is an affront to God.

By divine mandate, human beings

are obligated to redress the affliction of others.
A social order based on obligation is difficult to
conceive and Weil depends on a Kantian recognition of
human obligation to every other human being.
is a recognition.

Obligation

Law can sustain the environment in

which obligations are met, but obligations cannot be
dependent upon law or other convention, for convention is
prone to modification while human obligation is eternal.
Human beings shared divine origins, all were created out
of decreated reality, and these shared origins, not some
conception of an "eternal destiny," determined the
universality of obligations.

Weil believed that

obligations must become a fact of political existence
independent of eternal destiny.

"A human being's eternal

destiny cannot be the motive of any obligation," she
wrote, "for it is not subordinate to external
actions."105 What is owed the human being as human
being is respect shown through the medium of earthly
needs.

Our obligations stem from the vital needs of the

human being alone.

The just environment or vital medium

must meet these needs which Weil enumerated in The Need
for Roots.

Chief among human needs for Weil was food or

105Ibid., 6.
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nourishment:

no one should suffer hunger.

All other

human needs she drew by analogy from this one.
Weil distinguished between the needs of the body and
the needs of the soul.

The needs of the body, food,

warmth, sleep, health, rest, exercise, and fresh air,
could be provided by a certain arrangement of the
individual human life, that is, through the creative
exercise of human freedom.

Creating a livable human

order, however, was a spiritual as well as a social and
political problem.

In creating a livable human order

"the first thing to be investigated is what are those
needs which are for the life of the soul, what the needs
in the way of food, sleep and warmth are for the life of
the body."106 The needs of the soul were less tangible
than those of the body and thus more fragile and less
easily met.

They must not be "desires, whims, fancies

and vices."107 Their obscurity, however, marked the
difficulty in refashioning political life in conformity
with justice.

Privation of the needs of the soul left

the soul in "a state analogous to that of a starved or
mutilated body."108 A livable and just human order

106Ibid., 9.
107Ibid.
108Weil, "Draft for a Statement of Human Obligations"
in Selected Essays. 224.
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required that the needs of the soul be enumerated and
defined for "the lack of any such investigation forces
governments, even when their intentions are honest, to
act sporadically and at random."109
The first need of the soul was order.

Weil knew her

audience had spent the war years subverting the order
imposed by the Nazis in occupied France.

The adjustment

to a legitimate order after the war would be difficult.
The anti-order of resistance presented her with an
opportunity to rethink order itself.

For Weil, order is

a texture of social relationships such that no one
is compelled to violate imperative obligations in
order to carry out other ones. It is only where
this, in fact, occurs that external circumstances
have any power to inflict spiritual violence on the
soul.110
An order which creates situations in which one must
choose between basic obligations is unacceptable, indeed,
crime was the denial of some obligations to simplify
existence.

Overcoming this difficulty required

conceiving needs as occurring naturally in seemingly
"antithetical pairs."

These pairs, for Weil, must be

seen "to combine together to form a balance."

She was

confident that a "veritable human order" could provide a

109Weil, The Need for Roots. 9.
110Ibid., 10. Though Weil claims the necessity of
pairing the needs of the soul in The Need for Roots, she
actually pairs them in "Draft for a Statement of Human
Obligations."
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space wherein needs which seemed to conflict could be
"fully satisfied in turn."111
Liberty and obedience formed the first of Weil's
antithetical pairs.

Liberty (or freedom) was the ability

and obligation to choose in accordance with the good.
Choices should always be grounded in understanding the
laws and mores of the community which were reflections of
the communal encounter with necessity.

Written laws

should be comprehensible to the average intelligence.112
Freedom grounded in obedience to law and custom was
necessarily limited.
choice.

Law served to limit the range of

Otherwise, freedom would become a burden, human

beings would cease to enjoy liberty and "end up by
thinking that liberty is not a good thing."113

Liberty

also entailed obedience to necessity in the form of
leaders whose positions were based upon a consent freely
given.

Consent was an attitude of soul not to be coerced

by threats or the promise of reward, particularly
monetary reward, for consent "is not something which can

l11Ibid., 12.
112Ibid., 13.
113Ibid.
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be sold."11* Only free action in an attitude of consent
could show initiative while embracing responsibility.115
Human beings must have a stake in their community,
impersonal as well as personal.

Weil's pairing of

equality and hierarchy derives from this idea.

Equality,

she wrote,
consists in a recognition, at once public, general,
effective and genuinely expressed in institutions
and customs, that the same amount of respect and
consideration is due to every human being, because
this respect is due to the human being as such and
is not a matter of degree.116
While advancing equality as equal respect owed all human
beings as human beings, Weil conceded inequality in the
realm of wealth and power.

To offset this inequality,

she proposed that the exercise of important public
functions carry serious personal risks.

She advanced "a

conception of punishment in which social rank, as an
aggravating circumstance, would necessarily play an
important part in what the penalty was to be."117
Hierarchism was "a certain veneration, a certain devotion
toward superiors, considered not as individuals or in

1uIbid.
115Ibid., 15.
116Ibid., 16.
117Ibid.
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relation to the powers they exercise, but as
symbols.11118 Persons of such symbolic rank would be
particularly answerable to the community for their
conduct.

She did not fear the emergence of a class

structure accompanying her notion of hierarchy.

The

development of distinctions of social rank was inevitable
in any case.

She argued that, more important than the

emergence of a class structure, the "effect of true
hierarchism" would be "to bring each one to fit himself
morally into the place he occupies."119
The responsibility accompanying status and political
power flowed naturally from Weil's pairing of honor and
punishment.

Honor was an important source of respect for

self and others.

She described it as regard given a

human being due to social surroundings, like membership
in a group having a noble tradition enshrined in history.
For Weil, crime, especially that in which the individual
evidenced a lack of self-respect, was a measure of a
society not meeting the soul's need for honor.

Crime,

then, was as much a judgment on society as on the
individual.

Punishment undertaken in the right spirit

should have as its goals the restoration of self-respect
and the reintegration of the human being into the

118Ibid., 19.
119Ibid.
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community.

Punishment should educate as well as punish.

"Punishment must be an honor," Weil wrote.

It "must not

only wipe out the stigma of the crime, but must be
regarded as a supplementary form of education, compelling
a higher devotion to the public good."120
The reintegration of criminals into the social order
is necessary because of the fear and terror the presence
of a criminal class is likely to create.

Fear for

personal safety is inimicable to social order.

Personal

security is required for human beings to take the
creative risks that stimulate the life of a community.
Security and risk, thus, are vital to a healthy social
order.

Security is simply the absence of fear or terror

except in unavoidable, brief and exceptional
circumstances.

Providing security might entail risk, but

might also encourage the taking of necessary chances.
The absence of risk is not at all desirable, writes Weil,
for it "produces a type of boredom which paralyzes in a
different way from fear, but almost as much."121
Boredom stifles creativity and thereby discourages the
initiative and innovation necessary for social change and
essential to keeping a community vital.

120Ibid. , 21.
121Ibid., 34.
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Considerations of risk and security raise issues of
property.

At risk in civil society is not only personal

safety, but also property.

Despite her socialist

background, Weil considered property a vital need of the
soul.

She carefully distinguished between private

property and collective property.

The soul, she wrote,

"feels isolated, lost, if it is not surrounded by objects
which seem to it like an extension of the bodily
members."122

Private property did not include money and

entailed more than the articles of ordinary consumption.
At issue was the owner's stake in the right order of the
community:

"the majority of people should own their

house and a little piece of land round it, and, whenever
not technically impossible, the tools of their
trade."123 At the same time, there should be property
commonly-held by the members of a community in which all
felt a stake:
Where a real civic life exists, each one feels he
has personal ownership in the public monuments,
gardens, ceremonial pomp and circumstance; and a
'display of sumptuousness, in which nearly all human
beings seek fulfillment, is in this way placed
within the reach of even the poorest."’24

122Ibid.
123Ibid., 35.
124Ibid. , 36.
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Property, commonly and privately held, was critical to
Weil's understanding of membership in a just community.
Inequalities were inevitable; but to foster a sense of
membership, the differences between the lives of the
wealthy and the lives of the poor must be differences in
degree not in kind.

Keeping these inequalities in check

would be the responsibility of the better off.

For Weil,

in a community where property was a necessary component
of community life, ownership must be recognized as a
vital component of membership or belonging.
Weil does not rely on structures to meet the needs
of the human soul.

She clearly envisions a community of

responsive, responsible citizens.

She tries to maintain

a delicate balance between personal responsibility and
civil liberties.

She was least successful in keeping

this balance in her considerations of the obligations and
responsibilities of intellectuals which she addressed in
her pairing of freedom of opinion and truth.

Weil

believed that the intelligence, in order to be creative,
had need of unlimited freedom of expression.

That

expression, however, must meet the inexpressible and,
therefore, problematic, criterion of truth.

Authors

seeking to contribute to a "complete and correct
tabulation of data concerning each problem" should be
free from risk by law.

"On the other hand," she held,
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"publications destined to influence what is called
opinion, that is to say, in effect, the conduct of life,
constitute acts and ought to be subjected to the same
restrictions as are all acts."125
It is unclear how Weil would distinguish between the
valued accumulation of data and the dangerous pandering
to opinion.

It is clear that she intended to punish

authors for "irresponsible opinions" in intellectual
matters.126

Weil wished a kind of self-evident truth

to be the arbiter of the difference between data and
irresponsible opinion, truth being the most sacred of the
needs of the soul.

Drawing on her Platonic roots, she

suggested that the just society set up judges responsible
for "publicly condemning any avoidable error."

These

judges would be given power "to sentence to prison or
hard labor for repeated commission of the offense,
aggravated by proven dishonesty of intention."127

Her

main requirement of these judges was that they "love
truth."

Weil intends truth to be carefully understood as

125Ibid., 24.
126 Weil also uses the data/opinion distinction to
justify limiting the actions of associations and the
formation of parties. See ibid., 29-33. Organizations
cannot be free as they lack the human capacity for
freedom. Associations based on interests should be
closely supervised by the government, while associations
based on ideas should be outlawed.
127Ibid., 39.
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openness to the divine part of the human soul.

As a

standard, indeed, as a tool of judgment, however, truth
suffers the defects of its virtues.

Here, what faith

Weil has in human nature breaks down.

The data/opinion

distinction and the council of judges are potentially
tools of tyranny.

She institutionalizes the discipline

necessary in all human creative endeavors.

In so doing,

she provides a body of human beings with the authority to
define, far too precisely, the subjects and boundaries of
creative action in the community.

Weil, like many before

and since, succumbs to the temptation to enforce social
control on human thought and creativity in the name of
truth.
Despite the unfortunate discussion of truth and
freedom of opinion, the value of Weil's enumeration of
the needs of the soul is the picture it provides of the
just political order.

Justice on this model is not a

series of statements, but rather is made possible by the
creation of conditions for the exercise of a certain kind
of human freedom.

A political order that does not create

the conditions necessary to meet each of these needs, one
that does not make of itself a vital medium, cannot
expect the love that is true obedience and will not
survive.

Ignoring these needs begat the hopeless and

destructive human beings of the twentieth century.
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protecting the individual by seeing that these needs are
met, Weil hopes for the emergence of a new form of
collectivity deriving its legitimacy from the created
climate of justice rather than from its structures.

For

Weil, structural forms are secondary to providing for the
needs of the human body and soul.

Weil's faith is that

meeting those needs will mandate just as opposed to
arbitrary structures.

These structures will provide the

context in which the needs of the soul will be met.
Except for the seriously flawed council of judges
discussion, Weil fortunately leaves devising the
structures which will support these needs to the
formulation of others.
made:

The crucial points have been

human beings have duties toward themselves, but

obligations toward other human beings.

Justice is as a

context within which human beings are free to pursue the
needs of the body and soul.

It is critical that none of

the needs she enumerates can be met by the solitary self;
they require the authentic human interaction which modern
political order made impossible and which Weil, like
Camus, hoped to foster.
Camus:

The Style of Freedom

"There is justice," Camus wrote in The Rebel, "in
restoring freedom, which is the only imperishable value
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of history*"128 For Camus, justice was a state of being
that could only be attained by providing for the free
exercise of human creative capacities.

The freedom Camus

envisioned was not the fictional "absolute freedom" he
criticized throughout The Rebel. but rather a freedom
limited by law and the freedom of others.

From the

waning days of the Resistance until the end of his life
reconciling freedom and justice was the focus of Camus's
political thought.129

The reconciliation meant the

creation of a community in which the freedom of all was
exercised mindful of the freedom of others.

This

community should yield space for the development of
individual genius as well as for cooperation among its
members.

But Camus ultimately eschewed consideration of

the kind of institutions that would provide such freedom,
seeking it instead in the conduct of individual human
beings.

Camus found the reconciliation of freedom and

justice in what he called "style."

The just community

would encourage the development in each citizen of a
creative way of life, a "style" of life, distinct from
but complementary to that of the community.

128Camus, The Rebel. 291.
129See the discussions in Wilhoite, Bevond Nihilism.
170-175; Jeffrey Isaac, Arendt. Camus and Modern
Rebellion. 185; Sprintzen, Camus. 189-193.
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The primacy of reconciling freedom and justice
emerged while Camus was editor of the Resistance
newspaper Combat.

In an editorial of 8 September 1944,

Camus wrote that "the question for all of us is how to
reconcile justice with freedom.11130 Making life free
for the individual and just for all would be a difficult
task:
We do not deny that such a balance is difficult. If
we look at history, we see that it has not yet been
possible, that between freedom and justice there
seems to exist a state of contradiction. How could
there not be? Freedom for each means freedom for
the rich and ambitious; that invites injustice.
Justice for all means the submission of the
individual to the collective good. How can we
speak, then, of absolute freedom?131
Human beings were obligated to work through the
contradictions.

This was life in rebellion:

to point

out the contradictions, make the effort at reconciling
them, and recognize that "justice does not come without
[this] revolt."132

A new social and political

environment would have to be created.
capacity would be severely tested:

The human creative

"under conditions so

desperate," Camus wrote, "the hard, marvelous task of
this century is to create justice in the most unjust of

130Camus, "Justice and Freedom," Combat. 8 September
1944, in Between Hell and Reason. 51.
131Ibid.
132Ibid.
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worlds and to protect freedom from those souls who, out
of principle, choose servitude.11133
Tony Judt has shown that many French intellectuals,
Camus included, believed that it was the job of a free
press to show the way.134 As editor of Combat. Camus
fashioned working definitions of the two concepts in an
attempt to make them compatible.

Justice was "a social

state in which each individual starts with an equal
opportunity, and in which the country's majority cannot
be held in abject conditions by a privileged few."135
"And we shall call freedom," he continued, "a political
climate in which the human being is respected for both
what he is and for what he says."136 Setting aside the
Camus's dubious assumption about the possibility of every
individual starting out with an equal opportunity, the
value of his conceptions lies in making the two terms
compatible by conceiving them as related elements of the
same environment.

Justice was a "social state," while

freedom was a "political climate."

Reconciling the two

133Ibid., 52 (my emphasis) .
134See Camus, "Critique of the New Press," Combat. 31
August 1944 and Camus, "The Journalistic Critique,"
Combat. 8 September 1944, in Between Hell and Reason. 44,
52. See also Judt, Past Imperfect.
135Camus, editorial, Combat. 1 October 1944, in
Between Hell and Reason. 57.
136Ibid.
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values would take place at the communal or institutional
level:

a just state would ensure a free political

climate.
Camus's uncharacteristic and short-lived faith in
institutional arrangements can be directly traced to his
recent Resistance experience.

Before the Occupation, the

Third Republic had failed France.

During the Occupation,

widespread collaboration was a failure of French citizens
as individual political actors.

After the Liberation, it

made sense for Camus to stress the creation of an order
fit to be inhabited by human beings rather than a way of
being human out of which that order would emerge.

This

position, while temporary, was nonetheless theoretically
consistent with Camus's desire to create a home for the
free human being.

Camus, like other Resistants, believed

postwar France must be a working model for all of Europe.
What institutional arrangements were appropriate to this
vision?
Our plan is to make justice reign throughout the
economy and to guarantee freedom through
politics. . . . What we want for France is a
collectivist economy and a liberal political
structure. Without a collectivist economy to take
away money's privilege and put money back to work,
political liberalism would be a farce. But without
the constitutional guarantee of a liberal political
structure, a collectivist economy could consume all
individual initiative and expression.137

137Ibid.
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Blending a socialist economy and liberal political
structures with the requisite "intellectual and moral
honesty," Camus and his Combat cohorts envisioned a "New
Socialism" which might provide the difficult balance
necessary to allow freedom and justice to coexist.
Camus was not particularly interested in
theoretically justifying this structural vision.

He

lacked the political naivete to believe that creating a
different kind of political order required creating a new
philosophy.

He was content with the name "Socialism."

Brilliant or original theoretical justifications were not
always corollaries of effective political action.

"It is

not absolutely essential," he wrote:
that political doctrines be new. Political thought
(though not necessarily political action) can do
without genius. Human affairs are complicated in
detail but simple in principle. Social justice can
be realized without brilliant philosophy.
It
requires the basic elements of good sense, which are
clearsightedness, energy and selflessness.138
Perhaps more important, the twentieth century had shown
that political doctrines do not succeed through their
novelty but rather through the "energy and sacrifice they
inspire."139 Camus could not speak to what socialist
theory meant to the socialists of the failed Third

138Camus, editorial, Combat. 24 November 1944, in
Between Hell and Reason. 85.
139Ibid.
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Republic, but he did know that now socialism gave "form
to the impatience, to the fever for justice" of many of
his compatriots.140
Camus carefully distinguished his "New Socialism"
from earlier forms.

He despised the socialism which took

refuge in "false optimism":
It preaches love of humanity so as to exempt itself
from serving men, inevitable progress so as to
ignore the question of wages, and universal peace so
as to avoid necessary sacrifices. That form of
socialism is accomplished above all by the
sacrifices of others.141
Camus's "new" socialism had no faith in progress and was
willing to make sacrifices.

Rejecting "weakness and

lies," it was "convinced that the fate of men remains
always in the hands of men" and that only by "tenacious
efforts" could the human condition be improved.142

This

would mean revolution, but of a different sort:
For this socialism, justice is worth a revolution.
And because revolution comes harder to this
socialism— since it respects human lives— its
revolution is all the more likely to require only
the necessary sacrifices.143
Camus lost faith in his "New Socialism" at the precise
point it was required to decide which were the "necessary

140Ibid.
141Ibid.
142Ibid., 86.
143Ibid.
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sacrifices."

These editorials coincided with the purge

trials and executions in France that Camus initially
supported and then rejected in January of 1945.144

His

revulsion with the purges forced him to reconsider his
conception of politics.

The purges, in which the lives

of suspected collaborators were ruined when not actually
taken, bespoke a type of revolution based on murder that
Camus could not long support.

A way to reconcile freedom

and justice would have to be found that did not rely on
murder, especially state murder.145
In the Rebel. Camus sought the intellectual roots of
the murder of millions of human beings in the first half
of the twentieth century.
notion of absolute freedom.

He found them in the dubious
Only the human being

possessed of absolute freedom could justify taking
another life, destroying the possibilities that life
represented.

To redress the ubiquity of murder, to

preserve the integrity of the individual and to create
justice, then, required interrogating the absolute
freedom that many modern artists and philosophers had
tried to claim.

The attempt to release human beings from

144See Camus, editorial, Combat. 5 January 1945, in
Between Hell and Reason. 100. See Judt's valuable
discussion of the purges in Past Imperfect. 57-74.
145See Camus's impassioned 1957 plea for an end to
death by guillotine "Reflections on the Guillotine" in
Camus, Resistance. Rebellion and Death. 175-235.
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the constraints of necessity proved disastrous, creating
not freedom but a murderous chaos.

Camus wrote:

Chaos is also a form of servitude. Freedom exists
only in a world where what is possible is defined at
the same time as what is not possible. Without law
there is no freedom.146
For Camus, like Weil, law marked the limit of human
freedom, the limit of human creativity.
ends in themselves.

Human beings are

Law regulates "means" while removing

"ends" from the province of human beings who are illequipped to handle it.

Law conceived as the monitor of

means in the defense of an end undefined is the
limitation at the root of Camus's conception of
rebellion.

Rebellion occurs within limits indigenous to

the human condition that must be recognized by the rebel.
Whether those limits are legal, social or ontological,
historical or metaphysical, there is always a constraint
beyond which the rebel cannot move.
interaction, that limit is death.

In human
Rebellion preserves

the tension between the motive for the revolt and the
limit.

Camus's critical insight is that the limit exists

whether it is recognized or not.

Creative rebellion,

free action in the name of justice, recognizes the limit;
destructive revolution does not.

146Camus, The Rebel. 71.
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All rebellion, limited or not, is claimed as the
legitimate exercise of freedom in the name of justice.
Camus intends his conception of rebellion as a counter to
the idea of absolute freedom.

Rebellion "puts total

freedom up for trial" and "specifically attacks the
unlimited power that authorizes a superior to violate a
forbidden frontier."147 The rebel understands that
"freedom has its limits everywhere that a human being is
to be found— the limit being precisely that human being's
power to rebel."148

The rebel claims this freedom with

limits for humanity while denying humanity absolute
freedom.

In so doing, the rebel rejects the Hegelian

master-slave dialectic:
He is not only the slave against the master, but
also man against the world of master and slave.
Therefore, thanks to rebellion, there is something
more in history than the relation between mastery
and servitude. Unlimited power is not the only law.
It is in the name of another value that the rebel
affirms the impossibility of total freedom while he
claims for himself the relative freedom necessary to
recognize this impossibility. Every human freedom,
at its very roots, is therefore relative.149
Human justice, Camus argues in The Rebel, is the justice
produced when the lie of absolute freedom is replaced by

147Ibid., 284.
148Ibid.
149Ibid.
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a conception of freedom limited precisely by the freedom
of every other human being.
Camus's analysis begs the question of conflict
resolution.

Law limits the freedom of human beings in

relation to one another, with the implication that all
resulting disputes can be resolved through legal
processes.

But the inadequacies of the trial in The

Stranger, the limited effectiveness of the authorities in
The Plaque and the dubious ethical stance of Clamence the
judge-penitent in The Fall calls even this most general
of assumptions into question.

The absence of an

effective dispute-resolution mechanism in Camus's work is
an unresolved weakness, but it illustrates that his real
concern is the conduct of the individual.

Camus suggests

that with the self-regulated individual conflicts will be
minimal and non-violent, since violence is an
impermissible violation of the other.

Camus, therefore,

concerns himself with the problem of individual conduct,
specifically, how to overcome murder as the political
modus operandi of the twentieth century.
Learning how to live with the massive destruction
of human life and potential in the first half of the
twentieth century was not "a matter of constructing an
ideology," Camus wrote in Combat, "but simply of pursuing
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a certain style of life.1'150

Camus could not disengage

authentic freedom from the ability to create a "style" of
life.

Style was a term he used frequently in his

discussions of art and rebellion.151

In art, style

referred to the limited transformation the artist imposed
on reality through the creative act.

The correction the

artist imposes on reality, Camus wrote, "by his language
and by a redistribution of elements derived from reality
is called style and gives the re-created universe its
unity and its boundaries.1,152

Style's imposition is

limited, the human actor cannot impose truth.
rather, expresses a vision.

Style,

In the ethical realm, style

refers to acting in conformity with an understanding an
individual has of what it means to be a human being and a
member of a community.

Style is the element of action

preserving the tension between vision and reality:
It is the same thing with creation as with
civilization: it presumes the uninterrupted tension
between history and values. If the equilibrium is

150Camus, "A New Social Contract," Combat, 29
November 1946, in Between Hell and Reason. 135. This
essay is part of the series of essays Camus wrote between
19 November and 30 November 1946 entitled "Neither
Victims Nor Executioners."
15lStyle is a neglected aspect of Camus's ethical and
political thought. Sprintzen, Camus. 223, defines it a
purely artistic term indicating "the way the sensuous
qualities and dramatic meanings are expressed in the
medium."
152Camus, The Rebel. 270.
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destroyed, the result is dictatorship or anarchy,
propaganda or formal insanity. In either case,
creation, which always coincides with rational
freedom, is impossible.153
In ethics, the style of life preserves the tension
between the law and mores of the social order and the
individual's view of his or her role in that order.

The

style of the social order finds expression in laws,
customs, mores, and rituals.

Because it gives expression

to a community's sense of its own meaning, this
collective sense of style resembles Weil's conception of
the vital medium.

The political actor, by giving subtly

(or not so subtly) different articulations of his or her
role in a social order, contributes to the growth and
self-understanding, the style, of that order.

A

political act can be complete, but never perfect, so the
actor can never claim to have acted with absolute
freedom:

"Through style," Camus wrote, "the creative

effort reconstructs the world, and always with the same
slight distortion that is the mark of both art and
protest."154
Style is not something an individual or community
does, but rather is something an individual or community
is.

"Great style," Camus held, "is invisible

153Ibid.
154Ibid.
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stylization, or rather stylization incarnate.1,155
Acting in accordance with style entails responsibilities
that can put the actor at odds with an illegitimate, but
prevailing communal style.

In the case of Vichy, it

would have been much easier for the few members of the
Resistance to assume France had no meaning and for them
all to become collaborators.

But as with the artist

whose style is the model for this ethic, style entails
discipline and a commitment to the potential beauty of
human being.

This actor, Camus said in a late speech,

without refusing to take part in the combat, at
least refuses to join the regular armies and remains
free-lance. The lesson he then finds in beauty, if
he draws fairly, is a lesson not of selfishness but
rather of hard brotherhood.156
Acting with style while finding limits in the freedom of
others is acting in accordance with the limited freedom
Camus envisioned.

This freedom is not the absolute

freedom of the artist who partakes of either extreme of
realism or formalism.

It is rather the limited freedom

that "presupposes health of body and mind, a style that
reflects strength of soul, and a patient defiance.1,157
Like all freedom, Camus concluded, this freedom involved

155Ibid., 272.
156Camus, "Create Dangerously," in Resistance.
Rebellion and Death. 267.
157Ibid.
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a perpetual risk.

M o d e m human beings "avoid risk today,

as they avoid liberty with its exacting demands in order
to accept any kind of bondage and achieve at least
comfort of soul."158 Camus hoped to overcome this
passive, deadly way of life through his formulation of
style.
A style recognizing the limits of human freedom
entailed obligations.159

Camus illustrated the style of

the citizen by speaking of the obligations of the artist.
Life in community entailed dialogue and effective style
compelled interaction.

In a 1957 lecture Camus said, "If

there is any man who has no right to solitude it is the
artist.

Art cannot be a monologue.1,160 It was the

artist's job to justify humanity, not judge it; to engage
humanity in a conversation about itself.

"The aim of

art," Camus believed, "is not to legislate or reign
supreme, but rather to understand first of all."161

To

be self-governing was the mandate of membership; to be
informed, the requirement of self-governance.

Only by

158Ibid.
159Here, I think, Camus like Weil values obligations
above rights. Scholars like Rosen argue that a
reconception of rights is the primary concern of Camus's
political theory.
160Camus, "Create Dangerously," in Resistance.
Rebellion and Death. 257.
161Ibid., 266.
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understanding can the artist or citizen begin to know
what it is he or she must reorder.

"The more

undisciplined what he must put in order," Camus said,
"the stricter will be his rule [of self] and the more he
will assert his freedom [through his work]."162 The
artist's freedom, then, like that of the free citizen,
entails responsibilities to the community.

The artist

must respect limits, of medium, of subject, of the
artist's abilities.

The citizen must also respect

limits, of resources, of law, of the other's capacity to
rebel.

The ability to act while respecting limits

defined the freedom of the artist, and, Camus believed,
the freedom of the human being.
For Camus, the question of whether by pursuing
justice freedom would be attained was moot.

"It is

essential," he argued, "to know that, without liberty, we
shall achieve nothing and that we shall lose both future
justice and ancient beauty."163

Only the promise of

liberty, Camus thought, would draw human beings out from
their isolation into a dialogue, into a communal
interaction that could embody justice.

Camus believed

that art, undertaken in the spirit outlined above, was
one way to realize the coexistence of freedom and

162Ibid., 268.
163Ibid., 266.
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justice.

This model of creativity also spoke to a

necessary reorientation to citizenship and community.
Camus had a distinct faith that such a world was
possible.

In the aftermath of Hungary and two years

before his death, Camus wrote that his faith was:
that throughout the world, beside the impulse toward
coercion and death that is darkening history, there
is a growing impulse toward persuasion and life, a
vast emancipatory movement called culture that is
made up both of free creation and of free work.164
Camus envisioned the style of a culture as the
aggregation of the styles of its members.

The task, the

"long vocation" of the artist and political actor was to
add to that culture by their "labors" and "never
subtract, even temporarily, anything from it."165

The

obligation the creative political actor shared with every
other human being was "to defend personally to the very
end, against the impulse toward coercion and death, the
freedom of that culture— in other words, the freedom of
work and of creation.1,166

164Camus, "Kadar Had His Day of Fear," in Resistance.
Rebellion and Death. 162.
165Ibid.
166Ibid.
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V.

Conclusion:

Politics and "The Human Heart of Things"

Their orientations to political reality were
markedly different.

Weil believed that each human being

was possessed of the capacity to act upon the residual
decreated or divine part of the human soul.

Her ethical

thought thus depended upon paying close attention to the
affliction of the other and the shared obligation of each
human being to see that the needs of all human beings
were met.

To so act was certainly politically ethical,

but more important for Weil, it was to transform
necessity into a livable environment and to act in
accordance with obedience to God.

Justice for Weil was

creating an environment, a home, in which the created
part of the person would be valued by other human beings
like the decreated part would be by God.

By contrast,

Camus, as demonstrated above in the discussion of "the
indomitable men," found his transcendent principle, the
baseline for his ethics, in the everyday conduct of human
life.

The "human heart of things" must be served by

politics in the aftermath of total war.

Shared human

experience must be embraced and celebrated if there was
to be fruitful life in political community.

A style,

respectful of limits, must be encouraged as part of
communal membership.

Only by supporting the diverse

creative talents of individual human beings could a
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permanent but evolving communal style be sustained.

Only

by recognizing a limit in the freedom of other human
beings could real order be established.
Despite the differences, the similarities in the
concerns and goals of Weil and Camus are striking.

In

the objects of their political thought, each identified
the same problems:

reconceiving individual freedom

without nihilism; recreating community without the
debilitating effects of totalitarianism or the alienating
effects of an unregulated market; and in meeting these
two requirements, finding a way to reconcile justice and
freedom in such a way as to obligate each human being to
become the caretaker of every other human being.

Their

solutions, while differing in form, were strikingly
similar in substance.

They each met the problem of

nihilism in freedom by advocating a recognition of the
commonly-held interests of all human beings.

Against the

totalizing tendencies in modern politics, each viewed the
postwar world from the perspective of homelessness.

The

modern nation-state must be replaced by a renewed sense
of country as home drawing its strength from the cultural
inheritance of its inhabitants and distinguished by the
creative capacity of its members to transform that
culture.

These communities must be recognized as

precious, but not in such a way as to exclude the
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inestimable value of other communities.

Finally, justice

for both thinkers took the form of home wherein human
beings could exercise their freedom mindful of the limits
represented by the style of the place (laws, customs) and
the freedom of others.
There is something utopian in their
formulations.167 The context in which they wrote
contributes to this tendency.

Camus wrote in 1946:

The attempt, in short, is to define the conditions
necessary for a political position that is modest—
which is to say, free from both messianism and
nostalgia for an earthly paradise.168
They both believed they had the obligation to recast the
French political landscape and to redefine the terms in
which political life was lived.

The Nazi invader had

wiped away all that went before and when he was defeated,
something new would have to emerge or the mistakes of
1919 would be repeated.

Weil may be forgiven for her

faith in postwar possibilities.
the liberation.

She did not live to see

Camus lived into the postwar world, but

held fast to his faith in human beings to save themselves
even after he gave up faith in their ability to fashion a

167A charge of utopianism would not be entirely
unfair. See Weil, "Theoretical Picture of a Free
Society" in Oppression and Liberty. 83-108 and Camus, "To
Save Lives," Combat. 20 November 1946 in Camus, Between
Hell and Reason. 120-122.
168Camus, "To Save Lives," Combat. 20 November 1946
in Camus, Between Hell and Reason. 122.
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just political order.

What is most important in their

political formulations is the spirit in which they
proposed to recast the postwar world:

a spirit of

depersonalized self-interest, which was prerequisite to
the exercise of true freedom, and the creation and
revaluation of home as a just environment in which that
freedom might be exercised.
Weil and Camus addressed the more pressing questions
of political being and ethics in the twentieth century
through the idea of creativity.

They leave us with a

difficult vision of political existence that is much less
bound by specific political forms than contemporary
political discourse might be comfortable with.

In their

thought, institutional and legal forms must be allowed to
evolve out of the mores and traditions of communities or
"vital media."

At the same time, both thinkers wished to

shift the responsibility for creating a political milieu
of justice to human beings qua human beings.

Far from

denying the weaknesses to be found in human being, their
conception of a critical creative political existence
insists that human beings confront those weaknesses and
resist temptations to power or wealth in the name of a
human dignity which they believed we all hold in common.
There are problems intrinsic to any vision that relies
excessively on individual human beings to create, self-
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consciously, their existences.

But acknowledging our

debt to some inherited forms renders that burden a shared
one.

Weil and Camus are refreshingly candid about what

is required:
cure.

they are offering a prescription, not a

Chapter Five will flesh out the possibilities and

the problems with this prescription.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION: THE POSSIBILITIES OF
CREATIVE POLITICAL EXISTENCE
Creative political being is best understood as the
response of Weil and Camus to the destructive,
absolutist, "rational" forms of political order that
devastated twentieth century Europe.

In their political

thought, each countered the post-Enlightenment conceits
of human rationality by reconceiving the rational and
encouraging the use of the creative imagination in
political problem-solving.

This reconception of reason

in politics demanded respect for human life and
potentialities and aspired to the creation of authentic
political order.
I. The Rational Character of Absolutist Rebellion
In the political theory derived from the comparison
of Weil's thought to Camus's, authentic political
existence requires embracing a limited form of rebellion
Things are never as they should be, only nearer to or
farther from the ideal to which human beings must aspire
an ideal which may also change over time.

This is a

fairly fluid conception of political reality.

In the
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political thought of Weil and Camus, politics should be
recognized as being as fluid an undertaking as the rest
of human existence.

Absolutist forms of rational

politics denied this fluidity in the twentieth century.
The rebellion embodied in contemporary forms of
politics was a rebellion of absolute ends achieved by
absolute means.

These absolutist forms of rebellion

("modern revolution"), which Camus identified as
"metaphysical" and "historical," reconstructed political
reality in their own image.1 They entailed the
intellectual and then material destruction of known
reality and the creation of a new (their own) moral
universe.

These forms of rebellion assumed the power to

name the contingent elements of their re-created
universes and to posit their relationships as the
rational organization of reality.

Absolute rebellion

thus joined the delusion of material superiority to
intellectual invulnerability in a deadly combination.
The tragic result of this union of the passionate
rejection of reality to the "rational" ordering of that
reality was the justification of all manner of doing
politics, including the slaughter of millions of human
beings.

^amus, The Rebel, especially 23-104.
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The first absolutist form of rebellion identified by
Camus is "metaphysical rebellion.1,2 This form of
rebellion begins as a protest of human beings against the
human condition and broadens to a more general rebellion
against all of creation.

In other words, the

metaphysical rebel protests not only his condition, but
all of creation.

The rebel deems the apparent unity

underlying all of creation as unsuitable for human
habitation and judges the source of that unity, God,
responsible.

In this form of rebellion, God must be

relieved of his duty as the source of all being.3 The
metaphysical rebel overthrows God and the rebel assumes
the throne.

Henceforward, it is the rebel's

"responsibility to create the justice, order and unity
that he sought in vain within his own condition, and in
this way to justify the fall of God."4
The removal of God precipitates a crisis of meaning,
specifically, a crisis of moral meaning.5 Though
claiming no belief in God, Camus recognized that the
removal of God deprived human beings of a fundamental way

2Ibid., 23-104.
3Ibid., 62.
4Ibid.
sThis insight is one of Camus's debts to Nietzsche.
See ibid., 65-80.
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of understanding their relationship to the universe and
each other.

A conception of the divine as a ground for

ethics had been modestly effective in keeping human
beings from slipping into something akin to the Hobbesian
state of nature.

Rejecting this grounding, the

metaphysical rebel can claim absolute freedom.

Camus

argues, however, that rather than "possessing" the
absolute freedom claimed, the metaphysical rebel has only
managed to create "the implacable reign of necessity."6
The rebel who could formerly claim to understand reality
only through the human relationship to God, now must
create a new understanding, a new orientation to reality.
The rebel is necessarily inadeguate to this task.

The

resulting disorientation feeds the sense of homelessness
of modern human beings.

The metaphysical rebel then

seeks solace in a structure and the new dispensation
takes a familiar if more deadly form:
To kill God and build a Church are the constant and
contradictory purpose of rebellion. Absolute
freedom finally becomes a prison of absolute duties,
a collective asceticism, a story to be brought to an
end. The nineteenth century, which is the century
of rebellion, thus merges into the twentieth, the
century of justice and ethics, in which everyone
indulges in self-recrimination.7

6Ibid., 80.
7Ibid., 103.
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Having driven God from His heaven, the metaphysical rebel
builds a new Church by embracing the revolutionary
movements inhabiting the rebel's "prison of history and
of reason."

Aligned with the revolutionary's irrational

claims to absolute freedom, the rebel "adopts reason as a
weapon and as the only means of conquest which appears
entirely human.1,8
The weaknesses and overreaching aspirations of the
metaphysical rebel are one source of rational
totalitarian political orders of the twentieth century.
It was this absolutist form of political order and the
accompanying absolutist form of reason that Weil and
Camus each spent a great deal of energy combatting.

Weil

identified this conception of society as "the domain of
the devil," wherein,
The flesh impels us to say me and the devil impels
us to say us; or else to say like the dictators I
with a collective signification. And in conformity
with his particular mission, the devil manufactures
a false imitation of what is divine, an ersatz
divinity.9
For Weil, God's absence was not responsible for the
tragedy of twentieth century political existence.

Weil's

God is only present in the decreated part of each human

8Ibid.

Previous quote, ibid., 80.

9Simone Weil, Waiting for God. 54.
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soul.10 The responsibility for creating a livable
order, therefore, falls on each human being.
Metaphysical rebellion took that obligation to an
extreme, creating wounds in the human psyche that it
seemed could only be treated by a collectivist form of
politics.

The consequences had been disastrous.

Camus identifies a second, related type of rational
rebellion called "historical rebellion."

In this form of

rebellion, the rebel, freed from the reign of God, seeks
to exercise control of his existence by imposing a
definitive meaning upon history as the story of human
progress.

The revolutionary order that must be created

in the present (by all manner of methods, including
executions and resettlements of whole peoples) is
justified by the inexorable march of human progress.
Camus finds in regicide the definitive act of historical
rebellion.

Regicide was the historical rebel's

equivalent to the metaphysical rebel's dethroning of God.
Up to now, God played a part in history through the
medium of kings. But His representative in history
has been killed, for there is no longer a king.

10An argument could be made that this is where Weil
found what value she did in Nietzsche. His madman finds
God dead and blames man for killing him. Weil chooses to
believe, through decreation, that God is still present in
human beings, but not heeded (therefore, absent, not
dead). For Weil, refashioning our way of being in the
world requires attending to this residual divine
presence.
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Therefore there is nothing but a semblance of God,
relegated to the heaven of principles.11
Here again, the source of meaning formerly represented by
the symbol of God is no longer an actor in human reality.
Through the historical rebel's initial act, history, the
terrifying and wonderful story of human civilization, is
rendered incoherent.12 The historical rebel must re
create that meaning and may do so to whatever advantage
he pleases.
The issue in historical rebellion is not so much the
displacement of God (certainly a component), but the
rebel's claim to be able to read His mind.

With the

representatives of God no longer participating in making
human history, its meaning has been lost.

To recreate

that meaning, and to give that re-creation some validity,
the historical rebel must claim to understand history in
some coherent fashion, that is, in a way analogous to the
way God understands history.
If man is reduced to being nothing but a character
in history, he has no other choice but to subside
into the sound and fury of a completely irrational
history or to endow history with the form of human
reason. Therefore the history of contemporary
nihilism is nothing but a prolonged endeavor to give

11Camus, The Rebel. 120.
12Ibid., 71, Camus wrote that "[c]haos is also a
form of servitude."
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order, by human forces alone and simply by force, to
a history no longer endowed with order.13
Hegel's dialectic is the intellectual manifestation of
this attempt and Marx's dialectical materialism is the
more immediate political form it took.14

The

totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century all take
rewriting history as part of their task, justifying their
actions in the present in the name of fulfilling the
grand design of history.15 All manner of terror has
been rationalized by claiming to read the mind of God.
Historical rebellion bore bitter fruit.

"Cynicism, the

deification of history and of matter, individual terror
and state crime," Camus wrote, "spring armed to the
teeth, from the equivocal conception of a world that
entrusts to history alone the task of producing both
values and truth."16
Camus was not so concerned about the role of God in
the present as he was about the role the symbol God

13Ibid., 221.
14For the capacity of Hegel and Marx as historical
rebels, see ibid., 189-226.
15Excellent work has been done on the importance of
the critique of totalitarianism to the political thought
of both Weil and Camus. On Weil, see for example, Mary
Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine. 50-59. On
Camus, see Jeffrey Isaac, Arendt. Camus and Modern
Rebellion. 37-67.
16Camus, The Rebel. 146.
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played in the human past and what it meant to replace
that conception with a single or collective human will.
For her part, Weil believed the human presence bears the
divine presence and she was, therefore, more concerned
with the residual effects of God's presence.
Metaphysical rebellion sought to replace a God banished
from His universe with a human presence.

That presence

took the form of a state fancying itself an ersatz
divinity.

To similar effect, the historical rebel

sought to make up for that absence by creating a
surrogate God in the form of a state capable of
justifying its actions by its "comprehensive"
understanding of the historical past.

In

transformation of reality is absolute and

both cases, the
in both

cases,

the transformed reality is explained "rationally" to the
satisfaction of the many.

In both forms of rebellion,

the human capacity for reason, given free

play in a

universe where all previous relationships

and

understandings have been fundamentally altered or
destroyed, becomes the arbiter of the "sacred."17

In

this understanding, the sacred is secularized and what is
valued above all else is derived from the founding

17In this context, "sacred" means supremely valued.
While its spiritual component is preserved, any reference
to a specific religious sense of the term must be
omitted.
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principles of a Thousand Year Reich or a Communist
Revolution.18
The role of reason in absolutist forms of rebellion
is decisive to the countering strand of political thought
represented by Weil and Camus.

In the forms of absolute

rebellion the universe as it was known is torn down.

Its

contingent elements are renamed and their relationships
to one another are recast in terms intelligible to the
human mind.

Those elements which are not intelligible to

the mind are dismissed as superstition and ignored.19
The aspects of reality that make human beings human,
things like love, compassion, commitment to the
potentiality each human being represents, are ruled out
at the beginning.

All natural relationships can be

explained rationally or are deemed unworthy of
consideration.

18It is only fair to note that both Weil and Camus
identified these tendencies in the institutional orders
of the West where they were in a less advanced state of
decay. Each expressed a hope that the West's emphasis on
justice and freedom would derail the kind of absolutist
politics experienced in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany
and Fascist Italy.
See for instance Weil, "Cold War
Policy in 1939" in Selected Essays. 177-94 and Camus,
"Homage to an Exile" in Resistance. Rebellion and Death.
98-107.
19Camus identified these as "leaps" or "acts of
eluding." This is also the tendency that Weil resisted
by attempting to remain "intellectually rigorous."
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The modern "rational" project seemed to give human
beings absolute dominion over the natural world.

The

notion of human dominion over nature is one (not to say
the only) inheritance of the Enlightenment.20

In their

separate analyses, Weil and Camus each found this view of
reason to be fundamentally flawed.

The very things left

out of this rational conception of the world,
specifically human emotion and imagination, were actually
at work in this "rational" conception.

There was nothing

more simultaneously creative and rational than the
apparatus devised by the Nazis for the destruction of
European Jews during the Second World War.21

Yet the

impetus for devising that apparatus was emotional:
unchecked, irrational hatred.

raw,

The conception of reason

as devoid of emotional content characterized the
absolutist forms of rebellion that created the
destructive politics of the twentieth century.

This

"objective" and calculative form of reason is the precise
form of reason that the creative conception of politics
found in Weil and Camus seeks to overcome.22

20An argument of Nietzsche that Camus greatly
appreciated. See Camus, The Rebel. 65-80.
21See, for example, Bauman, Modernity and the
Holocaust and Rubinstein, The Cunning of History.
22The "calculative" nature of modern conceptions of
reason is given extended exposition in the work of Thomas
Spragens. See Spragens, The Ironv of Liberal Reason.
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The implication of this refashioning of the role of
reason in politics is twofold.

First, for both Weil and

Camus, "rational" entails the integration of reason and
the passions or imagination.
of an emotional content.
myth.

There is no reason devoid

Objectivity is a dangerous

The best that can be hoped for is Weil's

conception of the "impersonal" which makes a political
value of empathy.

Second, human beings are at least as

good as they are bad.

For the Christian Weil, human

beings are drawn to the worldly and thus away from the
good, but by nature each also houses a bit of the divine.
This divine component, nourished and encouraged, can
compel individual human beings to act in conformity with
the good ("consent").

For his part, Camus accepted that

human beings have as much capacity for good as for evil.
For Camus, too, the good must be fostered and then
persuaded to accept the limits of human action in the
world.

The integration of reason and imagination and the

acknowledgement that human beings are good as well as bad
represents an alternative to the "reason as a check on
the passions" model of politics.
The first step in reclaiming reason for a creative
politics was recognizing that the massive destruction
wrought by "rational" politics in the twentieth century
consumed enormous amounts of psychic and physical energy.
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The political thought derived from a comparison of Weil
and Camus poses a simple question:

Why can that energy

not also be harnessed into constructively creative
pursuits?

Neither Weil nor Camus believed that

destruction could be expunged from political being, but
both fervently hoped for the emergence of a new creative
perspective on political being as a counter and may be an
alternative to those destructive tendencies.
II.

The Response of Creative Politics

The creative conception of politics emergent in the
comparison of the political thought of Weil and Camus
tries to render the use of force and power, inevitable in
politics, more just.

For the two thinkers, the political

is inescapably the realm of power and force.

But while

political order is often seen in terms of its
institutions, Weil and Camus recognized the need to put a
human face back on political order.

Recognition of that

human face demanded the reconciliation of freedom and
justice.

The difficulty broached by their political

theory was, thus, devising a form of justice compatible
with a limited conception of freedom.

This limited

freedom consisted of the exercise of the force that each
human being brought to bear in interactions with
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others.23 The creative conception of politics, with its
emphasis on free creation and its limits, would encourage
the just exercise of power.

In creative political

action, the values of beauty, that is, order, proportion
and harmony, are the guides by which the justice present
in an order could be determined.
The exercise of individual force finds its limit in
the presence of the other.

The other's capacity to

exercise force determines the character of that exercise.
At the core of creative political existence is the
ability to recognize the other as an analog to the self.
In the realm of political action, human beings are not
predisposed to place the other before the self.

In

politics, encounters in which one person possesses
authority or power over another are common.24

As Weil

argued, a force or power possessed demands to be wielded.
It is the nature of power to want to replicate itself.
Human beings cannot, however, avoid wielding power in
certain situations, whether it is the power of a parent
over a child or an agent of the law over the citizen.

^ e i l wrote of this "small but real force" that
each human being may bring to bear on reality in her
essay on "Human Personality." See Weil, "Human
Personality," in Selected Essavs. 15.
Weil.
Weil:

24Nicely illustrated by Peter Winch in his work on
See especially the conclusion of Winch, Simone
The Just Balance.
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a free society, law and its institutional manifestations
can regulate the way power is wielded.

A society's legal

apparatus finds it difficult, however, to regulate the
character of the power possessed, that is, law cannot
anticipate new, extralegal forms the exercise of power
may take.

Weil and Camus believed the individual must

regulate this aspect of power.

In the conception of

creative politics, the way power is used can and must be
regulated by the self-governing individual.
ethical imperative of creativity.

This is the

The temptation to

wield the power without reference to the needs of the
other must be resisted.

Respecting this limit is the

difficulty of creative political action.
Neither Weil nor Camus undertook a systematic
discussion of creativity, but they found remarkably
similar ways to talk about it in relation to politics.
Both had occasion to consider the creative capacities of
human beings in their criticisms of modern working
conditions and each tied a conception of self-conscious
political participation to a discussion of the artist's
work.

From these discussions a general understanding of

creative politics can be derived.

Creativity in the

realm of politics values reflection and recognition of
the other as necessary preludes and correlates to action.
A creative politics is a politics of the possible.
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Political creativity involves imaginatively comprehending
political reality from a perspective beyond immediate
self-interest.

Action issues from a recognition of the

interconnectedness of human beings and of the limitations
of human being.

Politics is a communal undertaking.

Thus creative political actors are compelled to share
their response to political reality, to offer, not to
impose, a "solution” on others.

The perspectives of the

ruled are shared and acknowledged as valid for the
purposes of public discourse.

The result is the dialogue

and compromise undergirding the vision of politics Weil
and Camus shared.
Though in itself a political act, articulating the
creative encounter with political reality is only the
beginning of politics.

The creative form of political

action reconceives citizenship as a set of mutual
obligations.

This conception of political being counters

the egoistic style of politics and requires thoughtful,
responsible participation or citizenship.

Hostile to

prevailing forms of the collective, Weil and Camus each
acknowledged that human beings live in communities from
which they necessarily draw part of their identities.
Political acts are never solitary; they always take place
in a context of other people, of traditions, of mores, of
practices, of laws.

The creative conception of politics
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contributes to community-building by requiring civic
responsibility in the form of dialogue beyond immediate
and personal self-interest.
When speaking of the uses of political force or
power, "creative” means imaginative, but careful in
consideration and application.

In this conception, power

is more likely to be used to ends other than selfgratification, because creative political action begins
with recognition by the actor of belonging to a place and
to a community of others.

By compelling the citizen's

public articulation of his or her opinions, the creative
perspective seeks to bind the citizen's self-interest
inextricably to the interest of the place and the
community.

The solitary self is not a political self.

Harm done to the community, as in Weil's understanding of
crime, is done to the self.

In the form of citizenship

suggested by creative political action, the citizen must
recognize the principle of the interconnectedness of the
interests of the self and the community.
Weil and Camus each posited the political expression
of the creative artistic temperament as an antidote to
the power-driven destructiveness of modern politics.25
Authentic political order must be characterized by the

^See the discussion of Weil, Camus, art and
politics above in Chapter Three. See also Weil, The Need
for Roots. 216-218 and Camus, The Rebel. 253-278.
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just exercise of power.

This statement, however, means

very little without an adequate understanding of justice
and, for both Weil and Camus, a conception of justice
required a corollary notion of beauty.

In artistic

creation, beauty has its ineffable quality, but also
demands and manifests itself as order, proportion and
harmony.

The ineffable quality, call it "grace" in

either its vertically transcendent Weilian form or its
horizontally transcendent Camusian conception, is the
inevitable motivation of the creative act.

Beauty is a

quality in creation of seemingly self-evident order
discerned through the careful articulation of an
encounter with reality.

Beauty is never the last word,

but always another word in the larger work of creation.
Beauty brings order to disordered reality by restoring
proportion to that which seems not to possess it and a
harmony to the cacophony of noises which necessarily make
up reality.

Ordering the disordered with reference to

proportion and harmony not only suggests beauty, but also
justice, making this reconception of beauty attractive to
both Weil and Camus as a source of political value.
In politics, justice, like beauty, connotes order,
but not only order.

Twentieth century politics had seen

all manner of political "order."

Justice means an

equitable order in which, as Weil argued, no harm is done
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to human beings.26 Justice is an environment of
equitable distribution (proportion) in which each citizen
is recognized in his or her freedom as being limited only
by the freedom of others.

This is a freedom exercised in

full knowledge that disputes will arise, but be justly
resolved.

The assurance of just dispensation must be

rooted in the community's past.

Justice, therefore, also

required knowledge and respect for the traditions of the
community and similar knowledge or at least respect for
the traditions of other communities.

It is unclear how

disputes would be resolved among communities and between
citizens of one community and other communities, though
Camus briefly flirted with the idea of a kind of
democratic "world government" right after the war.27
The point is that in the creative conception, justice is
simultaneously an environment and a way of being in the
world.

Authentic political order requires a commitment

to justice in the form of care that equity is maintained
in all disputes.

This care is the "hard task" of

26Weil, "Are We Struggling for Justice?".
27Camus briefly proposed an international parliament
to pass and enforce international law. See Camus,
"International Democracy and Dictatorship," Combat. 27
November 1946, in Camus, Between Hell and Reason, 128130.
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political creativity.28 Like beauty, justice is not a
thing to be possessed, dispensed or achieved once and for
all.

Minimally, justice like art demands care, attention

to detail, mindfulness of the larger moral and political
environment, and an awareness of its own temporality.
The foregoing is a fairly generalized account of the
implications of the combined thought of Weil and Camus on
issues of creativity and politics.

The discussion is

suggested by two elements of the Weil-Camus intellectual
relationship:

first, Camus read and appreciated Weil's

work while keeping his patterns of thought distinct from
hers and second, both concerned themselves with the
relationship of the aesthetic to the political, she from
the perspective of the mystic philosopher and he from the
perspective of the artist.

But their writings considered

separately seem to exhibit differing expectations for the
creative perspective.

Weil believed creativity to be an

essential element in ruling, what she called the
"political art."

Camus perhaps had a deeper faith that

all human beings possessed the creative capacity and
should be encouraged in its exercise.

The differences

between them are differences in emphasis.

These

differences must be recognized, however, even if, when

28See Camus, "Justice and Freedom," Combat, 8
September 1944, in Between Hell and Reason. 52.
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taken together, they generate the larger perspective
depicted here:

that each thinker saw the creative

temperament as a means to rehumanize politics.
Weil's political art is a nearly Platonic conception
of the governance of those best-suited to govern.

In her

"Note on Social Democracy," she argues that just
government requires a governor to use imagination
effectively to counter the collective, less disciplined,
imagination of the ruled.

Governing successfully, that

is, justly, depends upon discerning the temperament of
the governed in order to know the limits within which the
governor can act.

The creative use of this "methodical

action" compels the governor to master the art of
anticipating and then seizing the right moment to act.
The seamlessness of the just exercise of political power
constitutes its beauty.

The order, proportion and

harmony of the just political order should appear
effortless.

The best rule is effective to the degree

that it preserves a just and equitable environment, while
also being didactic, that is, serving as an example to
the ruled of the way to exercise what political power one
possesses.
Camus's conception of "style" spoke more directly to
the members of a community.

A political order

encouraging the citizen to act in conformity with a
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vision of his or her role in the community was a just
order encouraging freedom.

The citizen's role in the

community was not an egoistic fantasy, but rather derived
from the individual's understanding of the style of the
community.

That style finds expression in the laws,

traditions, and mores of the community.

The need for

knowledge of the communal style, therefore, compels the
individual to be familiar with the laws, traditions and
mores of the community.

Communal style represents the

boundaries of authentic action in the community.

The

more immediate limits of political action are the other
inhabitants of the community.

Individual style is a

function of personality but also a function of the style
of the community.

Individual style explores its own

creativity while respecting the potentiality represented
by every other human being.

In Camus's vision, the

aggregation of the individual styles of the inhabitants
of a community flesh out the skeleton of communal style
represented by the laws, traditions and mores of a given
community.
Weil and Camus, then, are each articulating a style
of political being.

For Weil, the political art is a

style of rule to be practiced by those prepared to rule.
For Camus, the style of the citizen forms and is formed
by the style of the community.

Weil fashions a style of
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rule; Camus a style of membership and belonging.

Neither

necessarily contradicts the position of the other.
Weil's emphasis on education and her sense of justice as
an environment speak to her commitment to the creative
possibilities within each human being.

Similarly,

Camus's conception of style would certainly be reflected
in a style of rule seen as a product of a given political
environment.

But Weil sees political authenticity

flowing from the top down while Camus sees political
authenticity generated from the ground up.

The source of

these differences are easy enough to discern.

Weil's

belief in an otherworldly divine means that human beings
must learn through a grace bestowed through decreation.
Camus's refusal of an otherworldly grace leaves him only
the belief in the human potentiality for good as the
source of authentic political participation.
III.

Creative Politics:

Recognition of the Other

Putting a human face on politics means returning the
human form to the center of the conception of politics.
In the creative perspective articulated here, politics is
only secondarily about the relationships between
governing institutions.

The institutional articulation

of order becomes more or less permanent, but it is not
good for all times and all situations.

Institutions are

to be seen as reflections of the collective values of the
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inhabitants of a community (rootedness) which may change
subtly over time.29 The relative fluidity of
institutional order must have its counter in something
that is permanent and more or less unchanging.

For both

Weil and Camus, this something is the human presence that
transcends borders and governing forms.

The first

function of political order must be the preservation of
human potentialities.

Politics must be fundamentally

about ethics, that is, about the interaction of human
beings with each other.

The just community becomes the

space of creative freedom wherein authentic interaction
takes place and equitable order is maintained in spite of
inevitable differences among people.
Two attributes of the modern political environment
alienated human beings from their appreciation of the
other as a human presence.

First, reliance on

institutional forms of social arrangement alienated human
beings from each other, their tasks and obligations.
This critical insight reflects the residual appeal of
Marx for both Weil and Camus.

The "rational" arrangement

of human society turned out to be the dehumanizing
arrangement of human society.

The second alienating

^Both thinkers believed preserving a society's
story to be very important. For Weil the story is a
critical part of "rootedness." Camus demonstrates the
need in The Plaque, at the very least a "chronicle" of
evil.
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component was related to the first:
absolutizing form of reason.

reliance on an

Mastering the uncertainty

of nature by imposing seemingly rational structures upon
it was one manifestation of this reliance.

Another

perhaps more critical manifestation was the subsidiary
belief that human reason could so master reality only by
holding the passions in check.

The post-Enlightenment

orientation to reason had not held the passions in check.
Instead, the passions were sublimated, creating an
anxiety about the contaminating presence of emotion and
imagination in problem-solving.

As Nietzsche predicted,

this denial of passion or instinct in favor of reason was
a denial of a critical part of human being.

Weil and

Camus each recognized that the repression of passion
generated violently destructive forms of "reason."

The

excessively "rational" post-Enlightenment form of knowing
exiled human beings from their passionate, creative,
constructive natures.

The absolutizing form of reason

ruled out the discernment of beauty in the world and in
others and, in so doing, rendered human knowledge a cruel
parody of human experience.
A creatively constructive politics can only occur in
a context made up of whole human beings.

The human being

produced by the twentieth century was homeless, that is,
a fragmented personality without a spiritual or physical
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place.

The conception of creative politics may be read

as an attempt to make human existence whole through
politics.

The temperament required for creative

political existence engaged and valued natural beauty,
discerned order, harmony and proportion in nature and
tried to apply these values to ethical and political
interactions with other human beings.
Weil and Camus agree in principle.

On these points,

The pictures of the

political actor that emerge from their separate analyses,
however, are significantly different.

Here as earlier it

is perhaps more valuable to read these differences as
complementary rather than exclusive.

Together they may

yield a more complete picture of the sensibility of the
creative political actor.
Weil's is an intimate conception of political
interaction.

She makes empathy a decisive ethical value.

She valued entering into the experience of the other,
particularly taking on the suffering of the other.30
This affinity for the suffering of the other, in fact,
hastened her premature death.31

Weil values a distance

30See especially Weil, "Human Personality," in
Selected Essays. 9-34.
31Hospitalized with tuberculosis, Weil refused to
take more nourishment than the starving in occupied areas
of Europe were receiving. On her death certificate, this
refusal to take proper nourishment is listed as the cause
of death. See Petrement, Simone Weil: A Life.
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on the self (the "impersonal") as requisite to entering
into the suffering of another.

The ethical actor must be

free of all self-interest except as it is understood as
being bound up in the well-being of the other.

For Weil,

only this distance on the self creates the possibility of
the intimate spiritual interaction with the other that
must characterize human existence.
is not wholly interpersonal.

Even this interaction

There is always the

presence of a third, the divine presence.

Acting on the

impersonal is acting on the divine within, the residue of
decreation, and bringing that divine to the encounter.32
It may or may not elicit a similar response from the
other, but it is an ethical imperative to respond to
suffering this way.
The creative component of this response is its form,
which calls for discerning the source of the suffering
and addressing it in a way that will not dehumanize the
sufferer even further.

The creative effort is to bring

the other into fellowship with the actor, to reintegrate
the other into the community.

Beauty is to be found in

the possibilities of even the most destitute sufferer and
there is beauty to be created in acting justly toward the
afflicted.

There is beauty in constructively acting on

32This is the ethical value of Weil's religious
discussions. See for example, Weil, Waiting for God.
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suffering in the presence of the divine.

In the just

community this individual ethical imperative, this
commitment to the possibilities within the afflicted
other, is the primary political value.

The value of

empathy colors the self-understanding of this community,
the structures of this community, and all exercise of
political power within the community.
Weil's platonic conception of the "political art" is
as a style of rule, but the ruler is to govern an ethical
society valuing empathy and intimacy.

Camus longs for

the kind of community that Weil seeks to create; this may
be the source of his affinity for her work.

He has a

general conception of political order in which each finds
a style of membership.

He too hopes for a society in

which each member acts on empathy.

Camus as political

actor, however, fears this kind of intimacy and is not
sure that politics can ever be this kind of intimate
interaction.

The hunger for power and the willingness to

manipulate others is too ingrained in the human being.
Moreover, for Camus, there is no divine to act as an
ethical mediator.

There is no "third" party to mediate

our relationships to others.

Camus must rely on human

beings and he had far too much interaction with them to
trust them with the kind of intimacy Weil seeks.

As a

result, he is most comfortable above the fray of
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politics, but knows that this perspective is not
conducive to the formation of community.
There is much more than fear or distrust to Camus's
more distant conception of political action.

In a

crisis, specifically in the crisis of modern politics,
someone must remain above the fray.

The distance on the

self that Weil posits as necessary would appeal to Camus
as an antidote to the tendency to "eluding."

Someone

must be able to see the political landscape for what it
is, be able to maintain a critical distance.

That

someone must also be solitary/ a Cassandra with a voice
but without a home in the community.33 Camus recognized
politics as a collective activity, but remained deeply
suspicious of all collective activity.

The exception had

been the Resistance experience, but even that led to his
support of the purges, an error in judgement for which he
seems never to have forgiven himself.

But the role of

clearsighted seer is necessary to political order and
Camus indicates that in order for a human community to
survive, someone must accept the role of solitary
observer.

Camus embraced this role without accepting the

inevitability of the homelessness it seemed to entail.
He recognized the artist as a likely candidate for the

33Camus often considered himself Cassandra,
particularly in his essays on Algeria. See Camus,
Resistance. Rebellion and Death.
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role.

But perspective must provide insight without

exile.

Camus's conception of the artist as an image of

the political actor was intended to overcome the distance
between the artist and the world, between the observer
and the fray.
The observer's solitude is part but not all of an
adequate conception of political action for Camus.

All

other members of the community have something to learn
from the solitary observer (artist). The observer knows
the political landscape through careful observation.

The

artist or observer gives form or a reading to that
landscape by articulating it.

Though that reading is not

always readily understandable, it is articulate and may
be discerned with effort.
artist:

This is the value of the

the articulation means different things to

different people and thus encourages conversation.

The

articulation is never complete and always demands another
effort.

This renewal of the effort requires maintaining

some perspective on the awful intimacy of politics.
Members of a political community must respect
perspective, while acknowledging the impossibility of
permanently living at that distance.

A community in

which everyone is above the fray is not a community
worthy of the name.

Camus valued a balance between an
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observer's perspective on the nature of things and the
need for a community, a home.
The optimum way of being in the creative perspective
on politics probably lies somewhere between Camus's
solitary observer and Weil's intimate empath.

Together,

however, the two give us a picture of what the creative
might mean to political existence.

Primary is the

recognition that despite all its icy order, modern
politics damaged human beings by destroying the
possibility of real intimacy among human beings.

Like

Weil, Camus, too, longed for fellowship among human
beings.

He feared, as in The Plaque, that such

fellowship and cooperation was only possible in
extraordinary circumstances and for brief periods of
time.

The aspiration of both was to reveal that the

twentieth century was just such an extraordinary time and
represented the opportunity for a reorientation of
political being.
As a theoretical position, creative political being
relies on the creative individual to transform politics.
Its strength is in this general empowerment of the
individual, which frees the actor to act while demanding
personal responsibility for the consequences of creative
acts.

Weil hoped to transform the all too human

expectation of good into an ethic productive of a just
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environment.

Camus regarded the good as a necessarily

human creation and believed that acts could be judged
based on how well they resonated with an immanent
conception of the good.

Both thinkers judged the good

discernable in the world as beauty and justice, that is
as the order, proportion and harmony evident and possible
in the natural world.
The weakness of creative political being is this
excessive reliance on the individual.

Much of political

theory begins from the presupposition that human beings
are motivated by either self-interest, passion, desire or
the need for self-preservation.

Weil and Camus

recognized the limited truth of these presuppositions.
The temptation to the "selfish" in human behavior is the
motivation for Weil's conception of the impersonal, the
distance on the self that necessarily precedes all
ethical action.

Camus posits the artist's temperament as

a similar device that allows the emergence of a style in
the context of other styles.

Not everyone can be

expected to observe these limitations in all situations
at all times.

Human beings act out of some form of self-

interest and in community this tendency will create
conflict.

Neither Weil nor Camus deny that conflict is

an inevitable component of political life.

The question

is, what does the creative perspective say to conflict?
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The peaceful functioning of a just political order
requires some allowance for the resolution of conflict.
In a conception of politics relying on the creative
action of individuals, the absence of a conflictresolution mechanism could be a substantial weakness.
This is the point at which the creative perspective
concedes that political order demands institutions.

Weil

and Camus were suspicious of institutional order and
speak of it only vaguely in terms of the characteristics
it should exhibit:

it should have the highest regard for

law; it should be grounded in the community's past? and
it should be flexible enough to meet the changing
circumstances of the future without compromising the
community's conception of itself.

This general vision of

political order hardly suffices for a blueprint.

Their

embrace of the need for political institutions is a
recognition of weakness in human beings and consequently
of politics as a human activity characterized by
conflict.

The value of the creative perspective in

regard to conflict is that it does not seek to resolve
conflicts once and for all.

In fact, it may be its

central value that it attempts to derive a political way
of being in the world that preserves conflicts as
tensions representing the ambiguities of human existence,
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the distortions of the order of nature that make up our
perceptions.
Unlike absolutist rebellion, creative political
being does not claim to resolve the tensions of existence
by dissolving those tensions into a particularized
imaginary unity that must then be imposed on political
reality.

In the creative way of being, legitimate

tensions that have come into conflict may be temporarily
resolved, that is, a compromise or agreement may be
reached, but particular decisions are not then
transformed into universal truths.34

In ideal

circumstances, the decisions will be viewed as just, that
is, as congruent with the good, but the essential tension
between two competing perspectives will be preserved.
That is, the "losing" position will be recognized as
legitimate in spite of the decision.

The preservation of

the tension requires the creativity to derive a
resolution to the conflict between two legitimate
positions and the discipline to understand that a
resolution is not the final word on a given problem.

It

also requires patience with the resulting healthy
fluidity of human political existence.

^Both thinkers had high regard for the role of
basic tensions as depicted in Sophoclean tragedy. See
Weil, "Antigone," in Intimations of Christianity. 18-23
and Camus, "On the Future of Tragedy," in Lyrical and
Critical Essays. 295-310.
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The creative perspective, by valuing the tensions of
political existence, seeks to preserve the tensions while
simultaneously offering resolutions to local conflicts.
Here the value of the artistic sensibility reemerges.

As

in artistic creation, the articulation of the tensions in
political existence requires choosing a medium, a mode of
expression.

The medium is a self-consciously chosen mode

of communication.

To the degree that it is successful,

the use of the medium, what it expresses and how it
expresses it, represents the creation of a common ground
between hitherto distinct positions or realities.
common ground is essential to conversation:

This

in art, it

may be a commonly-shared idea of the water lily; in
politics, it may be a commonly-shared idea of the
importance of equity.

On that common ground,

conversation may occur which, in ’'real11 political life,
can result in the mediation of disputes.

Each

articulation is temporary and the opposing positions are
only suggestions, but they are also important gestures, a
reaching out from a place of reflection and careful
consideration.

It was

was thinking about

when she wrote that "politics cannot

but be as muchin need
and science."35

thiskind of politics that Weil

of creative invention as are art

It was

alsothis kind of politics Camus

35Weil, The Need for Roots. 218.
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envisioned when he wrote that "our proudest duty is to
defend personally to the very end, against the impulse
toward coercion and death, the freedom of [the emerging
political] culture— in other words, the freedom of work
and creation."36
IV. Concluding Remarks:

Creativity and Political Thought

Simone Weil and Albert Camus, from their differing
perspectives, proposed a reorientation to political being
that here has been called "creativity."

Implicit in this

reorientation is a distrust of the traditional ways of
doing and thinking about political business.

This

implication is confirmed by their use of categories of
thought not ordinarily associated with politics.

They

were concerned with freedom and justice, traditional
categories in their own right, but not before redefining
them.

While their insights on the problem of freedom and

justice contribute to the ancient dialogue among
political thinkers, neither Weil nor Camus is a
systematic or traditional political theorist and the
categories they bring to the discussion are necessarily
different.

"Rootedness," "style," and "empathy" are not

traditional categories of political thought.

Indeed, the

body of political thought emergent in this comparison

^Camus, "Kadar Had His Day of Fear," in Resistance
Rebellion and Death. 164.
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moves among and between traditions of political thought.
Like all thinkers, their thought was a product of the
interaction between their interests, educations and
experiences.

The result of this confluence is political

theory from the perspective of the religious philosopher,
concerned with grace, compassion and life seeking the
divine on the one hand, and the artist, concerned with
beauty, order and the creative expression of reality on
the other.

From these different perspectives emerges a

political theory valuing human dignity before the usual
institutional components of political order.
All this is not to say that the political theory
which emerges from the comparison is not shaped by
traditional political concerns.

To the contrary, they

may be called political thinkers precisely because they
seriously engaged matters normally associated with social
and political theory.

A series of observations can

illustrate the point:

Each was concerned with the

objectification of the modern human being in the
workplace and in politics.

As a response, Weil and Camus

sought to empower the individual.

Rosen suggests that in

so doing they are drawing upon the tradition of radical
individualism associated with French Revolution-era
thought.37

They did embrace a language of individual

37Rosen, "Marxism, Mysticism and Liberty."
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freedom, but always grounded it in an understanding of
the human need for community as home.

Witnesses to the

power of collectivities to pose as home, both thinkers
utterly rejected Robespierre's idolization of the state
as the ultimate guarantor of freedom and the cult of
personality on which he based the state's legitimacy.
Similarly, Weil and Camus insisted upon respect for human
dignity and so drew upon the concerns of modern
liberalism, but they rejected the laissez-faire economic
stance that usually accompanies that position.

In the

critical realm of economics, they conceded the need for a
form of the state reconceived as a "vital medium."

Both

thinkers preferred a humane form of socialism to either
liberal capitalism or the absolutist form of socialism
that had taken the name Soviet Communism.

Finally, each

viewed tradition and ritual as necessary expressions of
civilizational meaning, but conceived that meaning as
organic and emergent not as something static in a Burkean
past.

Even as they drew upon them, however, Weil and

Camus found the traditional categories of political
theory tragically inadequate.

The modern conception of

"rational" politics would not be enough to overcome the
destruction of the first half of the twentieth century.
By opening political inquiry to questions of creativity,
legitimate political order might be made to consider what
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Weil called the needs of the soul, needs like rootedness,
free expression and love.
Creative political being, then, is a reconception of
political existence intent on reinvigorating the pursuit
of justice while imposing perceptible and acceptable
limits on human freedom.

As a mode of political being,

creativity encourages the development of the human
intellect and creative capacity while engendering respect
for human life and regard for the mores and traditions of
a community.

This reconception of political existence

was self-consciously intended to counter the dehumanizing
tendencies Weil and Camus each perceived in twentieth
century politics.

Both thinkers used the creative

political actor as an image of the ideal.

Neither

envisioned a civilization of artists and artisans, but
both thought that the temperament engendered by a
commitment to creativity could transform the destructive
politics of the twentieth century into a more
constructive form.
The impulse to think of politics in terms of
creativity reflects the two thinkers' education in a
decidedly neo-Platonic French intellectual tradition.
Their shared concern with discerning and valuing beauty
in the conduct of social and political life finds its
roots in a line of western thought running from ancient
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Greece through Plotinus to Nietzsche and Bergson.

From

Plotinus came the desire for union with the One,
exhibited in the beauty of the divine (or, for Camus,
nature).

In this perspective, creativity supplemented

the intellect as an avenue of access or recognition of
the transcendent.

Clearly, the mystical component is

stronger in Weil's thought, but both thinkers worked from
the Plotinian presumption of the interconnectedness of
all existence.

Like Nietzsche and Bergson, their

emphasis on creativity was intended as a counter to the
modern overreliance on a certain form of reason.

More

significantly, perhaps, the creativity implicit in the
political thought of Weil and Camus entails recognition
of a limit that both attribute to the influence of
ancient Greece.
The difference between the modern European and the
ancient Greek, Camus wrote, is that "we have exiled
beauty; the Greeks took arms for it."38

The

contemporary exile of beauty derives from the modern
tendency to dismiss or destroy all in nature that is not
extolled.

The consequence is that modern civilization is

a civilization of extremes.

The Greeks distrusted

extremes, choosing instead a moderation in which all were

38Albert Camus, "Helen's Exile," in Lyrical and
Critical Essays. 148.
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given a hearing.

Modern humanity extols one thing:

"a

future world in which reason will reign supreme."39 The
need for a life without limits yielded a civilization
more willing and able to destroy than to create.

What is

to be recovered, in the view shared by Weil and Camus, is
the need, the capacity to create without destroying.
Authentic creativity reaches its limit on the point of
destroying nature (human or otherwise).

In politics,

both Weil and Camus believed, justice should be the
object of such a creativity of limits.

"The Greeks,"

Weil wrote, "defined justice admirably as mutual
consent."40 The justice of the Greeks, Weil thought,
found its limit in the agreement of others.
contention found echo in Camus.

Her

Equity for the Greeks,

Camus wrote, "supposed a limit, while our whole continent
is convulsed by the quest for a justice we see as
absolute."41

The twentieth century vividly illustrated

that only madness and power are needed to destroy.

Real

genius, a genuine creativity respectful of limits, would
be required to (re-)build a civilization nearly
destroyed.

39Ibid., 149.
40Weil, "Are We Struggling for Justice?", 1.
41Camus, "Helen's Exile," 149.
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Far from encouraging a licentious individualism,
then, the idea of creativity found in the political
thought of Weil and Camus was an attempt to reconcile
human freedom with the limits and complexities of life
lived in community.

The terms in which they write,

"rootedness,” "style," even "beauty," are not the terms
of traditional political theory.

But the politics of the

twentieth century revealed the emptiness and inadequacy
of the terms of modern political discourse.

What was

required in the aftermath of Auschwitz and Hiroshima was
a new vocabulary.

This analysis of the political thought

of Simone Weil and Albert Camus reveals their shared
belief that part of that vocabulary was already
available.
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